Klesa and Its Bearing On the Yoga Analysis of Mind

·期刊原文
The Notion of Klesa and Its Bearing On the Yoga Analysis of Mind
By Anindita N. Balsev
Philosophy East and West
Vol. 41, No. 1 (January 1991)
pp. 77-88
Copyright 1991 by University of Hawaii Press
Hawaii, USA

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Kle`sa, generally translated as affliction, is a technical term and a key concept of Yoga philosophy. To expose and expound this idea in the context of the discourse on emotion in the West is a challenging task. What relevance the Yoga idea of Kle`sa could possibly have for the contemporary discussion concerning emotion is a matter to be investigated and debated. Various questions may be asked, such as: Is there any overall bearing of the idea of Kle`sa on emotion! If so, can all emotions be designated as Kle`sa? What is the place of emotion in Yoga ethics and soteriology? How are cognitive and volitional aspects of mental life related to the emotive in the Yoga context? And so on and so forth. I will offer a few comments of my own at the end of this essay. I would like to observe, however, that the purpose here is not to study the Yoga view of the mind by following any specific paradigm or method that may have been found useful by some contemporary academics involved with these questions, nor will there be any attempt to acquaint the reader with the competing paradigms to which discussions on this subject have given rise. The aim will be to lay bare the traditional Yoga analysis of such phenomena as desire (raaga), hatred (dvesa), focusing on the I-sense (asmita), and so forth, all described in the literature as afflictions (Kle`sa) and also as erroneous cognitions (viparyaya). The cognitive, affective, and conative features of Kle`sas will be noted in the light of traditional Yoga soteriology. It is hoped that the Yoga insights will inspire those who are inquiring today into the cultural assumptions that have gone unexamined in a study of emotion in the West and are rightly questioning the legitimacy of such dichotomies between the private and the public, the rational and the irrational, and the moral and the amoral aspects of emotions.

At first let me briefly outline the basic idea of Kle`sa and its role in the theoretical frame of Yoga analysis of the mind and mental states/ modifications, a standard English rendering of the Sanskrit words citta and cirta-vrtti. Ideas dealing with the notion of Kle`sa from various perspectives are scattered throughout the Yoga-suutras of Pata~njali and the traditionally acknowledged commentaries and subcommentaries thereon. For an authentic appreciation of the Yoga philosophy of mind, it is essential that these ideas be fully explored. Even for obtaining a theoretical insight into what is recommended and what is prohibited in connection with the Yoga practices -- issues that have drawn so much attention in recent years -- an understanding of the nature of Kle`sa is indispensable.

Before going into the details of what Kle`sa is and what its implications are, let us recall the striking metaphor of the mind, found in the com-

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mentary of Vyasa, which reveals the thought-world that is characteristic of Yoga. It reads:

The river called mind flows in two directions.... (Citta-nadii naama ubhayatavaahinii...) (Y.B. 1/12)

A proper cognizance of this powerful metaphor, which is at once descriptive and evaluative, helps one to perceive how closely the psychological, the ethical, and the soteriological aspects are interwoven into the Yoga view of the incessant modifications of the mind. The imagery of the 'two directions' transforms the flow of mental life, a metaphor found across cultures, into something more than a mere psychological description. The 'two directions' are at first characterized as flowing toward good and toward evil (vahati kalyaanaaya vahati papaayaca), which seems to express primarily an ethical consideration. A further phrase, however, specifies that that which flows toward discrimination (viveka) and isolation/salvation (kaivalya) is good, whereas that which leads to worldly existence (samsara) is evil, clearly indicating a soteriological concern.

This metaphor of the mind as a river flowing in two directions, however, acquires a specific technical significance as the Yoga-`saastra introduces a broad division of all the states of the mind, classifying them into two groups -- kli.s.ta - and akli.s.ta-v.rtti.

This distinction, which is of vital importance for Yoga soteriology, involves the notion of Kle`sa. The subtle distinction in discerning the meaning of the word can be seen in the commentaries of the Yoga-suutra. Kli.s.ta-v.rtti are those states of mind, we are told in the Yoga-bhaa.sya, which are caused by Kle`sa (Kle`sahetukaah) , whereas the Yoga-vaarttika describes them as those which lead to suffering (Kle`sa). The modifications of the mind which cannot be thus characterized are the akli.s.ta-v.rtti.

