The Neo-Confucian Confrontation with Buddhism:

·期刊原文
The Neo-Confucian Confrontation with Buddhism:
A Structural And Historical Analysis

Edward T. Ch'ien

Journal of Chinese Philosophy
vol.15(1988)
P.347-348
Copyright@1988 by Dialogue Publishing Company, Honolulu,
Hawaii, U.S.A.

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P.347

It is common knowledge that tension existed between
Buddhism and Confucianism as two of the three major systems
of thought in Chinese history. In their classification of
teachings, the Buddhists almost invariably ranked Buddhism as
the "ultimate cure" (pi-ching chih)(a) while characterizing
Confucianism as a "worldly dharma-medicine" (shih-chieh
fa-yao) (b) which merely provided a "view of the temporary"
(chia-kuan)(c) and which, though necessary for those who were
unable to achieve "profound transformation" (shen-hua) (d)
because of their "thin and weak" (po-jo) (e) capacities,
needed to be transcended if salvation were to be attained. I
have put the words "ultimate cure," "view of the temporary,"
"profound transformation" and "thin and weak" in quotation
marks because they were the actual words used by Chih-i(f)
(538-597) in elaborating a theory of "contemplating the mind"
(kuan-hsin).(g1) However, if the specific words were those
used by an individual monk to articulate a specific
theory,the attitude they embody toward Confucianism was
exemplary of a view which was widely held by the Buddhist
monastic establishment in general. Tsung-mi(h) (780-841), for
instance, was by no means a narrow- minded Buddhist monk, but
was syncretically oriented. He maintained that the Three
Teachings were mutually complementary and should all be
"observed with respect" (tsun-hsing)(i). Nevertheless, for
all his liberal catholicity toward the diversity of
teachings, Tsung-mi still regarded Buddhism as the
"definitive and final" (chueh-liao(j)) teaching; and his
syncretism was predicated upon a principle of hierarchy which
necessitated the ultimate condemnation of Confucianism as a
"delusion" (mi(k)).(2) He wrote,

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Although the Three Teachings equally reflect the
intentions of the sages, differences exist in that there
are real and provisional doctrines.Confucianism and
Taoism are provisional doctrines while Buddhism consists
of both real and provisional doctrines......In going to
the root of things, only Buddhism-since it examines all
phenomena and, using every means, investigates their
principles in an attempt to reveal their nature--is
definitive and final.(3)

This mixture of initial open-mindedness with ultimate
exclusiveness which characterized Tsung-mi's syncretic
outlook pervades the thinking of a number of eminent Chinese
monks who, though ostensibly all-embracing, were nonetheless
unequivocal in their rejection of Confucianism as being
inferior. Chih-yuan(1) (976-1022), to cite another example,
considered the Three Teachings to be the "same" (t'ung)(m) in
"[making people] move toward the good and depart from evil
and in [helping them] overcome cruelty and weed out murder."
But, he added,

[Confucianism and Taoism],though extensive and complete,
only briefly point to the general aim of reaching to the
spirit and investigating ultimate principles. That which
fully expounds their wonders [i.e., the spirit and
ultimate principles] consists in the teachings of
Shakyamuni.(4)

The Confucians, on the other hand, brought against
Buddhism a whole array of charges which suggest that they
considered it to be among the worst of all heterodoxies. As
Ch'eng Hao(n) (1032-1085) stated,

The harm of Yang Chu and Mo Ti is greater than that of
Shen Tzu and Han Tzu, and the harm of the Buddha and Lao
Tzu is greater than that of Yang and Mo.... Shen Tzu and
Han Tzu are shallow and vulgar, and obviously
so.Therefore, Mencius attacked only Yang and Mo, for they
delude the world to a high degree. The words of the
Buddha and Lao Tzu are close to being true. In this they
cannot be matched by

P.349

Yang and Mo. This is why they are much more harmful.(5)

This essay will examine some of the Confucian charges
against Buuddhism, especially as they were articulated by the
Neo-Confucians. In doing so, however, the validity of these
charges will not be judged but their meaning will be
ascertained. The Neo-Confucian charges against Buddhism,
whatever their philosophical value and however diffuse and
wide-ranging, are fully sensical statements; they possess a
certain coherence which is informed in its meaning by the
structure of Neo-Confucianism as a historically constituted
discourse.
Of all the Confucian charges against Buddhism as
heterodox, the one Buddhist metaphysics emerged relatively
late in time. The Confucians did not seriously engage the
Buddhists on the metaphysical level until the Neo-Confucian
revival of the Sung. But emerging late as it did,the
metaphysical charge must be viewed as the most basic in terms
of the philosophical consciousness of the orthodox
Neo-Confucians.It is rather ironic that while the importance
of metaphysics in Neo-Confucianism is usually recognized, the
metaphysical significance of the Neo-Confucian confrontation
with Buddhism is not always fully appreciated. It has been
said, for instance,that the Ch'eng brothers' criticisms of
Buddhism are "based on morality and common-sense" and that
their "fundamental objection" to Buddhism lies in their
judgment that "the ultimate motive of the Buddhist is
selfish."(6) Actually, however, Ch'eng I(o) (1033-1107) had
insisted that the "foundation" or pen-ling(p) of Buddhism was
wrong.In response to a student's enumeration of the
similarities between Buddhism and Confucianism, Ch'eng I
said, "Although there are many similarities like these,
simply because their [i.e., the Buddhists'] foundation is
wrong, everything of theirs is wrong."(7) Together with his
brother Ch'eng Hao, Ch'eng I had also rejected any suggestion
that the "mind" or hsin(q) of Buddhism might be right whereas
its "practice" or chi(r) was wrong. Repeatedly, the two
Ch'engs signled out Wang T'ung's(s) (583-616) distinction
between "mind" and "practice" for criticism,(8) suggesting
that they considered their differences with the Buddhists to
be more than a mere matter of moral practice and that their
apparently ethical and common-sensical arguments against
Buddhism were grounded

