The World and the Individual in Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy

·期刊原文
The World and the Individual in Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
By Yoshifumi Ueda[a]
Philosophy East & West
V. 14 (1964)
pp. 157-166
Copyright 1964 by University of Hawaii Press

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p.157

I. THE FUNDAMENTAL WAY OF THINKING IN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
THERE IS A UNIQUE WAY OF THINKING in Buddhist philosophy which is not found in any other philosophy. Since in early Buddhism this unique way of thinking existed in an immature, naive form[1] whose special characteristic was not dearly distinguishable, it was open to several differing interpretations. Consequently, it was difficult to determine which among the various interpretations was the correct one. It was in Mahaayaana Buddhism that this way of thinking appeared in a form clear enough not to allow differing interpretations. From the Praj~naapaaramitaa Suutras, through the Maadhyamika, the Yogaacaara, and Zen,[b] to the Shin[c] Buddhism of Shinran,[d] who expounded faith in Amida Buddha, all Maahaayana Buddhist philosophies, with the exception of a few,[2] have followed this way of thinking. Since they follow this way of thinking, they belong to the Mahaayaana tradition. If one should take away this way of thinking, it would not be an overstatement to say that the whole point of view had thereby lost its essence as Mahaayaana Buddhist philosophy. To say that almost all Mahaayaana Buddhist philosophies follow this way of thinking means that they have all originated in or have been derived from one and the same concept of reality-body (dharmakaaya).[3]

If Aristotelian logic is meant by the word "logic," this Buddhist way of thinking will probably not be considered logical. However, this is clearly one way of thinking, and, if we should wish to include in the broad meaning

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of "philosophy" a way of thinking that is unique to Asian peoples, then we must recognize a type of logic that is non-Aristotelian. Perhaps we need not necessarily call it "logic." It is simply that, should we not recognize that we have here a unique way of thinking and should we immediately decide that its propositions are not valid simply because they go against Aristotelian logic, it would be impossible to understand Buddhist philosophy. This way of thinking is truly difficult to understand for those who have been trained in philosophies which base their thinking upon Aristotelian logic. And, since we shall follow this way of thinking in our consideration of the problem, "The World and the Individual," we must consider here why Buddhist philosophers had to develop this way of thinking.

The focus of the problems pursued by Buddhist philosophers has been our true self. They pursued the true self to its limits and were finally able to realize it through a unique experience. This way of thinking was born within that experience. It goes without saying that most people and many philosophies think it is possible to know ourselves-through self-reflection. However, if we consider this very carefully, we will see that the self grasped through reflection is a conceptualized self and that our true selves, i.e., the self as it really is, can never be grasped through reflection. Those philosophies which think it is possible to cognize the self through reflection establish self-cognition on an assumption. The problem is whether or not that assumption may be permitted. One of the leading philosophers of Japan during the first half of this century, Seiichi Hatano,[e] had the following to say concerning self-cognition.[4]

Parallel to the cognition of the objective world, the subject also knows itself. As is stated above, objects are expressions of the subject and contain the factor of selfhood which is disclosed in them. The subject does not express itself except as object or in objects. This is the reason why the subject can know its own self. When the objects, that is, the expressions of the subject, become the symbols of the subject: that is, when the subject gets acquainted with its own self, and the hidden self or the center of the knowing act and the disclosed self or the known self are separated and opposed and, at the same time, maintain or realize their identity, the subject knows itself. . . .

Of course, while we talk and think in this manner, we are obliged to stand at the level of reflection. And while distinguishing the factor of the life of experience, i.e., of real existence, from that of reflection, i.e., of ideal content, we establish a relationship of the two. So the former, i.e., the real existence, may also be introduced into the

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content of conceptual cognition. This is, however, the very difficulty one must face when he seeks for the source of experience. But it is a problem which one can no longer solve at the level of reflection. It is the very basic fact of life and there is no other way than to be in it and to live through it. A closer observation will show us that, as we have seen in the cognition of the self, all the difficulties in identifying the hidden, really existing subject with the disclosed, ideal subject belong, after all, to the same category. They may all equally be reduced to what we call the transcendental identity of the subject. It is the identity of the subject of basic experience and that of reflection, in other words, the identity of the really existing subject and the subject which is expressed in reference to concepts in their objective phase. That is, it is the identity of the cognizing subject [really existing subject] and the subject which is cognized (ideal, conceptual subject). Thus as this identity is primarily assumed as a prerequisite of reflection, it is not a matter of comprehension, but is a basic fact of life that should be experienced as we live through it.

