A philosophical investigation

·期刊原文
The mind-body relationship in Pali Buddhism: A philosophical investigation

by Peter Havery
Asian Philosophy

Vol. 3 No. 1 1993

Pp.29-41

Copyright by Asian Philosophy

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ABSTRACT The Suttas indicate physical conditions for success in meditation,
and also acceptance of a not-Self tile-principle (primarily vinnana) which
is (usually) dependent on the mortal physical body. In the Abhidhamma and
commentaries, the physical acts on the mental through the senses and
through the 'basis' for mind-organ and mind-consciousness, which came to be
seen as the 'heart-basis'. Mind acts on the body through two 'intimations':
fleeting modulations in the primary physical elements. Various forms of
rupa are also said to originate dependent on citta and other types of rupa.
Meditation makes possible the development of a 'mind-made body' and control
over physical elements through psychic powers. The formless rebirths and
the state of cessation are anomalous states of mind-without-body, or
body-without-mind, with the latter presenting the problem of how mental
phenomena can arise after being completely absent. Does this twin-category
process pluralism avoid the problems of substance-dualism?

The Interaction of Body and Mind in Spiritual Development

In the discourses of the Buddha (Suttas), a number of passages indicate
that the state of the body can have an impact on spiritual development. For
example, it is said that the Buddha could only attain the meditative state
of jhana once he had given up harsh asceticism and built himself up by
taking sustaining food (M.I. 238ff.). Similarly, it is said that health and
a good digestion are among qualities which enable a person to make speedy
progress towards enlightenment (M.I. 95). The crucial spiritual quality of
mindfulness (sati), moreover, is first developed with processes of the
physical body as object. This enables mindfulness to be strengthened,
before being applied to more illusive mental states.

It is also clearly stated that the attainment of jhana, meditative trance,
has a marked effect on the body. Of the first of the four jhanas, it is
said that the meditator, "drenches, saturates, permeates, suffuses this
very body with joy and happiness" (M.I. 276f.). On the third jhana,
Buddhaghosa also refers to "the exceedingly superior rupa [matter]
originated by that happiness associated with the group of mental states
(nama-kaya)" (Vism. 163).

Physical and mental/spiritual states are thus seen as constantly
interacting; they are not two totally separate spheres. As Winston King
says:

at any given moment of experience, body-mind represents an intimate organic
unity. For though Buddhism recognizes a polarity between mental and
physical constituents of sentient beings, it never sharply divides them but
on the contrary strongly emphasizes the close relationship of all mental
and physical states. (1964, p. 19)

The 'Life-principle' (Jiva) and the 'mortal body' (Satira)

The Buddha was often asked a set of questions known as the 'undetermined
(avyakata) questions' which included 'is the life-principle the same as the
mortal body' and 'is the life-principle different from the mortal body?'.
The questions are said to be 'undetermined' because the Buddha did not
accept any of the views expressed in the questions. He 'set aside' the
questions as timewasting and misconstrued. The crucial reason that he saw
them as misconstrued was that he saw them as asking about a permanent Self
(S. IV. 395). In the case of the above questions: how is a permanent
Self/life-principle related to the mortal body? As he did not accept such a
Self, he could not accept any view on how it was related to the body! Apart
from this, he also seems not to have accepted either view because he saw
body and that which enlivened it as neither identical nor totally distinct.
That is, while he did not accept a permanent life-principle, he accepted a
changing, empirical life-principle. This life-principle was partly
dependent on the mortal physical body, but not in such a way that the death
of the body destroyed it; this would be to deny rebirth. The life-principle
is normally sustained by (and sustains) the body, but it can be sustained
without it, too.

The evidence for the Buddhist acceptance of a 'life-principle' is as
follows. At D.I. 157-58, the Buddha is asked the undetermined questions on
the life-principle. Part of his reply is that one who had attained any of
the four meditative jhanas would not give either answer. The same is then
said of someone in the fourth jhana who applies his mind to 'knowledge and
vision' (nana-dassana). Elsewhere, 'knowledge and vision' is said to
consist of a series of meditation-based knowledges (D.I. 76-7). The first
is where one comprehends:

This body (kayo) of mine has form (rupi), it is made from the four great
elements, produced by mother and father ... is subject to erasion,
abrasion, dissolution and distintegration; this is my consciousness
(vinnana), here supported (sitam), here bound.