P.350

in fundamental considerations off metaphysics. In point of
fact, the orthodox Neo-Confucians had always viewed their
metaphysics to be different from that of the Buddhists. Thus
it is said in the Chin-ssu lu,(t)

The Buddhists do not understand yin(u) and yang(v), day
and night, life and death, or past and present. How can
it be said that their metaphysics (hsing-erh- shang
che(w)) is the same as that of the Sage?(9)

In metaphysics, the orthodox Neo-Confucians developed the
theory of "Principle" (li(x)) with which they opposed the
Buddhist doctrine of "Emptiness" (k'ung(y) or sunyata). As
propounded by the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi(z) (1130-1200),
Neo-Confucian Principle "is not just an idea or something
abstract,"(l0) not only because it is embodied in concrete
things but because it exists metaphysically as the essence of
things and is that which gives reality and universality to
things. As the essence of things, Principle is inherent in
all things and is never in actuality separate from things or
material force (ch'i(aa)), for, as Chu Hsi said, "it is only
when there is material force that Principle finds a place to
settle."(11) In this sense, Principle is necessarily
immanent. On the other hand, however, Principle is also
transcendent, as it exists "above physical
form"(hsing-erh-shang(ab) )and is itself without "form."(12)
Therefore, although Principle is inherent in things and is
actually inseparable from them, it does not depend on them
for existence. It has a metaphysical existence of its own
which does not transform with the transformation of thing.
Principle, in other words, is immaterial but nonetheless real
in the sense that it is "eternal and unchanging" and that it
forms the "essence of things" and is "indestructible."(13)

As such, Neo-Confucian Principle was often contrasted
with Buddhist Emptiness which the orthodox Neo-Confucians
understood in a negative sense as a denial of the reality of
their Principle. Chu Hsi, for instance, made an absolutely
unqualified condemnation of the Buddhist idea of Emptiness
which, he said, "means complete non-being."(14) He pointed
out that the Buddhists considered Heaven and Earth as
"illusory and erroneous"(15) and that "the Buddhists talk
about Emptiness whereas the

P.351

Confucians talk about reality, and whereas the Buddhists
talk about nonbeing, the Confucians talk about being."(16) He
also criticized the Buddhists for mistaking "mind" for
"Nature" (hsing)(ac) and for being " most afraid of the very
mention of the word 'Principle'."(17) He said,

with us Confucians, although the mind is vacuous,
Principle is real. The Buddhists, on the other hand, go
straight to their destination of Emptiness and Voi d.(18)

He thus rejected the view that the distinction between
righteousness and selfishness was the "only difference"
between Buddhism and Confuciaism and insisted that the
"fundamental points" of these two teachings were different
because, he said, "we Confucians say all Principles are rea l
while they [i.e., the Buddhists] say all principles are
empty."(19) Chu Hsi's metaphysical criticisms of the Buddhist
idea of Emptiness are standard among the orthodox
Neo-Confucians and can be traced back to the anti-Buddhist
arguments of Chu's early Sung predecessors such as Chang
Tsai(ad) (1020-1077) and the Ch'eng brothers. Chang Tsai
accused the Buddhists of "not knowing to investigate
Principle to the utmost." As a result, "the Buddhists do not
know Heaven's decree and consider mind-dharma as the reason
for the rise and extinction of Heaven and Earth."(20) He
said,

The Buddhists have false ideas about our Heaven-endowed
Nature and do not know how to shape and bring into
completion the functioning of Heaven. On the contrary,
they regard such small things as the Six Sense Organs to
be the causes of the universe. They cannot thoroughly
understand these things, and consequently falsely assert
that heaven, earth, the sun and the moon are illusory and
false.... Can they be said to have investigated Principle
to the utmost? Can they be said to have fully developed
their Nature?(21)

Ch'eng Hao also condemned the Buddhists trying to "do
away with Four Elements"(22) and to "annihilate normal nature
completely."(23)

P.352

In doing so, he said, the Buddhists would only "deviate
very far from the Way"(24) or Tao(ae) and end up "With having
no reality."(25) The Budd according to Ch'eng Hao, also
"wanted to eliminate this Principle." But,he said, all things
have and come from "this Principle" which "is why it is said
that all things form one body." For Ch'eng Hao, "to eliminate
this Principle" is utterly impossible and becomes possible
"only in death."(26)

Compared with Chang Tsai and Ch'eng Hao, Ch'eng I is not
particularly known for his metaphysical criticisms of
Buddhism. As Professor Wing-tsit Chan has pointed out, Ch'eng
1 criticized Buddhism mostly on moral and social grounds.(27)
But even Ch'eng I denounced the Buddhists as those who "do
not understand Principle"(28) and contrasted them with the
Sage as a follower and practitioner of Principle. He said,

Heaven has this Principle. The Sage follows and practices
it; [i.e., Principle]. This is what is called the Way.
The Sage bases himself on Heaven whereas the Buddhists
base themselves on mind.(29)

In thus rejecting Buddhist Emptiness as nihilistic, the
orthodox Neo-Confucians have been dismissed as "baseless." It
has been argued for instance, that in Mahayana Buddhism,
especially in its Chinese articulations as T'ien-t'ai,(dl)
Hua-yen, (dm) and Ch'an, (ay) there is
"transcendence-in-immanence"and that

Nagarjuna's 'negativistic' logico-ontological analysis of
the epistemological duality of the mind, the truth, and
the reality constructed by men as well as of the
ontological nondifferentiability of nirvana/samsara,
absolute/relative, etc., is finally transformed into a
direct, positive, and dynamic affirmation of the reality
of the phenomenal world and everyday life.(30)

This argument sounds plausible, for, ultimately,
Emptiness in Mahayana Buddhism advocates not "annihilation"
(chi-mieh)(af) but a transcendental reality which, in terms
of Hua-yen's formulation, is a world of interpenetration with
"all phenomena perfectly harmonized"