The attitude expressed in Hatano's consideration of the problem is sound, and a penetrating insight faithful to the facts is advanced. As long as we take the standpoint of reflection, we cannot help but come to the same conclusion as Hatano. However, if we look at the problem from the standpoint of Buddhist philosophy, we can ascertain whether or not "this identity ... assumed as a prerequisite of reflection" can be established. The reason we can do so is that Buddhist philosophers have succeeded in "knowing" the really existing subject without transformation into an ideal, conceptual content, and, since they were able to cognize the true self, they were able to know just what constituted the identity between the subject which knows and the subject which is known in the self-cognition of the true self.

What is the nature of this identity between the subject which knows and the subject which is known in the self-cognition of the true self? In the self-cognition of the true self, since the really existing subject knows itself, what knows and what is known are both the same real self--they are completely one and the same. Nevertheless, since the act of knowing is thereby established, the differentiation of the knower and the known must be established within this one and the same subject. The fact that there is one and the same self and at the same time that there is the differentiation of the knower and the known is a logical contradiction, but, in order to establish the self-cognition of the true self, such a contradictory relationship must be capable of establishment. Buddhist philosophers put their greatest effort and endeavor into establishing in reality this kind of experience, and into finding a way of thinking through which this experience can be expressed. When Asa^nga and Vasubandhu spoke of differentiation of non-differentiation i.e., the subsequently realized wisdom (tat-p.r.s.tha-labdha-j~naana) , and when Pai-chang

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Huai-hai[f] said, "Awaking to the Here-Now," it was of the experience of the realization of the true, real self. Naagaarjuna's "highest wisdom" (praj~naa-paaramitaa) is nothing other than this experience. This experience is established when there is no differentiation of subject and object, i.e., when one has gone through the experience of non-differentiation (nirvikalpa). What is realized in this non-differentiated experience is called "fundamental wisdom" (muula- j~naana).[5] When this fundamental wisdom develops further and the differentiation of the knower and the known arises, though without losing its non-differentiation, the realization of the true self is established. This is what Asa^nga called "the subsequently realized wisdom."

Since this simultaneous relationship between the non-differentiation and the differentiation of the knower and the known is logically contradictory, it is completely different in nature from that identity which had to be assumed as a prerequisite of self-cognition from the standpoint of reflection. When it is seen that this non-differentiation must be a complex structure which includes contradiction, it can be seen that the identity necessarily assumed as a prerequisite of self-cognition from the standpoint of reflection is not a true one. In other words, the identity between the ideal, conceptual subject and the really existing subject (known through reflection) cannot be established, and it is dear that the former (the ideal, conceptual subject) does not manifest the latter (the really existing subject).

"Praj~naa" (the term Naagaarjuna uses), or "the subsequently realized wisdom" (Asa^nga's and Vasubandhu's expression), is the wisdom established upon pursuing and realizing the true self. In this wisdom, one can know, not only the really existing self as it is, but also each thing in the world as it really is. This is because, when one realizes the real self, one at the same time touches reality itself; to know the real self means, at the same time, to know reality. A thing known as it really exists is nothing other than reality known as it is. To know reality can be nothing other than to know ourselves and all the things in the world as they really exist and become. In this manner, the wisdom that can know the real self can also know everything in the world as it really exists and really becomes, i.e., it can know things completely objectively. We shall consider this more in detail in the following.

In the self-cognition of the self, the knower and the known are the same self, i.e., the same subject. Herein there is only the subject; there is no object. With this meaning, it is subject-only (uijr~naanamaatra).[6] This subject-only has

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a twofold structure. That is, it has the aspect of the differentiation of the knower and the known, i.e., the affirmation of the subject and the negation of the object, and it has the aspect of the non-differentiation or identity of the knower and the known. Although subject-only shows that it is not an object, i.e., the known, if it were simply a subject, there would not be the least meaning of "the known." If this were the case, since there would be the meaning of a knowing subject only and no meaning of a known subject, it could not be said that the self knows the self. How can the meaning of a known subject be included in subject-only? It is the other aspect of subject-only, i.e., it is nothing other than the known which is included in the non-differentiation of the knower and the known. However, since this known is identified with the knower, its meaning is not completely manifest. In order to manifest completely the meaning of this known, it must be made clear that it is not the knower---in other words, there must be the negation of the knower. Accordingly, since the knower is truly the self, or the subject, the negation of the knower is non-self, or non-subject, i.e., the object. In this manner, in order that the meaning of the known, which is included in subject-only, may be completely manifest, the object must be affirmed and the subject negated. That is, object-only must be established. Only in this manner can the true self first be known as it really exists, i.e., become the known. This is the reason that Vasubandhu said subject-only (vij~naanamaatra) is non-subject (=no-mind=acitta).[7] That subject-only is object-only he expressed as "subject seen as things in the world" (artha-pratibhaasa^m-vij~naanam).[8] No-mind has the same meaning as non-self (anaatman).