This suggests that one who is proficient in meditation is aware of a kind
of life-principle in the form of consciousness (perhaps with some
accompaniments), this being dependent on the mortal physical body. In this,
consciousness is like its synonym citta, which is said to be 'without a
mortal body (asariram)' (Dhp. 37) but to be 'born of the mortal body
(sarira-ja)' (Thag. 355).

The early Buddhist understanding of the life-principle, in the context of
rebirth, can be seen at D. II. 332ff. Here, the materialist prince Payasi
feels that he has disproved rebirth as, when he put a criminal man in a
sealed jar and let him die, he saw no life-principle leaving the jar when
it was opened. In order to show that this gruesome 'experiment' does not
disprove rebirth, Maha-Kassapa argues that, as the prince's attendants do
not see his life-principle 'entering or leaving' him when he dreams, he
cannot expect to see the life-principle of a dead person 'entering or
leaving' (D. II. 334). Thus the life-principle is not denied, but accepted,
as an invisible phenomenon.

Certainly, the start of life, at conception, is seen as involving the
flux-of-consciousness, from a past life, entering the womb and, along with
the requisite physical conditions, leading to the development of a new
being in the womb:

'Were consciousness, Ananda, not to fall into the mother's womb, would
mind-and-body (nama-rupa) be constituted there?' 'It would not, Lord'.
'Were consciousness, having fallen into the mother's womb, to turn aside
from it, would mind-and-body come to birth in this present state?'. 'It
would not, Lord.' (D. II. 62-3)

It can thus be seen that the life-principle referred to by Maha-Kassapa
seems to be, in the main, the flux of consciousness which enters the womb
at conception and leaves the body at death.

In arguing against another 'experiment' of Payasi concerning a
life-principle, Maha-Kassapa says that a body "endowed with vitality, heat
and consciousness" is lighter and more pliable than a dead body, just as a
heated iron ball "endowed with heat and (hot) air" is lighter and more
pliable than a cool one (D. II. 334-5). Moreover, only a body so endowed
can be aware of sense-objects, just as a conch-shell-trumpet will only make
a sound when "endowed with a man, an effort and air" (D. II. 337-8).

A third simile is that of a fire-drill which will only make fire when
properly used, not when chopped up to look for the 'fire' in it (D. II.
340-2). That is, the life-principle is not a separate part of a person, but
is a process which occurs when certain conditions are present, namely
'vitality (ayu)' 'heat (usma)' and consciousness. This life-principle
complex relates to the body like heat and surrounding hot air to heated
iron. A more modern analogy might be to see it as like the magnetic-field
of a piece of magnetised iron: both heat and magnetism may be a property of
iron, but this does not prevent them being transferred to something else:
an analogy for rebirth.

It can thus be seen that the 'life-principle' accepted by the Suttas is a
complex of 'vitality, heat and consciousness'. 'Heat' is a physical
process, 'vitality' consists, according to the Abhidhamma, of one
'life-faculty' (jivit-indriya) which is physical, and one which is mental,
and consciousness is mental. This complex consists of conditionally arisen
changing processes, which are not identical with the mortal body (except
for heat and the physical life-faculty), nor totally different from it, but
partly dependent on it. If the life-principle is taken as a (non-existent)
substantial Self, it is meaningless to say that 'it' is the 'same as' or
'different from' the mortal body, but if it is recognised as not-Self, then
these views can be seen as actually false. The life-principle is neither
the same as nor different from the mortal body, as the relationship is that
of the mingling of mutually-dependent processes. Thus at S.I. 206, when a
nature-spirit (yakkha) says "'Material shape is not alive (na jivan)' say
the Buddhas, then how does this [life-principle] find this mortal body?",
the Buddha replies by outlining his view of the stages of embryonic growth.
As seen above, the mortal body of a person develops because consciousness,
the crucial factor in the life-principle process, enters the womb at
conception; consciousness then remains supported by and bound to the body
(though meditation can lead to it becoming less dependent on the body: see
below).