This brings us to the main theme of this essay. The word Kle`sa in its conventional usage is a synonym of duhkha or suffering. Although it has a technical meaning, which will be described shortly, it still retains the nuance of suffering: klisnati iti Kle`sah. Here, the significance of the word suffering, as in Buddhist soteriology, transcends its conventional meaning. Duhkha or Kle`sa in that sense is not merely an antonym of sukha or pleasure but is coextensive with that which opposes salvational pursuit and leads to sa.msaara. This significance is clear as Vyaasa comments on Y.S. 1/14, saying that even at the time of enjoyment of pleasure (vi.sayasukhaakalepi) the yogii discerns it as painful, as a hindrance (pratikulaatmakam). Thus, the term Kle`sa is part and parcel of Yoga soteriology.

Mention must also be made of the notion of sa.mskaara. It is said that any v.rtti or state that arises in the mind leaves behind it a trace -- a sa.mskaara -- which in turn can provoke and reinforce a similar state. Thus, the Yoga literature speaks of the perpetual wheel of modifications and traces (v.rtti-sa.mskaara ani`sam cakram). A samskara is not merely a

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memory trace but also a latent tendency, a propensity, which is often compared to a seed that germinates under favorable conditions. The theory also maintains that the vrttis or the states are always known (sadaaj~naataa citta-v.rttayaa), but that does not hold true for sa.mskaara. The latter may be described, as they often are in Yoga literature in English, as subliminal impressions which remain unwatched (alak.sita), that is, unconscious.

It is, however, important to remember the claim that for an advanced adept of Yoga even such traces (sa.mskaaras) can be perceived as is indicated in Y.S. 3/18 -- the idea of sa.mskaara-sak.saatkaara.

In what follows, I will recapitulate some of the salient features of the Yoga understanding of Kle`sa, using the Yoga terminology which is inseparably linked to it.

The technical use of the term 'Kle`sa' becomes evident as one reads Y.S. 2/3 which puts forward a concise list of five afflictions -- 'avidyaasmitaaraagadve.saabhinive`saah pancakle`sah.' These may be translated as nescience, I-sense, desire, aversion, and fear, principally concerning death. Now, the question may be asked: what do these five have in common that allows for the designation of Kle`sa or affliction? These are precisely the five, which soteriological analysis reveals, that drive the mind towards all that is 'of this world', sa.msaara, and block discriminative knowledge, which is essential for salvation or kaivalya. In this connection, it is interesting to recall that these five afflictions (pa~nca-Kle`sah) are also designated as the five erroneous cognitions ('pa~nca-viparyaya'). Viparyaya is a technical term which requires elaboration. To put it briefly, it is a general term for those states of mind which are discerned as erroneous cognitions and which can be negated or corrected by valid means of cognition (pramaa.nena baadhyate; see Y.B. 1/8). Thus, if I-sense, desire, aversion, and fear of death are labeled as Kle`sa and also as viparyaya, it means that each of these is an affliction and gives rise to erroneous views of things. The significance of this description is evidently to be grasped in the soteriological context. We have noted the use of the term Kle`sa in Yoga literature. Let us now observe that not all erroneous cognitions are referred to as Kle`sas, although the five Kle`sas are no doubt said to give rise to mistaken views of things and hence are viparyayas.

Avidyaa or nescience, heading the list of afflictions, is precisely this latent, subliminal trace (vaasanaa) of erroneous thinking.(viparyayaj~nana vaasanaa etyaarthah; Y.S. 2/24). It is described as the k.setra or field, and the prasava-bhuumi or breeding ground, for the four that follow. This implies that all the kli.s.ta-v.rtri or the afflicted states of the mind share the main characteristic of the avidyaa Kle`sa -- a predisposition, so to speak, toward taking a thing for what it is not. This can be corrected, it is claimed, with the dawning of discriminative knowledge (viveka-khyaati). How exactly the idea of wrong cognition is shown to be the feature of any state of

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mind that touches upon desire, aversion, fear, or I-sense is clearly indicated in the literature. Asmitaa Kle`sa is considered to be a viparyaya as it is responsible for taking the impermanent (anitya) to be the permanent/abiding (nitya). It is raaga Kle`sa that gives rise to the erroneous view of taking the impure, the repulsive (a`suci), as pure and attractive (`suci). The Kle`sa called dvesa is responsible for not discriminating the really painful (the ideas of parinamii-, taapa-, and sa.mskaara-du.hkhataa need to be elaborated in this context) from what is pleasing (sukha), and abhinive`sa for not discriminating the not-self (anaatmaa) from the self (aatmaa).