P.353

(shih-shih wu-ai)(ag 31)
However, plausible as the -argument is, it is also beside
the point. It is beside the point because it overlooks the
context in which the orthodox Neo-Confucians rejected
Buddhist Emptiness as nihilistic. Structurally speaking, the
question raised by the orthodox Neo-Confucian rejection of
Buddhist Emptiness is not one of immanence versus
transcendenceor or this-worldliness versus other-worldliness.
Rather, in the orthodox Neo-Confucian confrontation with
Buddhism, the question of immanence versus transcendence or
this-worldliness versus other-worldliness constitutes what in
Michel Foucault's terms is an "object" of discourse.(32) As
such, it has a certain specificity of meaning and can become
intelligible only in terms of its deployment in the context
of orthodox Neo-Confu-cianism as a "discursive formation"(33)
which is metaphysically defined by the idea of Principle. As
Professor T'ang Chun-i(ah) has pointed out, Neo-Confucian
Principle is first and foremost a "Principle of generation
and regeneration" (sheng-sheng chih li)(ai)(34) which, in
Professor Mou Tsung-san's(aj) terms is a "creative reality"
(ch'ua-sheng ti shih-t'i)(ak 35) comprised of both t'i(al) or
"substance" and yung(am) or "function." T'i exists
ontologically as the being of Principle and generates yung in
the phenomenal world as the activity of Principle. T'i and
yung thus form a pair of organically conjoined correlates as
the necessary content of Principle and set Principle apart as
a concept from Buddhist Emptiness.
In its basic and root meaning, the term "emptiness" is
"dependent co-origination" (yuan-ch'i(an) or pratilya
samutpada). As such, "emptiness" is not a metaphysical
concept but a mere description of "dependent co-origination"
and cannot be analyzed in terms of the categories of t'i and
yung. It would not make sense to speak of "emptiness" in this
usage as the t'i of "dependent co-origination" or of
"dependent co-origination" as the yung of "emptiness." The
t'i-yung analysis simply does not apply to "emptiness" as
"dependent co-origination." On the other hand, however,
"emptiness'. can become a metaphysical concept when, for
instance, it is realized as the Ultimate Emptiness (pi-ching
k'ung) (ao) through the Eightfold Negation and mystical
contemplation. The Ultimate Emptiness thus realized is called
the "correct Principle" (cheng-li)(ap) and is equivalent to
the Realm of Dharma (fa-chieh(aq) or Dharmadhatu), True
Suchness

P.354

(chen-ju(ar) or Bhutatathata), the Law Body (fa-shen(as) or
Dharmakaya) or any such terms(36) which can be and have been
analyzed in terms of t'i and yung. As an example,we may turn
to the Sung dynasty monk Ch'eng-ch'ien.(at) In his commentary
on Fa-tsang's(au) Treatise on the Golden Lion (Chin-shih-tzu
chang)(av), Ch'eng-ch'ien referred to the "gold" of the
"golden lion" as the t'i of Dharmadhatu and to the "lion" as
the yung of Dharmadhatu.(37) Similarly, The Awakening of
Faith (Ch'i-hsin lun)(aw) speaks of Dharmakaya as the t'i of
Bhutatathata and of Niramanakaya and Sambhogakaya as the yung
of Bhutatathata. Dharmakaya as the t'i of Bhutatathata is,
according to The Awakening of Faith, "undifferentiated" and
"devoid of all characteristics" but is "complete and not
lacking in anything" whereas Nirmanakava and Sambhogakaya as
the yung of Bhutatathata can "extinguish ignorance and reveal
the original Dharmakaya "(38)
In point of fact, therefore, the t'i-yung analysis has
been used in both Buddhist and Neo-Confucian metaphysics.
This similarity of usage, however, is only apparent and not
real, since the relationship between t'i and yung as implied
in the Neo-Confucian concpet of Principle is of a totally
different kind from the t'i-yung relationship as it appears
in the Buddhist ideas of Bhutatathata and Dharmadhatu. As
Professor Mou has pointed out, Dharmakaya as the t'i of
Bhutatathata does not of itself generate Nirmanakaya and
Sambhogakaya as the yung of Bhutatathata. It is only in
response to the Bodhisattvas, Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and
sentient beings that Dharmakaya becomes manifest as
Nirmanakaya and Sambhogakaya. Therefore, although Nirmanakaya
and Sambhogakaya are manifestations of Dharmakaya, Dharmakaya
is not their "direct generative cause" (chih-chieh
sheng-yin)(ax), and the immediate responsibility for their
coming-into-existence lies with the Bodhisattvas, Sravakas,
Pratyekabuddhas and sentient beings.(39) The same may also be
said of the relationship between the gold and the lion of the
"golden lion" as it is stated in Ch'eng-ch'ien's commentary
on the Treatise on the Colden Lion As the t'i of Dharmadhatu,
the gold is certainly necessary for the existence of the
lion. But the Lion, as the yung of Dharmadhatu, is not a
necessary outgrowth of the gold because the gold does not of
itself transform into the lion without the conditioning of a
skillful goldsmith. There-