The Inter-relation of Nama and Rupa

The most common way of dividing the component processes of a person is into
'nama', literally 'name' and 'rupa', 'form', 'material shape'. Rupa is
said, in the Suttas, to consist of the 'four great elements', or the four
'primaries': solidity (literally 'earth'), cohesion (literally 'water'),
heat (literally 'fire') and motion (literally 'air'), and rupa 'derived'
(upadaya) from these. The Theravadin Abhidhamma enumerates the forms of
'derived' rupa as follows:

1-5: the sensitive parts of the five physical sense-organs;

6-9: visible appearance, sound, smell and taste;

10-12: the faculties of femininity, masculinity and physical life;

13-14: bodily intimation and verbal intimation (see below);

15: space;

16-23: lightness, pliability, workableness, integration, maintenance,
ageing, and impermanence of rupa, and nutritive essence (Dhs. section 596);
later texts also add the 'heart basis'--see below.

Of these, items 10-23 cannot be sensed by the physical sense-organs, but
are known only by the mind (Dhs. 980), be this by inference or
clairvoyance. Apart from the occurrence of the 'four great elements' and
the various forms of 'derived' rupa, all of which are mutually conditioning
in various ways, there is no 'material substance': rupa is just the
occurrence of these states or processes. However, D. J. Kalupahana argues
that the four primary elements can be seen as 'material substance' as they
are the underlying basis of 'derived' matter (1976, p. 100). He compares
this with John Locke's idea of material 'substance' as an imperceptible
basis which must be postulated as the 'support' for material qualities such
as hardness, shape or colour. This comparison is inappropriate, though, for
the Abhidhamma holds that the primary elements can be directly sensed, by
touch (at least in the case of solidity, heat and motion). He likewise
holds that citta is like a mental 'substance' as 'mental states'
(cetasikas) depend on it. But again, citta is not an unexperienceable
support of that which can be experienced. It is itself experiencable.
Having wrongly argued that the four elements and citta are like two
substances, Kalupahana then wrongly interprets a text as saying that these
cannot interact (1976, p. 99). He cites Ask 313, "Where there is a
difference of kind, there is no stimulus. The Ancients (porana) say that
sensory stimulus is of similar kinds, not of different kinds." Kalupahana
sees this as saying that mind and matter cannot affect each other, whereas
the context shows that it is simply saying the the sensitive part of a
sense-organ only responds to the relevant kind of stimulus (e.g. the ear to
sounds).

In the Suttas, nama is used to refer to all aspects of mind except
consciousness itself. In later texts, it usually also includes
consciousness. As 'name' it essentially refers to those states which are
intensional: which take an object. According to the Abhidhamma, this
differentiates all such states from the rupa states, which never take an
object (Dhs. 1408). On the other hand, states of nama (i.e. mental states)
have no rupa, or 'form', 'material shape'.

In the Abhidhamma, mental states and material states are seen as
interacting from the moment of conception. The Patthana Vol. I, pp. 5, 8,
9; see CR. I. 5-11) holds that, at this time, states of nama and rupa are
mutually related to each other by a number of conditions, the meaning of
which is explained by Vism. 535:

i) conascent (sahajata) condition (the states support each other by arising
together);

ii) mutuality (annamanna) condition (the states mutually arouse and
consolidate each other, like sticks in a tripod supporting each other);

iii) support (nissaya) condition (the states act as a foundation for each
other, as earth is a support or foundation for trees);

iv) presence (atthi) and non-disappearance (avigata) conditions.

Moreover (p. 7), throughout life, mental states act as 'postnascent'
conditions for physical ones, i.e. they help to consolidate those physical
states which have already arisen (Vism. 537).