These four afflictions, it is pointed out, are not always present in their fully manifest forms. A distinctly psychoanalytical tone of description of the Kle`sa, found in Y.S. 2/4, is that a kle`sa may be dormant (prasupra), attenuated (tanu), intercepted (vicchinna), and fully manifest (udaara). This is indeed a significant aspect of the Yoga analysis of Kle`sa on which I shall comment later in connection with the cross-cultural perspective of the study of emotion.

Before discussing the notion of asmitaa-Kle`sa, an intriguing feature of Yoga understanding of mind, let me briefly review the ideas concerning raaga-dve.sa-abhinive`sa, where the emotive core of the concept of Kle`sa is obvious. The idea of sa.mskaara, referred to earlier, now comes to play an important role in the analysis. The traces of the experience of pleasure are operative in and supportive of raaga or desire. The modifications take the form of gardha, t.r.s.na, and lobha, which may be translated as longing, thirst, and greed, respectively. They also carry the nuance of hankering, attachment, and infatuation, as is clear from the various examples used in the texts. Metaphorically, the seeds of sukha-sa.mskaara or traces of pleasurable experiences are now germinating, actively pushing, and this will give rise to a state of desire, leading to effort directed toward (tatsaa-dhane) the attainment of the object of pleasure.

As opposed to desire, the emotive core of dve.sa or aversion is provoked by the seed of recollection of pain. The states that arise are those of pratigha, manyu, jighaansaa, and krodha, which could be rendered in English as retaliation, malice, revenge, and anger. Thus, raaga-dve.sa, attachment, and aversion or desire and repulsion dwell upon the sa.mskaaras of pleasure and pain. The mind is not repelled by that which is pleasurable, nor does it desire that which is painful.

The v.rttis strengthen the sa.mskaaras, the latter in turn facilitating the rise of the former. There is no conception of mind as tabula rasa to be found here.

Y.S. 2/9 deals with the Kle`sa called abhinive`sa. The primary meaning of the term in this context is stated in Vyaasa's commentary to be fear of death or fear of annihilation (mara.na-traasa uchedad.r.staatmaka). Why make a separate rubric for fear of death and not simply list it under dvesa or aversion, marking death as the most undesirable? Abhinive`sa is afflic-

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tive dread, which, it is said, the learned share with the ignorant. Unlike the sukha-du.hkha or pleasure-pain traces, of which examples are easily found in this life itself, the sa.mskaara of fear and anxiety concerning death cannot be so accounted for, there being no such experiences in this life. The idea of 'previous death' comes into play. This anguish is described as svarasavahii; it arises naturally and spontaneously from the accumulated traces.

It may now be observed that our desire, hatred, fear, and I-sense are not hidden from us insofar as they are expressed in terms of v.rtti or modification, but the traces or sa.mskaaras which they leave behind and which in turn provoke them are not immediately perceived. Occasionally, they are inferred but very largely remain unnoticed (an exception is the case of the advanced yogii).

Now it is time to focus on the Kle`sa that precedes desire, aversion, and fear of death and which is placed next in importance only to avidyaa or nescience, namely, asmitaa or the sense of (I)-am-ness or I-sense. It is perhaps easier to incorporate raaga-dve.sa-abhinive`sa into the basic catalog of emotions anywhere, but to consider asmita-kle`sa as the same genre of mental phenomena might meet with some resistance. The overcoming of this resistance and the ability to discern that asmitaa is fundamental to desire, hatred, and fear, and is likewise an affliction would already be accomplishing a task which perhaps goes against our customary thought habit but is in consonance with the Yoga view of mind. This would also involve the perception that the I-sense which is generated as a mental modification, due to asmitaa, is eventually analyzable into heterogeneous components. A set of ideas needs to be examined very carefully in order not to lose the diverse implications of the concept of asmitaa: It appears in three important contexts of Yoga discourse: (a) asmita as a tattva or category; (b) asmitaa as a Kle`sa or affliction; and (c) asmitaa as in saasmita-samaadhi or the one-pointed concentration on I-sense.