P.355

fore,as in the t'i-yung relationship of the three bodies of
the Buddha, it is not the gold as t'i but the craftsmanship
of the goldsmith that provides the "direct generative cause"
for the lion to come into being as the yung of
Dharmadhatu.(40)
When we turn to Neo-Confucianism, however, the
relationship between t'i(al) and yung(am) is very different
from that in the Buddhist context. In the Neo-Confucian
concept of Principle, t'i not only exists as the being of
Principle but is necessarily creative of yung as the activity
of Principle. Neo-Confucian t'i is thus both the ground of
being and the "direct generative cause" of Neo-Confucian
yung. It is true that Neo-Confucian t'i does not materialize
as yung without the mediation of ch'i(z) as the third party.
Ch'i thus performs a function which may seem comparable to
that which is assumed by, for instance, the Bodhisattvas.
Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and sentient beings in the
Dharmakaya's mani-festations as Nirmanakaya and Sambhogakaya.
But this resemblance in function is superficial. Unlike the
Bodhisattvas, Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and sentient beings
who are the "direct generative cause" of Nirmanakaya and
Sambhogakaya, ch'i does not give rise to any kind of yung. In
the Neo-Confucian frame of reference, t'i remains the sole
agent responsible for the generation of yung, while ch'i is
merely the medium through which t'i materializes as yung.
Moreover, ch'i though a mere medium which is not creative of
yung, is nonetheless necessary and real, whereas the
Bodhisattvas,Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and sentient beings
are only conditional and illusory.
These differences between ch'i on the one hand and the
Bodhisattvas, Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and sentient beings
on the other imply that there is an essential distinction in
the conception of yung between the Buddhists and the
Neo-Confucians. Neo-Confucian yung, because it is created by
the necessary and real t'i through the equally necessary and
real ch'i, cannot be other than necessary and real. By
contrast, Buddhist yung is conditional and illusory because
it has as its "direct generative cause" beings who have only
conditional and illusory existence. Furthermore, according to
Buddhism, what is conditional and illusory must be made
necessary and real. Nirmanakaya and Sambhogakaya, for
instance, are ultimately to be absorbed into Dharmakaya, just
as the Bodhisattvas,

P.356

Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and sentient beings are eventually
to be transformed into enlightened Buddhas. Therefore, while
Neo-Confucian t'i brings forth yung through the never-ending
process of "generation and regeneration, " Buddhist t'i
assimilates yung by converting yung into t'i which alone has
necessary and real existence.
To the extent that Buddhist Emptiness entails a t'i which
does not of itself generate yung, it is not a "creative
reality" and is thus rejected by the orthodox Neo-Confucians
as metaphysically nihilistic. In purely abstract terms, this
orthodox Neo-Confucian rejection is not indisputable, for
Buddhism in fact affirms a t'i which does not happen to be of
the Neo-Confucian kind. Nevertheless, it makes sense as a
statement on Buddhist Emptiness as the antithesis of
Neo-Confucian Principle. Emptiness conceptualizes a
thoroughly Buddhist universe which is diametrically opposed
to the Neo-Confucian world of Principle and to which Ch'an
Buddhism is not an exception. Ch'an(ay) has often been
claimed to be "a happy combination of Buddhist
transcendentalism and Taoist naturalism,"(41) into which "the
Chinese feeling for life has been assimilated."(42) However,
in terms of the t'i-yung relationship that it maintains,
Ch'an is still recognizably Buddhist. As examples, we may
turn to the pronouncements by Ta-chu Hui-hai(az) who was an
8th century monk and a disciple of Ma-tsu Tao-i(ba)
(719-788). Ta-chu used the t'i-yung analysis an a number of
occasions to clarify the apparently paradoxical nature of the
Ultimate Reality which he designated variously as "The
Absolute," "Dharmakaya," "Prajna, " and "Vimala" and in
Vimalakirti. On these occasions, the Ultimate Reality is said
to be possessed of a "substance" which "does not
differentiate" and is "formless, " "immaterial, " and
"spotless" and is in this sense considered to be a "void." At
the same time, the Ultimate Reality as "substance" is also
described by Ta-chu as "not void" because the "substance" of
the Ultimate Reality "contains functions as numerous as the
sands of the Ganges," "avails itself of the prevailing green
bamboos" and "yellow flowers" to "reveal" or "manifest
itself' and has the "kirti" of Vimalakirti as its "functional
manifestation" which "proceeds from the fundamental
substance." Significantly, however. Ta-chu characterized the
functioning of his "substance" as "responsive functioning"
(yingyung)(bb) which arises in response to "circumstances"
and "to the needs of

P.357

living beings like the moon being reflected in the
water."(43) Thus, as was the case with The Awakening of Faith
and Ch'eng-ch'ien's commentary on Fa-tsang's Treetise on the
Golden Lion, Ta-chu's t'i is still not the "direct generative
cause" of yung; and what has been referred to as Ch'an's
"dynamic and naturalistic reemphasis on the reality of the
phenomenal world and everyday life" actually operates in a
normatively Buddhist framework and is governed by a type of
t'i-yung relationship which, though reality-affirming in its
own terms, is nonetheless nihilistic in the Neo-Confucian
sense.
Being thus rejected as metaphysically nihilistic,
Buddhism was also condemned by the orthodox Neo-Confucians as
amoral. As is well known,a large part of this orthodox
Neo-Confucian attack on Buddhism as amoral was focused on the
Buddhist institution of monasticism or "leaving the home"
(ch'u-chia) (bc) which was an obvious affront to the
Neo-Confucian valuation of the family as the basis of the
Neo-Confucian ethical system of the Five Human Relationships
(wu-lun)(bd). It needs to be emphasized, however, that the
Neo-Confucian ethical system inhabits a broad moral sphere
which is coterminous with the metaphysical sphere of
Principle and that the two charges of amorality and nihilism
are interrelated and homologous. As a "creative reality,"
Neo-Confucian Principle creates a universe which is both real
and moral. Principle is thus simultaneously the reason for
creation and the source of goodness. Not surprisingly,
therefore, Buddhist Emptiness was viewed by the
Neo-Confucians not only as metaphysically nihilistic but also
as morally hollow. Ch'eng Hao, (n) for instance, while
accusing the Buddhists of attempting to "do away with the
Four Elements." also criticized them for having only
"seriousness to straighten the internal life but having no
righteousness to square the external life." As a result, he
said, "those who are rigid become like dry wood and those who
are relaxed end up in recklessness."(44) Ch'eng Hao's dual
rejection of Buddhism as metaphysically nihilistic and
morally hollow was echoed by Ch'eng I(o) and Chu Hsi,(aa)
both of whom, on the basis of their belief in the moral
character of Principle, attacked what appeared to them to be
the amorality of Buddhism. Ch'eng I denounced the Buddhists
for "desiring to forget about right and wrong" and said, "How
can right and wrong be forgotten? There is naturally the
Principle