As to the meaning of object-only, although it means that the true self is known, it is nothing other than reality being known. And reality is not merely the self; it is all things in the world. Object-only means that, besides all things in the world, there is no subject opposed to them. And yet the fact that this thing is an object shows that this is that which is known. Accordingly, that the subject knows all things becomes the relation of all things (reality) as they are known by themselves. Here, the identity of the knower with the known is included. It is not that the subject is existent outside the object and sees it as an object. Rather, the subject, being non-existent other than as an object, knows all things. The subject, as it were, being non-existent, sees the object. This is nothing other than being free of all subjective and

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partial views and seeing things just as they are. Seeing the self as it is is not different from seeing things as they are; neither is it anything other than seeing reality as it is. It is only because the self is the knower and things are not the knower that knowing the self as it is is called "subject-only" and that things known as they are are called "object-only." However, since the self as reality is no different from things, subject-only simultaneously includes the meaning of object-only. And, since the self as reality is the knower, the identity of the knower and the known is included in the fact of things being known. Accordingly, if there is no subject-only, object-only cannot be established, either.

Subject-only, i.e., non-self, is nothing other than the true self, which has cognized itself. At the same time, it cognizes the world just as it is (object-only). And, on the other hand, in order that things in the world can be known just as each is or becomes (object-only), subject-only, i.e., the non-existence of the object, must be established, too. This is the meaning of Seng-chao's[g] "All things in the world, though real, are formless,"[9] and Zen's "To see the form of the formless." The true self is non-self, and things as they really are are formless forms. The so-called fourfold consideration of Rinzai (Lin-chi,[h] died 867), a famous Zen Master, shows this subject-only and object-only in four phrases:

(i) Object only
(ii) Subject only
(iii) Both subject and object negated
(iv) Both subject and object affirmed

The true self is this kind of subject, and really existing things are this kind of object. When one knows the self and the things in the world in this unique way, one knows tathataa (suchness). Tathataa has many synonyms: `Suunyataa (emptiness), animittam (the formless), dharmataa (things as they really are), bhuutako.ti.h (extent of reality), paramaarthataa (objects as known in supreme wisdom), dharmadhaatu.h (realm of things as they really are).[10] In addition to these, the following, which were previously given, are also synonyms: vij~naana (=vij~naapti)-maatrataa or =cittamaatrataa (subject-only or mind-only) and acitta (no-mind).

One of the greatest Buddhist philosophers of Japan, Doogen,[i] had the following to say. "To study Buddhism is to study oneself. To study oneself is to

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forget oneself. To forget oneself is to realize oneself as all things [in the world]. To realize oneself as all things is to strip off both one's own mind and body and the mind and body of others."[11] Here, what was said before--that Buddhist philosophy began with the problem of knowing one's true self, that the self-cognition of one's true self (subject-only) is non-self, that this is object-only, and that this is freedom--is expounded in a way different from that of Rinzai and in a clearer manner. The first original philosopher to be respected as such after the transplantation of Western philosophy into Japan and whose name is known even in other countries is Kitaroo Nishida.[j] That his thought has something in common with the foregoing thought of Buddhist philosophy can be seen in his words: "Our true self is the basic substance of the universe, and, when we know the true self we not only unite with the good of mankind, but we merge with the basic substance of the universe and spiritually unite with the divine mind."[12]

That an individual knows his true self means that the universe awakens to itself from itself. The individual's self-cognition is not simply a phenomenon in the consciousness of an individual, but indeed a fact of the universe. When he knows things in the world, it is not merely the individual himself who knows, but the universe; and, when things are known by him, the universe knows itself from within itself. When he knows things, this brings about the self-awakening of the universe from within itself, and this is nothing other than the development and growth of the universe. It is the becoming of the universe.