The first usage is synonymous with ahamkaara or the ego-principle as in Saankhya. The Yoga-bhasya 2/19 lists it: .sa.s.tha`scaavi`se.sah asmitaamaatra. As a tattva it shares with the five 'tanmaatras' the same characteristics, but that is a different issue into which we need not go for the present.

What concerns us here is to grasp the sense in which asmitaa or the I-sense, which is composite but appears as if it is one (ekaatmataa-iva), is diagnosed as an affliction. The Yoga-suutra 2/6 defines it: "d.rgdar`sa.na`saktaur ekaatmatevaasmitaa" Looking upon two principles, that of pure awareness (d.rk`sakti) and that of cognition (dar`sana saakti), as the same is asmitaa. To put it in other words, the I-sense which appears to be undivided, homogeneous, is generated by the nondistinction of the two utterly heterogeneous components, the experiencer and the experienced. There is no unchanging mental substance as the basis of such a cogni-

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tion. The Yoga view of how I-sense is generated is radically different in this regard from such theories, like Vai`se.sika in the Indian context, where I-consciousness (ahampratyaya) simply indicates the self (aatman). The Yoga theory points out that the heterogeneous constitution of I-sense and the Kle`sa which is operative is precisely asmitaa. This becomes the base for the assertive ego, source of pride (abhimaana), and egoism as well. Thus, the sense of I-ness and my-ness (ahamkaara and mamakaara) are so intimately related and fundamental to the three Kle`sas which follow that it may be said that there will be no desire, hatred, or fear without asmitaa: It may now be observed that the order of the arrangement of the Kle`sas is not arbitrary. Its significance may also be appreciated when viewed in the opposite order: the object of fear in abhinive`sa is hated, this aversion (dvesa) is provoked when desire (raaga) is thwarted, and desire presupposes asmitaa or I-am-ness, which runs through the three. To say that avidyaa or nescience is the 'soil' for all four is nothing but a soteriological reading of the situation. This description that the four Kle`sas are prime examples of erroneous cognitions is especially noteworthy as it cuts through the stereotyped opposition between the emotive and the rational or the cognitive. This brings forth an integral view of the mind. It is in this frame that the picture emerges that worldy existence (sa.msaara) is not possible without I-sense, desire, hatred, and fear. These govern the mind of the individual and perpetuate the rotation of the wheel of sa.msaara.

It is interesting to observe that for Yoga the Kle`sas are not merely consequences of action but are equally springs of action--in fact the principal motivations. These are seen as basic to both morally good or bad actions. As in Y.B. 2/12, merit and demerit arise from desire, greed, infatuation, or anger (tatra pu.nyaapu.nyakarmaa`sayah kaamalobhamohakrodha prasavah). Emotions are not seen as merely passive, but as actively provoking actions. In other words, there is no room for such polemics about the irrationality or arationality, and the immorality or amorality, of emotions.

Briefly, for ethics or soteriology asmitaa Kle`sa remains preponderant. The egoistic march of desire, hatred, and fear cannot be controlled unless asmitaa Kle`sa is subdued, weakened.

It is therefore important to lay bare the real nature of I-sense, to show that it is not the immutable pure consciousness, the unchanging purusa that it is erroneously taken to be, that it is generated by an interplay of the self and the not-self (passive puru.sa and active buddhi). In order to do justice to this complex set of ideas, one has to see how Yoga gradually uncovers the two transcendental principles of puru.sa and prak.rti.

For the moment it may be said that it is only in that form of intense one-pointed concentration, called saasmitaa-samaadhi, that the heteroge-

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neous constitution of the I-sense is observed. It is then disclosed that what was taken for simple, unchanging, or stable is really composite (sa.mhata) and changing (parinaamii). This is the last or the highest stage of sampraj~nataa-samaadhi The yogii has now to attain the samaadhi called asampraj~nataa; when nescience is destroyed and kaivalya is achieved.