The commentator Buddhaghosa explains the inter-dependence of the two at
Vism. 596. On its own, nama lacks efficient power, for it does not eat,
speak or move; likewise rupa lacks efficient power, on its own, for it has
no desire to do such things. Each can only 'occur' when 'supported by'
(nissaya) the other. The relationship between the two is like that of a
blind man (rupa) who carries an immobile cripple (nama) on his shoulders:
together they can prosper. They are like two sheaves of reeds which lean
against each other and support each other (Vism. 595). Buddhaghosa then
quotes an undetermined source in support of his position:

They cannot come to be by their own strength, Or yet maintain themselves by
their own strength; Conforming to the influence of other dhammas, Weak in
themselves and conditioned, they come to be. They come to be with others as
condition. They are aroused by others as objects; They are produced by
object and condition And each by a dhamma other [than itself]. (Vism.
596-7)

Of course, the reference to 'object', here, shows that the lines mainly
concern nama.

The Action of the Physical on the Mental

The most obvious way in which the physical affects the mental is through
the process of perceiving objects. From the Suttas it is clear that
consciousness (and other mental states) arise dependent on sense-organ and
sense-object. A common refrain is:

Eye-consciousness arises dependent on the eye and visible shape; the coming
together of the three is stimulation; from stimulation as condition is
feeling; what one feels one cognizes ... (e.g. M.I. 111)

Parallel things are also said about ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness,
tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness and mentation-consciousness. M.I.
190 makes it clear that a sense-consciousness is not only conditioned by a
sense-organ and its object, but also by an appropriate act of attention.
Again, in the Adhidhamma, it is clear that the arising of a
sense-consciousness is not only conditioned by physical factors, but also
by mental ones: the previous moments of cifra such as the bhavanga state,
the latent ground state of consciousness (Ptn. I. 312-13, 369; CR. I.
338-39, 407; Vism. 458-60). That is, consciousness is dependent on physical
states, but also on previous states of consciousness and other mental
states.

What, though, is said of whether there is a physical basis for
mind-consciousness? The Abhidhamma clearly specifies that there is such a
basis (vatthu), though it does not specify what it is. The Patthana (Vol.
I, p. 5; see CR. I. 6) says:

The rupa supported by which mentation-element (mano-dhatu) and
mentation-consciousness-element (mano-vinnana-dhatu) occur, that rupa is
related to them and their associated states by support condition ... by
presence condition ... by non-disappearance condition.

Likewise it is said (p. 72):

Conditioned by eye-sense-sphere is eye-consciousness; ... conditioned by
basis (vatthu) are (karmically) fruitional and functional indeterminate
(mental) groups. Moreover, karmically active mental states are also seen as
conditioned by such a basis (ibid). However, the physical 'basis' of mind
is itself said to be dependent on mental states, from the moment of
conception (p. 70). While this basis is always a 'prenascent' (i.e. prior)
condition for mentation (that which adverts to objects), it is not always
so for mentation-consciousness (p. 71). This must be because, at
conception, mentation-consciousness is that which is transmitted from a
dead person and, on entering the womb, conditions the development of a new
psycho-physical organism, including mentation and the physical basis for
the continuance of consciousness. In the ongoing flow of life, the mental
dhammas mutually condition each other, but are also conditioned by the
physical 'basis' (ibid.).

In the later Theravada tradition, the physical 'basis' of mind is specified
as the 'heart-basis' (hadaya-vatthu) (Vism. 537), and this was added to the
list of types of 'derived' rupa (the Sarvastivadin tradition remained
uncommitted as to what the 'basis' was). The heart was probably chosen as,
in terms of immediate experience, many emotional states seem to be
physically centred in the middle of the chest. Certainly, many of the
physical sensations associated with meditation are 'felt' here.

The 'heart-basis' is said to act as the 'support' for mentation-element and
mentation-consciousness-element, and to 'uphold' them, being itself
dependent on the blood (Vism. 447). Buddhaghosa sees the 'basis' as a tiny
region of the heart (Vism. 256), and dismisses the brain as a lump of
marrow in the skull (Vism. 259). W. F. Jayasuriya, though, argues that
'heart' is not literally meant, and that what may be referred to is the
entire nervous system (including the brain): which certainly is dependent
on (the oxygen supply in) blood (1963, appendix A). Yet if the 'basis' is
seen as present from conception, it cannot be identified, as such, with
either the heart or nervous system in their fully developed forms.