P.358

of the Way in abundance. Why bother to forget [about right
and wrong]?"(45) Chu Hsi, on the other hand, took pains to
draw a distinction between the Confucian and Buddhist
conceptions of Nature. The Confucians, he said, maintain that
Nature is "intrinsically possessed of the Principle of the
Way in abundance" and that it embodies a definite sense of
"right and wrong" whereas the Buddhists regard Nature as an
"indeterminate" (hun-lun)(be) state of "things and affairs"
without any sense of "right and wrong." Consequently, the
Buddhists take "seeing" of any kind as Nature regardless of
whether or not the "seeing" involved is in accord with
Principle. "That is why," he said, the Buddhists "are
topsyturvy and are never right anywhere."(46) For the
Neo-Confucians like the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi who
envisioned metaphysics as "moral metaphysics,"(47) Buddhist
Emptiness which they judged to be metaphysically nihilistic
could not but also be amoral. It does not help to argue that
Buddhism in fact advocates compassion and universal salvation
as Bodhisattva ideals and prescribes sila or chien(bf)
("precepts) for both the monastic and lay communities, for
these ethical ideals and precepts are not anchored in the
reality of Principle which, as the "direct generative cause"
of yung, is also of itself creative of morals. The
Neo-Confucian charge of amorality thus follows directly as a
logical concomitant from the Neo-Confucian judgment that
Buddhist Emptiness is metaphysically nihilistic.
As noted earlier, Neo-Confucianism was a historically
constituted discourse. As such, it did not remain static, but
experienced changes over time. These changes have
implications for the Neo-Confucian anti-Buddhist criticisms
which also witnessed changes in correspondence with the
changes in the infrastructure of Neo-Confucianism as a
historical phenomenon. A case in point is Huang Tsung-hsi(bg)
(1610-1695) whose statements on Buddhism fully exemplify the
consistency between the changes in Neo-Confucianism and the
changes in its charges against Buddhism. In comparison with
the orthodox Neo-Confucians of the Sung, Huang was
intellectually more tolerant and pluralistic. He greatly
values diversity in thought and considered it important to
distinguish what he called the "purpose" or tsung-chih(bh) of
each philosophical school or thinker.(48) For this reason, he
was critical of his fellow disciple, Yun Jih-ch'u(bl) (fl.

P.359

1630's), for suggesting that "[philosophical] discussions
must be brought into unity." He said, "With regard to the
learning of the different paths and many deliberations,
Chung-sheng(bj) (i.e., Jih-ch'u) still has a certain rigidity
which has yet to be transformed."(49) Simiarly, Huang was
disparaging of Chou Ju-teng(bk) (l547-1629?) for composing
The Orthodox Transmission of the Doctrine of the Sages
(Sheng-hsueh tsung-chuan)(bl) which traced the development of
the sagely learning from the earliest sage kings through Wang
Yang-ming(bm)(1472-1529) and his disciples to Lu Ju-fang(bn)
(1515-1588) who was Chou's own mentor. This work, according
to Huang, was flawed by its tendency to lump the various
schools and thinkers together like "amalgamating gold,
silver, copper and iron into one vessel." As a result, it
failed to clarify what in Huang's terms was the "special
purpose of each school."(50)
In contrast with, and as an alternative to Chou's
Shen-hsiieh tsung-chuan, Huang compiled A Critical Anthology
of Ming Neo-Confucians (Ming-ju hsueh-an)(bo) which even
included what Huang judged to be "onesided views and mutually
opposed doctrines."(51) Huang admitted that the divergent
views of Ming Neo-Confucians were not all equally valid. Some
were "profound" and "pure" while others were "shallow" and
"imperfect." But they all reflected the complexity of "mind"
which "suffuses Heaven and Earth"; and they each embodied
what an individual thinker or school had attained.(52) The
attainment of each school or thinker constituted the
"purpose" of the school or thinker. This "purpose" was a
focal point of study and was a "gate whereby students might
gain entrance [into the Way]." Students, according to Huang,
should pay particular attention to the differences between
the many schools and thinkers. They should not try to seek
confirmation from thoughts or doctrines which were of the
same kind as their own. "Learning," Huang said, cannot be a
matter of "aiding water with water."(53)
Huang's valuation of diversity in thought underlay his
attitude toward Buddhism which he rejected ultimately but to
which he accorded a certain degree of truth-value. He was
therefore able to defend Lo Hunghsien(bp) (1504-1564), a
leading Ming Neo-Confucian, against criticisms of Lo's
interest in Buddhism and Taoism. He said, "For Mr. Lo, there
is not a place which is not a place of learning; and there is
not a person who is

P.360

not a companion in learning."(54) Without mentioning Ch'eng
I's name explicitly, Huang also took issue with Ch'eng's
statement that Buddhism need not be "investigated" but only
be judged and rejected on the basis of its "practice."(55) He
claimed that "it is not that the Buddhists do not have any
true perception whatsoever,"(56) but that they "do not probe
deeply enough" and as a result fall short of the
ultimate.(57) In this regard, Huang is markedly different
from the orthodox Neo-Confucians of the Sung period whose
criticisms of Buddhism were characterized by him as
"superficial." He said in his "introductory Remarks" to the
Ming-ju hsueh-an,

It is often said that in literary and practical accompl-
ishments the Ming did not measure up to former dynasties.
Yet in the philosophy of Principle it attained what other
dynasties had not. In everything Ming scholars made the
finest of distinctions and classifications, as if they
were sorting the hairs on an oxen or picking silk threads
from a cocoon. They thereby discovered what other
scholars had failed to discover. Though the Ch'engs and
Chu Hsi [in the Sungl spent many words in refuting the
Buddhists, they never got beneath the surface. Buddhism's
specious reasonableness and confounding of truth they
failed to point out. But Ming scholars were so precise in
their analysis that the Buddhists were completely exposed
and trapped.(58)
Huang did not specify in this passage how the orthodox
Sung Neo-Confucian criticisms of Buddhism might be considered
as "super-ficial." A clue, however, can be gained from the
Ming-ju hsueh-an where Huang rejected a number of Ming
Neo-Confucian criticisms of Buddhism, which had been standard
among the orthodox Neo-Conlucians of the Sung. For instance,
he denied that Buddhism was necessarily nihilistic.(59) He
pointed out that the Buddhists "regarded True Emptiness as
wonderful being"(60) and that they did not really intend to
negate things and emotions. He said,