This is a brief outline of the Yoga understanding of Kle`sa. It may now be asked, granting that Kle`sas have a definite emotive core, whether all emotions can be said to bear the traits of an affliction. The answer is no. It is precisely those five which are diagnosed as Kle`sa; they are at the root of worldly existence (sa.msaara) (compare satimule tadvipako jaatyaayurbhogaah).

The place of emotion in the Yoga philosophy of mind is central. A complete study would call for a critical review not only of the Kle`sas but also of other emotions. One of the most pertinent questions to ask is, what is the role of emotion in Yoga ethics! Are there emotions which can be identified as virtues having a definite altruistic dimension to them?

This inquiry also appears in the contemporary discussion about emotion in the West. Some express definite interest "in developing an alternative to Kantianism, in particular to its minimization of the role of emotion in morality and its exclusive emphasis on duty and rationality" (Blum 1980).

In the Yoga literature, mention is made of a number of emotive attitudes. Some of these are identified as positive aids for acquiring serenity of mind, essential for concentration. The Y.S. 1/33 recommends a conscious cultivation of friendliness toward those who are happy, compassion toward those in distress, goodwill toward the virtuous, and indifference toward those who live in vice (maitrii-karu.naa-muditopek.saanaam sukhaduhkhapu.nyaapu.nya vi.sayaanaam bhaavanaa`scittaprasaadanam). Just as these attitudes are said to purify the mind, certain emotional states are labeled as companions of a disturbed mind, such as sadness or dejection, and are therefore regarded as obstacles for the attainment of concentration.

These ideas are particularly illuminating for a study of emotion as they focus on the adept of Yoga in an interpersonal context. The social dimension of emotions is seen in the background of the personal resolve of the adept of Yoga. The implications of the recommendation for a cultivation of certain attitudes, implying a gradual eradication of others, needs to be fully explored. This gives us an evaluation of emotions in a manner which makes any such conflict between the private and the public, the rational and the irrational, and the social and the individual aspects of a theory of emotion redundant. Such a study also helps us to construe the Yoga understanding of person where the emotive core

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of the interaction with others is not seen as irrelevant in the preparation for the pursuit of salvation.

Let us dwell for a moment on the Y.S. 1/33. Firstly, the suutra discloses that many emotions are evoked only in a situation where one interacts with others. Friendliness, compassion, and so forth are emotions that are directed toward others who are in widely different situations. Why does the Yoga literature specifically recommend the cultivation of friendliness toward those who are happy, and so forth? Is it because these emotions are not generally evoked in such situations? Swami Hariharananda Aranya elaborates on this question. He points out that often a human being is envious of another person who is perceived to be in a state of happiness, especially when there is no self-interest involved. Again, one may even be pleased to see an enemy in distress, or be angry to note weaknesses and vices in others, or feel resentment to find a prosperous or a virtuous person belonging to a persuasion different from one's own. These emotions, with which we are familiar in interpersonal relationships, it is urged, are hindrances for the attainment of an unperturbed mind. If the cultivation of certain emotions is recommended in specific interpersonal situations, it is precisely because these emotions are found to be helpful, and without them one-pointed concentration of the mind cannot be attained. It is even more so when a soteriological quest is the predominant interest of the aspirant. This is why a mind which is bereft of friendliness (maitrii) and compassion (karuu.naa), and so forth is a disturbed (viksipta) mind, unprepared for the discriminative knowledge. Every detail of Yogaanganu.s.thaana or the limbs of the Yoga practices is designed for the attenuation of the Kle`sa, which is indispensable for the dawning of viveka-khyaati.

In brief, emotions that are held to be a direct aid for creating a congenial state of mind, useful for Yoga practice, are those that gradually diminish and eventually purge the mind of impurities (a`suddhi-k.saya). The luster of discriminative knowledge (j~naana-diipti) destroys the impediments as light abolishes darkness. To strengthen the akli.s.ta-v.rtti means nothing but the weakening of the kli.s.ta-v.rtti.