We have pursued in the foregoing the fundamental way of thinking in Buddhist philosophy. All the problems of Mahaayaana Buddhist philosophy are considered on this base, so that one cannot consider other problems without touching upon it. As we have seen in the foregoing, the relationship between the knower and the known is not simply an epistemological problem but is fundamentally a metaphysical one. "To be" and "to know" cannot be discussed apart from each other. (And, as hinted at the end of the last paragraph, "to be" and "to become" cannot be considered apart from each other.) Next, let us consider the relationship of the individual and the world from the aspect of the relationship between the one and the many.

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II. THE ONE AND THE MANY
In Buddhist philosophy, the logic of the relationship between the individual and the world is grasped as the relationship in which "the one enters the many and the many enter the one" (one is one and not many, many are many and not one, and yet at the same time the one is identical with the many, and the many are identical with the one[13]). The one and the many are in a mutually negating opposition at the same time as they are one and the same. This is a case of differentiation of non-differentiation. But why is the relationship between the individual and the world like this? First, the individual, because he is born, lives, and dies in the world, is completely within the world. That the individual is established within the world as a historical product is because the one enters into the world as the many. Second, however, at the same time, the historical world is being built by the creative power emanating from the individual. The world exists, not only as an object seen by the individual, but, at the same time, as something being created by each individual it is in the process of becoming. The individual is not simply a seer, but also an actor. As something being created by this actor, the many are included in the one. This is stated as "the many enter into the one." The individual and the-world are mutually created by each other.

That this relationship is established is due to the facts that the individual is not simply one among many but is also the one as a negation of the many, and that the many are not simply a collection of ones but are the many as a negation of the one. To say that the individual is not simply one among many but is the negation of the many means that the individual is the subject. An individual viewed as a speck in society is an objectified individual. A man can survey a society which is made up of many people as an object. In what respect is this man different from the others in this situation? It is due, of course, to the fact that he is a subject who is seeing and creating the society. When he is subject, all the other persons are object; he alone is affirmed as subject, and all the others are negated. This is the aspect in which the many enter into the one, or it is the one as a negation of the many. This one is an affirmed self or the aspect of the existence of the subject, and the aspect of the non-existence of society or the historical world.

To say that the many are not simply a collection of ones but are the many as a negation of the one means that society is established with the negation of the individual. Each individual has to give up his own welfare when the

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welfare of his whole society requires it. This is the aspect in which the one enters the many, or it is the many as a negation of the one. This one is a negated self or the aspect of the non-existence of the subject (anaatman, non-self), and the aspect of the existence of the society or the historical world.

The Buddhist philosopher who made the framework of this mutual relationship of the one and the many dearest is Fa-tsang[k] (643-712) of the Hua-yen[l] school. He calls this the relationship of mutually becoming a lord and vassals.[14] In the aspect in which the many enter the one, each individual is, respectively, the center of the universe. When individual A is the lord, all other individuals, and Nature, or the whole world, are the vassals. At the same time, A, with respect to B or C, is a vassal. All individuals are at the same time lords and vassals. In this situation, the world of the many does not refer only to the assembly of men, with Nature unconsidered. There is no thought of a realm of matter severed from spirit or life. The concept of a body separated from mind, or of matter separated from spirit or life, was unknown to the early and Mahaayaana Buddhist philosophers. Material things, too, are grasped as things inseparable from spirit or life. All things are considered as personalities.

When the relationship between the individual and the world is grasped as the relationship in which the many are negated in the one and the one is negated in the many, it is probably the most radical manner of grasping that ~ relationship. The individual doer not refer to each respective human being, but to the subject. And the very subject is the true life. That life observed from the outside is not true life is seen in the fact that our own death can never be the same to us as is that of others. In the respect that the one enters the many, this is not monism; and, in the respect that the many enter the one, this is not pluralism in the usual sense. Since the establishment at the same time of the mutual negation and identity of the one and the many, in other words, of the relationship of differentiation of non-differentiation between the one and the many, as seen previously, is nothing other than the other aspect of the establishment at the same time of the mutual negation and identity of the subject and object, the opposition of monism and pluralism in the history of Western philosophy might be considered to be based on a way of thought quite different from that of Buddhist philosophy. In Buddhist philosophy, since subjectivism is transcended due to the concept of the non-existence of the subject, i.e., non-self or no-mind, idealism was not established; and,

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because of the negation of the concept of a real existence transcending the subject due to the concept of the non-existence of the object, realism was not established.