The Buddhists consider happiness, anger, sorrow, joy,
Heaven,

P.361

earth and the myriad things to be coming into and going
out of existence in the midst of Emptiness. [These
emotions and things and the universe] do not obstruct the
circulation [of the Way]. What need is there for them to
be annihilated?(61)

He further maintained that Buddhism could not be
distinguished from Confucianism, and therefore refuted as
un-Confucian any characterization of it as a doctrine which
"transcends the world" (ch'u-shih) , (bq62) is "selfish"
(tzu-ssu)(br) or "self-interested" (tzu-li), (bs63) and is
solely concerned with the "inner" (nei)(bt) or "mind" but not
with the "outer" (wai)(bu) or "Nature."(64) According to
Huang, these orthodox Sung-style refutations of Buddhism
missed the crux of the real problem which, for Huang, lay in
Buddhism's "seeing function as Nature" (tso-yung
chien-hsing).(bv65) In Huang's terms, this meant that the
Buddhists saw only "substance in [its state of] circulation"
and that, as a result, they perceived only change, but not
constancy in the midst of change.(66)

As conceived by Huang, the universe had two aspects: the
active (tung)(bw) and the tranquil (ching).(bx) In its active
aspect, the universe appeared as the "circulation of great
transformation which does not cease day or night." This
aspect of the universe was "change" (pien) (by) which,
however, was not random, but contained within itself a cert
ain order or regularity. Therefore, Huang noted,

After spring, there is necessarily summer; and after
autumn.there is necessarily winter. Men do not transform
into things; and things do not transform into men.
Grassdoes not change into plants; and plants do not
change Into grass.(67)

This order or regularity represented the tranquil aspect
of the universe. It has "remained as it is since antiquity"
and is referred to by Huang as "true constancy"
(chen-ch'ang).(bz) These two aspects of the physical universe
also prevail in the life of man. In man, the active and
therefore changing aspect manifests itself as the circular
movement of emotions between the two states of "being
aroused" (i-fa)(ca) and "not-yet-aroused" (wei-fa).(cb) The
unchanging aspect or "true constancy" of man exists in

P.362

the midst of the changing emotional states as the four
Mencian "beginnings" of goodness, i.e., the four fundamental
feelings of commiseration, shame, deference and the sense of
right and wrong.(68)

The Confucians, according to Huang, saw both "change"
and"constancy" in man and the universe. By contrast, the
Buddhists saw only "change" but not "constancy." They
considered "change" as absolute or, as Huang put it, as
"uncreated and inextinguishable."(69) In this sense, what the
Buddhists actually saw was not really wrong; it only fell
short of the Ultimate Truth because they "did not probe
deeply enough" to see the "unchanging" in the midst of
change.(70) Being thus without the "true constancy" to rely
on, the Buddhists could not but drift with the flow of events
and were unable to maintain a firm sense of good and evil or
right and wrong.(71) For the same reason, the Buddhists had
to accept an "adverse" situation and "abide by it as if it
were fate." The Confucians, on the other hand, recognized
only "righteousness" (i).(cc) They did not concern themselves
with "life and death" or "propitiousness and adversity." They
"lived if it were righteous to live and died if it were
righteous to die."(72)

The "true constancy" which the Confucians perceived but
which the Buddhists missed was identified by Huang as
Principle(73) which he, like the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi,
considered to be the same as Nature. He said, "What pertains
to Heaven is Principle and what pertains to man is
Nature."(74) Moreover, Principle bears to ch'i(z) the same
kind of relationship that prevails between Nature and
mind.(75) Unlike Ch'eng and Chu Hsi, however, Huang
considered this relationship to be one of identity. He said
that Principle and material force or mind and Nature were
merely "concepts" (ming)(cd) created by man to describe two
different aspects of the same thing. When viewed in terms of
its change, the universe is called material force. But the
same universe is also called Principle because its change as
material force conforms to a pattern of"regularity" (tse)
.(ce) Principle and material force or mind and Nature are
therefore "two concepts for the same thing" (i-wu erh
liang-ming).(cf) They do not designate "two things which are
of the same substance" (liang wu erh i-t'i).(cb76) Ch'i(z) or
mind, from this point of view, refers not only to change but
to intrinsically "regular" change. whereas li(x) or Nature is
not only "regula-

P.363

rity" but the intrinsic "regularity" of ch'i(z) or mind as change.