It is to be remembered, however, that the ultimate goal of Yoga is not the cultivation of certain emotions as values, or even the attainment of an unperturbed mind, but to bring all mental modifications to a complete suspension, a stop (nirodha), and the state of discriminative knowledge as well. The Y.S. 1/2 and the commentary thereon emphasizes these ideas.

It is also interesting to note that in Y.S. 1/21, proper zeal or enthusiasm (samvega) is recognized as a key to success in Yoga; but is this an emotion? This question may be raised regarding some of those earlier attitudes and states of mind that have been mentioned before as well: can all these really be classified as emotions?

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This problem, however, is met by anyone who has witnessed the contemporary discourse on the subject (Marks 1984 and Calhoun et al. 1984) and seen how difficult it is to find an appropriate and an adequate answer to the question of what emotion really is.

In the introduction to one collection of papers on emotions, the editor writes:

Emotions do not form a natural class. After a long history of quite diverse debates about their classification, emotions have come to form a hetero-geneous group: Various conditions and states have been included in the class for quite different reasons on different grounds, against the background of shifting contrasts.... [They] cannot be shepherded together under one set of classification as active or passive; thought-generated and thought-defined or physiologically determined; voluntary or nonvoluntary; functional or malfunctional; corrigible or not corrigible by a change of beliefs. Nor can they be sharply distinguished from moods, motives, attitudes, character traits. (Rorty 1980)

It may be observed that while some will unhesitatingly include zeal, enthusiasm, in the list of emotions, one must not lose sight of the technical aspect of the notion of samvega in the Yoga vocabulary. As the term 'samvega' appears in the Yoga-suutra, various commentators have interpreted the term somewhat differently. In order to appreciate the subtle nuances of the technical (paaribha.sika) meaning of the word, reference may be made to such well-known commentaries and glosses as those written by Vaacaspati Mi`sra, Vij~naanabhiksu, and Bhoja. From these we know that Vaacaspati emphasizes detachment (vairaagya) as a principal component of the idea of samvega, whereas Vij~naanabhik.su insists that the idea refers to rapidity in the discernment of the means (upaaya`saighra) for the accomplishment of the aim of Yoga. Bhoja, however, points out that the technical meaning of samvega is the deep trance (d.r.dasa.mskaara) acquired through performance of actions which urges the adept of Yoga to go forward in the pursuit of his/her chosen goal. Thus, it may be noted that in the context of the Yoga discourse samvega implies precisely that sort of zeal or enthusiasm which is born of traces of actions, done in a spirit of detachment, and which in turn will precipitate the attainment of salvation (kaivalya). This analysis is also noteworthy, as in the Yoga literature one comes across a classification of adepts of Yoga on the basis of this idea. It is said that success in Yoga practice is accelerated in accordance with the degree of intensity of samvega present in the aspirant. Samvega may be mild (mrdu), moderate/ medium (madhya), or very intense (tiivra). It is said that in the one in whom it is very intense, the attainment of one-pointed concentration is imminent (Y.S. 1/21-22 and commentaries thereon).

Thus, it is clear that samvega has an overt (v.rtti-ruupa) and a latent (sa.mskaara-rupa) aspect to it. This indicates that zeal, enthusiasm, in a

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certain direction is prompted by traces that are created by repeated activities previously performed, and this in turn influences the direction of the mind. The imagery of the perpetually rotating wheel of v.rtti and sa.mskaara must be taken into account for an understanding of the functioning of the mind.

I have no doubt that an in-depth study of the Yoga analysis of Kle`sa is an illuminating source for an understanding of the profound impact that emotion has on the cognitive and volitional aspects of our lives. It may also be observed that the Yoga understanding of the mind is such that it does not involve these categories in a manner in which they are generally used and understood in the West. As has been noted, the functioning of the mind is described in terms of vrtti and sa.mskaara. Valid (pramaa.na), erroneous (viparyaya), and verbal (vikalpa) cognitions and others are all v.rttis.

The theory does not split up the cognitive and emotional into opposite camps. It may be noted that despite elaborate discussion on Kle`sa and pramaa.na, the issues are not the same as with emotion and reason. Moreover, the absence of exact equivalence of these terms in Sanskrit literature has not hampered the growth of logical, epistemological, or psychological and metaphysical analysis.