The delineation given above of the framework of the establishment at the same time of the mutual negation and identity between the subject and object follows the interpretation of men belonging to the early Yogaacaara, i.e., Maitreya, Asa^nga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Paramaartha,[15] while the delineation of the framework of the one entering the many and the many entering the one follows the interpretation of Fa-tsang. The reason for this is that these men have best clarified the logic of these relationships. Neither of the two concepts can be established without the other. Fundamentally they are one. This single thought in its naive form is Naagaarjuna's idea. "Form (ruupa) is emptiness (`suunyataa), and the very emptiness is form." Form and emptiness are identical, yet, at the same time, they stand in mutually negating opposition.

If we desire to delve deeper than this into the logic of the relationship of the individual and the world, or the one and the many, we must enter into a consideration of Buddhist philosophy's most difficult problem, "time and eternity." With a consideration of this problem, the place of the individual as the center of the world of becoming would become even clearer; but, since it would be impossible to give an elucidation of this problem in the time available, I should like to leave it for a later occasion.

a. 上田義文 k. 法藏
b. 禪 l. 華嚴
c. 真宗 m. 鈴木一郎
d. 親鸞 n. 鈴木大拙
e. 波多野精一 o. 山口益
f. 百丈懷海 p. 正法眼藏
g. 僧肇 q. 現成公案
h. 臨濟 r. 善之研究
i. 道元 s. 華嚴一乘教義分齊章
j. 西幾多郎 t. 華嚴經探玄記

NOTES
1. For example, sec Pali Text Society's Paali-English Dictionary edited by T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, on the term, "sankhaara" as "... one of the most difficult terms in Buddhist metaphysics, in which the blending of the subjective-objective view of the world and of happening, peculiar to the East, is so complete that it is almost impossible for Occidental terminology to get at the root of its meaning in a translation."

2. There are a few in later Indian Mahaayaana Buddhism who are not in accord with this way of thinking.

3. The Mahaayaana-sa^mgraha (Taishoo Vol. 31, No. 1595, p. 1736) states: "The correct teaching of the Mahaayaana is that which has been streamed out of the pure world of Reality (dharmadhaatu)."

4. S. Hatano, Time and Eternity, Ichiroo Suzuki[m] trans. (Tokyo: Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, 1963), pp. 29, 35-36. Although the lines quoted here ate the same as those quoted in my "Thinking in Buddhist Philosophy," in Philosophical Studies of Japan (Tokyo: Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, 1964), Vol. 5, I have cited them again since the latter is still in press.

5. The substance of fundamental wisdom is the dharmakaaya. The dharmakaaya's characteristic is "the non-duality of the conditioned and the non-conditioned" (Asa^nga, Mahaayaana-sa^mgraha, Taishoo, Vol. 31, No. 1592, p. 25b).

6. This is a term used by Yogaacaara philosophers. D. T. Suzuki[n] calls it "pure subjectivity."

7. Tri^m`sikaa-vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi, ed. par S. L`evi, verse 29. See my article, "What is Idealism in Buddhist Philosophy," in C. A. Moore, ed., "Idealism in World Perspective" (in preparation) for a more detailed exposition of the theory of vij~naptimaatrataa.

8. See my "Thinking in Buddhist Philosophy" for more concerning the meaning of "arthapratibbaasa^m-vij~naanam."

9. Taishoo, Vol. 45, No. 1859, p. 154c. Although the phrase quoted here is the same as that quoted in my "Thinking in Buddhist Philosophy" (see note 4), I have cited it again since the article is still in press.

10. Maitreya, Madhyaanta-vibhaaga, ed. par Susumu Yamaguchi,[o] p. 49; Asa^nga, Mahaayaana-sa^mgraha, Taishoo, Vol. 31, No. 1592, p. 191c.

11. Doogen, Sbooboogenzoo,[p] chapter on Genjoo Kooan;[q] Taishoo, Vol. 82, No. 2582, p. 23c. Although the lines quoted here ore the same as those quoted in my "Thinking in Buddhist Philosophy" (see note 4), I have cited them again since the article is still in press.

12. Kitaroo Nishida, Zen no Kenkyuu[r] (A Study of Good) (2nd ed. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1924), p. 261.

13. Fa-tsang, Hua-yen-i-ch'eng-chiao-i-f^en-chi-cheng[s] (Kegon-ichijoo-Kyoogioobunzai-shoo) (A System of Kegon Philosophy), Taishoo, Vol. 45, No. 1866, p. 503b.

14. Ibid., p.505c and also, Fa-tsang, Hua-yen-ching-t'an-hsan-chi[t] (Kegon-gyoo-tangen-ki) (A commentary on the Avata^msaka Suutra), Taishoo, Vol. 35, No. 1733, pp. 123b, 124a.