Because Huang identifies li(x) and ch'i(z) or mind and
Nature as one, he denies that "ch'i must be governed by li,"
stating that to say so is to see "ch'i as a dead matter."(77)
For the same reason, Huang also denies that li is able to
generate ch'i(78) or that it has to be attached to ch'i in
order to circulate in the phenomenal world.(79) He thus
criticized Hsueh Hsuan(ch) (1389-1464) for using the simile
of "sunlight" and a "flying bird" which suggested that "li
became involved in activity by riding on the occasion of ch'i
just as rays of sunlight got into flight by riding on the
back of a flying bird."(80) Huang insists that both li and
chi are both active and tranquil. In their active aspect both
li and ch'i are "daily renewed" (jih-hsin).(ci) They both go
through the continual process of "coagulation and dispersion"
(chu-san);(cj) and neither the li nor the ch'i from the past
can be the li or the ch'i of the future. In their tranquil
aspect, however, both li and ch'i are "infinite and eternal"
(wu ch'iung-chin) (ck) and are without "coagulation and
dispersion."(81) Similarly, Huang denies the primacy of
Nature over mind, maintaining that Nature cannot be solely
identified with the tranquil state "before emotions are
aroused" or mind be solely identified with the active state
"after emotions are aroused." He regarded distinctions of
this kind between mind and Nature as fallacies of the Sung
Neo-Confucians, particularly Chu Hsi, who, though considering
mind as "the commander of Nature and emotions," never
actually ovcercame the view of mind and Nature as a
duality.(82)
Closely related to Huang's rejection of what he
considered to be the dualistic views of li and ch'i and mind
and Nature is his rejection of the characteristically Sung
Neo-Confucian concept of ch'i(z) or ch'i-chih(cl) ("physical
endowment") as a source of evil. He said that chi or
ch'i-chih is never evil and that what Chang Tsai called the
"nature of physical endowment" (ch'i-chih chih-hsing)(cm) is
nothing but Nature which is intrinsically and always good.
Huang allows that in the process of change, irregularities or
evil may occur in the form of "excesses" (kuo) (cn) or
"insufficiencies" (pu-chi).co Such irregularities or evils,
however, have nothing to do with chi. They occur only because
ch'i has lost its "original-so-ness"(pen-jan).(cp)But the chi
that has lost its "original-so-ness"is no longer really ch'i
which, being identified with li,is inherently regular

P.364

and can never be a source of evi1.(83) Huang pointed out
poignantly that Mencius only spoke of evil as a result of the
mind becoming "submerged"(hsien-ni),(cq) but never attributed
this "submergence" of mind to ch'i or ch'i-chih as a source
of evi1.(84) For Huang, therefore, there is no ch'i that is
not "spiritual" (ling)(cr) because ch'i is li.(85) Likewise,
there is no mind that is not "self-regulating" and
"self-regulated" (tzu-yu chu-tsai) (cs) because mind is
Nature."(86)The reason why ch'i is ch'i and mind is mind is
precisely that ch'i or mind contains within itself the
ordering principle of li or Nature.(87)

Huang's conceptualization of Ii and cch'i or mind and
Nature as on underlies his rejection of such Sung-style
criticisms of Buddhism as being concerned only with mind but
not with Nature. For Huang, this Sung position on Buddhism is
not tenable because it presupposes a dualistic view of mind
and Nature which regards Nature or li as external to mind.
Therefore, instead of refuting Buddhism as being concerned
only with mind and not with Nature, Huang maintained that the
Buddhists did not understand either mind or Nature and that
they did not understand Nature precisely because they did not
understand mind.(88) To regard the issue otherwise, as did
the Sung-style Neo-Confucians, was to commit the same kind of
fallacy that the Buddhists had committed. Huang observed that
although the Sung-style Neo-Confucians regarded li or Nature
as something to be integrated with mind (whereas the
Buddhists considered li as an "obstacle" (chang)(ct) to the
mind), they were the same in maintaining a dualistic view of
mind and Nature and in seeing Nature as external to mind.(89)

Again, the question is not whether Huang is justified in
his criticisms of Budd\hism or, for that matter, in his
refutations of Sung-style Neo-Confucianism. The point to be
emphasized is that his criticisms of Buddhism are fully
consistent with his refutations of Sung-style
Neo-Confucianism and that they both reflect a
characteristically Ming Neo-Confucian tenet which holds a
monistic view of li and ch'i or mind and Nature. As
Neo-Confucianism changed as a structure of signification, its
criticisms of Buddhism also changed as expressions of a
Neo-Confucian vision.

NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY

P.365

NOTES

1. Chin-i,(f) Mo-ho chih-kuan,(cu) in Taisho shinshu daizokyo
(cv) (hereafter cited as Taisho), Vol. XLVI. No. 1911,5a-
7b/52-100 (esp. 76-78)
2. Tsung-mi,(h) Yuan-jen lun,(cw) in Taisho, Vol. XLV, No.
1886, p. 708.
3. Ibid. Translation taken with minor modifications from de
Bary, ed., The Buddhist Tradition. New York: The Modern
Library (1969), p. 181.
4. Chih-yuan,(l) "Ssu-shih-erh-chang ching hsu,"(cx)
Hsien -chu p'ien,(cy) in Dai Nihon zoku zokyo,(cz), part
I, Series 2, Case 6, Vol. 1, 1/32a-b.
5. Chu Hri(au) and Lu Tsu-ch'ien, Chin-ssu lu chi-chu(da)(he-
reafter cited as Chinssu lu).(t) Taipei: Chung-hua
shu-chu (1966), 13/1a. Translation taken with minor
modifications from Wing-tsit Chan, tr., Reflections on
Things at Hand (hereafter cited as Reflections) New York:
Columbia University press (1967), pp. 279-280.
6. A. C. Graham. Two Chinese Philosophers. London: Lund
Humphries (1967). p. 85.
7. Chin-ssu lu, 13/3b;Chan.Reflections, pp. 285-286.
8. Grah-am, Two Chinese Philosophers,p.88.
9. Chin-ssu lu. 13/3a; Chan,Reflections, p 285.
10. Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-
Confucianism,"Etudes Song, Ser. II:1(1973). p.67.
11. Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (herea-
fter cited at Source Book). Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University press (1969), p. 637.
12. Ibid.
13. Chan.''Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism," p. 66.
14. Chu Hsi,(aa) Chu-tzu ch'uan-shu,(db) 1714 ed., 60/12b;
Chan, Source Book, p.646.
15. Ibid
16. Chu-tzu ch'uan-shu, 60/14b. Translation adapted from
Chan,Source Book, p. 648.
17. Chu-tzu ch'uan-shu. 60/15b-16b; Chan, Source Book, p. 649.
18. Clu-tzu ch'uan-shu. 60/14b. Translation adapted from
Chan,Source Book, p. 648.
19. Chu Hsi,(aa) Chu-tzu yu-lei,(dc)Taipei; Cheng-chung
shu-chu(1970), Vol. I. p.102.
20. Chang Tsai,(ad) Chang-tzu ch'uan-shu.(ad) Taipei:
Chung-hua shu-chu (1966). 2/22b.
21. Ibid. Trandation adapted from Chan.Reflections, p. 286.
22. Ho-nan Ch'eng-shih i-shu(de) (hereafter cited as Ch'eng-
shih i-shu).Shanghai: Commercial press (1935), p. 80;
Chan, Source Book, pp. 535-536.
23. Ch'eng-shih i-shu,p.24.