Many of the contemporary theorists of the mind are more and more recognizing the incompleteness of a theory of mind which emphasizes exclusively a view of a purified intellect, free from desire and other emotions, or a theory which claims that reason alone can move nothing, that it is a 'slave of passion'. In the West, as recent literature on the subject (Lutz, 1988) shows, questions have been raised regarding the validity of the sharp distinctions that are drawn between emotions and other psychological activities, arguing that emotional dispositions are not only presupposed by but also are expressed directly in intellectual investigations. This, it seems to me, is a far more interesting strategy for a theory of mind.

Modern theories of emotion deal with polemical issues such as whether an emotion is intrinsically rational or irrational, dispositional or not, only a feeling or intentional, passive or active.

The Yoga description of Kle`sa referred to earlier, as dormant, attenuated, intercepted, and manifest may be illuminating in the context of such discussions. I think that this description cuts through some of these different alternatives and looks upon them as expressing different facets and stages of the life of emotion. When a Kle`sa is described as dormant (prasupta), it is understood merely as a potency, as if in the seed form (vijakara). At this stage it is not intentional, but, as the commentary puts it, it is awakened or manifest only when it turns its face toward the object (tasya prabodha alambane sammukhibhavah). The characteriza-

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tions 'tanu' or attenuated (Y.B. 2/4) and vicchinna or intercepted are subtle observations which indicate that even when an emotion is not in its overt form, fully manifest (udaara), it is not totally absent. Examples are given to substantiate the point: when one is in a state of infatuation, one then is not in a state of anger, as anger is intercepted; or while infatuation toward one person is active, toward others it may be attenuated, not entirely lacking.

This analysis is, of course, invaluable to one who aspires to be a yogii and who has to be aware that desire, hatred, fear, and so forth can remain in a dormant state, even when not in their active, manifest form.

The mind, as Yoga sees it, is naturally drawn toward sa.msaara. It is a captive of Kle`sa. Its incessant modifications are very largely afflicted. Egoism (I-ness and my-ness), desire, hatred, and fear dominate mental life, scarcely giving it a chance to be one-pointed in a manner which is needed to discriminate the pratyaka-cetanaa; the individuated consciousness, from what it is not, to discern it as it is in itself (svaruupa). Thus failing because of nescience to uncover its nonintentional foundation -- the puru.sa -- one is lead to the erroneous idea about the nature of the self, at the root of which is asmitaa Kle`sa. This, in turn, means further involvement with polarities which are characteristic features of the whirlpool of existence that sa.msaara is. Virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and attachment and aversion are the six spokes of the wheel of sa.msaara (sa.da.dam sa.msaara-cakram). Transcending the psychological and ethical account of mental life, the soteriological description emerges. The mental life is seen not as only a web of states tinged with afflictions; these are intercepted by those which oppose this trend. To use the illuminating imagery of Yoga, these akli.s.ta v.rttis make loopholes (kli.s.ta-chidra), which are said to be oriented toward discriminative knowledge, toward salvation.

The practical goal of Yoga is therefore how to strengthen those akli.s.tav.rtti and sa.mskaara which are destructive of nescience, the matrix of all Kle`sas. The sole aim of obtaining samaadhi or one-pointed concentration is nothing but the attenuation of Kle`sa (samaadhi-bhaavanaarthah Kle`satanukara.naartha`sca; Y.S. 2/12). It is this effort which gives rise to unworldly values such as universal friendship (vi`svamaitrii), nonviolence (ahimsaa), desirelessness (vairaagya), compassion (karuu.na), and so forth, well recognized in the spiritual traditions across cultures.

Thus, Yoga practices are designed to strengthen the akli.s.ta-sa.mskaara, which are innate and which can eventually subdue and eradicate afflictions like I-sense, desire, hatred, and fear -- the four faces of avidyaa or nescience, gradually assuring an undisturbed flow of the 'river called mind' (cittasya av.rttikasya pra`saantavaahitaa stithih; Y.B. 1/13). Nirodha, or suspension of all v.rttis and sa.mskaaras, belongs to a later stage of this spiritual endeavor.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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