P.3 66

24. Ibid, p.80;Chan,Source Book, pp.535-536.
25. Ch'eng-shih i-shu,p.153.
26. Ibid., pp. 34-35;Chan,Source Book, pp. 533-534.
27. Chan,Source Book. p.565.
28. Ch'eng-shih i-shu, p.2l6;Chan,Source Book, p.564.
29. Ch'eng-shih i-shu, p. 300.
30. Charles Fu, "Morality or Beyond: The Neo-Confucian Confron-
tation with Mahayana Buddhism," Philosophy East and West,
XXIII:3 (July 1973), pp.390-391.
31. For the idea of shih-shih wu-ai,(ag) cf. Junjiro Takakusu,
The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy. Honolulu: Office
Appliance Co., Ltd. (1956), p. 119.
32. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, tr. by A.M.
Sheridan Smith New York: Harper & Row (1976), pp. 40-49.
33. Ibid.,pp. 31-39.
34. T'ang Chun-i,(ah) Chung-kuo che-hsueh yuan-lun yuan-hsing
p'ien,(df) Kow-loor. Hsin-ya shu-yuan yen-chin so (1974
pp. 336-367. The concept of "generation and regeneration"
is derived from the Book of Changes (cf. James Legge,tr.,
The I Ching. New York: Dover [1963],p. 356.)
35. Mou Tsung-san,(aj) Hsin-t'i yu hsing-t'i.(dg) Taipei:
Cheng-chung shu-chu (1973),Vol. I, pp. 33-42. The
following discussion is indebted to Professor Mou's
analysis of the problem of t'i(al) and yung(am) in Buddhism
(cf. ibid., pp.571- 657).
36. Cf. Chan,Sourre Book, pp, 357,436-437,n.44.
37. Ch'eng-ch'ien,(at) Chu chin-shih-tzu chang,(dh) in Dai
Nihon zoku zokyo.(cz) Part I, Series 2, Care 8, Vol. l,pp.
75b-78b (esp. p. 75b).
38. Yoshita S. Hakeda, The Awakening of Faith. New York: Colu-
mbia University Press (1967), pp. 65, 69-70.
39. Mou,Hsin-t'i yu hsing-t'i Vol.I.pp.6o7-616.
40. Ch'eng-ch'ien,(at) Chu chin-shih-tzu chang,(dh) pp. 75b-76
(a).
41. Fu, "Morality or Beyond: The Neo-Confucian Confrontation
with Mahayana Buddhism," p. 391.
42. Heinrich Dumoulin, A History of Zen Buddhism. New York:
McGraw-Hill (1965), p. 104.
43. Hui-hai(az), Tun-wu ju-tao yao-men lun(di) and Chu-fang
men-jen ts'an-wen yu-lu(dj) in Dai Nihon zoku zokyo,(cz)
Part I, Series 2, Case 15, Vol. 5, pp 425b,429a & 429b-
430a ; John Blofeld, The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai. London:
Rider & Co. (1969), pp. 77, 104, 111. The term ying-yung(bb)
is widely used in modern Chinese to mean "application" of
"applied" as, for instance, in the expression ying-yung k'
o-hsueh(dk) or "applied science." Most likely, however, it
is Buddhist in origin. As indicated by Hui-hai's use of
it, the term in tis original Buddhist sense exemplifies the
Buddhist concept of yung.

P.367

44. Ch'eng-shih i-shu, p. 80;Chan, Source Book, pp. 535-536.
45. Ch'eng-shih i-shu, p. 289.
46. Chu-tzu ch'uan-shu, 60/17a-19a.
47. For the concept of "moral metaphysics" cf. Mou, Hsin-t'i yu
hsing-t'i.Vol I, pp. 139-189.
48. Huang Tsung-hsi,(bg) Ming-ju hsueh-an.(bo) Taipei: Shih-
chien shu-chu (1965), "tzu-hsu," p. 1.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.,"fan-li,"p. 1.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., "tzu-hsu," p. l;cf. also "fan-li," p. 1.
53. Ibfd.,"fan-li,"p. 1.
54. Ibid., p. 158.
55. Ibid., p. 336. For Ch'eng I's statement, see Ch'eng-shih
i-shu. 15/166.
56. Huang,Ming-ju hsueh.an, p. 8.
57. Ibid., p.336.
58. Ibid., "fan-li,"p. 1.
59. Ibid., p. 151.
60. Ibid., pp. 8 & 371.
61. Ibid., p. 261.
62. Ibid., pp. 216-217.
63. Ibid., p. 336.
64. Ibid., pp. 336 & 486.
65. Ibid., pp. 7-8; cf. also pp. 101-102, 229, 311,352, 357.
66. Ibid., p. 8.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., pp. 8,126.
69. Ibid., p. 8.
70. Ibid., p. 336.
71. Ibid., pp. 8, 132.
72. Ibid., p. 607.
73. Ibid., p. 8.
74. Ibid., p. 485.
75. Ibid., p. 8.
76. Ibid., p. 466.
77. Ibid.,
78. Ibid., p. 524.
79. Ibid., pp. 485-486.
80. Ibid., p. 44.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., p. 486.
83. Ibid., p. 285;cf.also, pp.372-375,428.
84. Ibid., p. 399.
85. Ibid., p. 52;cf also pp.15,182.
86. Ibid., p. 448.
87. Ibid., p. 289.
88. Ibid., p. 486.
89. Ibid., pp.192,448.

p.368