Buddhaghosa also holds that in being the 'basis' for mind-consciousness,
the heart-basis is not a 'door' for consciousness, like eye-sensitivity
(Vism. 451). That is, it is not a place where consciousness receives
content from outside (Asl. 85). It simply supports it occurrence.
Similarly, it is not a 'door' to setting up activity in the body, as
'bodily intimation' and 'vocal intimation' are (Vism. 451).

The Mind's Action on the Body

Perhaps the main way in which the mind produces effect in the body is
through states of mind leading to speech and physical behaviour. In the
Theravadin Abhidhamma, the two crucial intermediaries in these situations
are:

i) 'vocal intimation' (vaci-vinnatti);

ii) 'bodily intimation' (kaya-vinnatti).

In the Dhammasangani (sec. 596), these are described as forms of 'derived
(upada) matter (rupa)'. That is they are forms of matter dependent on the
'four great elements'.

'Bodily intimation' is defined (Dhs. 636) as follows:

That state of bodily tension or excitement, or state of excitement, on the
part of one who advances, or moves back, or fixes the gaze, or glances
round, or retracts an arm, or stretches it forth: the intimation, the
making known, the state of having made known a citta (mind-moment or
thought) ...

Dhs. 637 says much the same on 'vocal intimation'. That is, both are seen
as physical states which make known a thought. As Buddhaghosa says, they
'display intention' (Vism. 448f.) and communicate (Asl. 82 and 87). as
among states of rupa which are 'citta-born' and 'citta-caused', as
'originated from citta'. However, the two intimations are the only kind of
rupa which are said to be 'coexistent with citta' (Dhs. 669) and to 'follow
after citta' (Dhs. 671). That is they are the only kind of material dhammas
that last no longer than a moment of citta, and change in unison with
citta.

In his commentary on these passages, though (Asl. 337), Buddhaghosa
explains that, "in the ultimate sense", only the phenomena on which the two
intimations depend are genuinely "originated from citta", and neither are
they literally "coexistent with citta". This is because a cifra exists only
for one seventeenth of the time a rupa dhamma lasts (Vism. 614). In fact,
Buddhaghosa sees the two intimations as only 'nominal' dhammas (Vism. 450):
they are not separate dhammas, but only aspects of other 'real' rupa
dhammas, which can be said to be genuinely 'originated from citta'. They
are 'nominal' in a similar way to that in which the 'impermanence' of rupa
is a nominal dhamma.

As Ask 83 explains:

Now the body originated from citta: that is not 'intimation'. But there is
a certain alteration in the mode (akara-vikaro) of the primary (physical)
elements when set up by citta, through which, as condition, the motion
element is able to strengthen and agitate the conascent body. This is
intimation.

More specifically, Vism. 447-8 says:

Bodily intimation is the alteration in the mode in the citta-originated
motion element that causes the occurrence of moving forward etc., which
alteration in the mode is a condition for the tension, upholding and moving
of the conascent rupa-body.

Similarly,Vism. 448 sees vocal intimation as an 'alteration in the mode in
the citta-originated solidity element'.

Thus the two intimations are seen as fleeting modulations in the 'motion'
and 'solidity' elements, which modulations can last as long as a citta
(mind-moment), but not as long as other rupa dhammas. They are 'nominal'
dhammas as they are merely modulations of other 'real' dhammas.

Thus the mind sets up movement in the body by altering the mode of rupa
produced by citta. Non-solid mind does not so much 'bump into' extended,
solid matter, as modulate the way in which aspects of matter arise. Note
that the 'motion/air' element might be related to the modern concept of
electrical discharges in the nerves: at M.I. 185ff., there is reference to
"airs/winds which shoot across several limbs". In that case, the mind would
move the body by effecting the electrical modulation of nerve discharges.

The Meaning of 'Citta-originated'

The discussion still leaves the meaning of 'citta-originated'
(citta-samutthana) rupa states to be determined. Dhs. 667 holds that the
two intimations are always 'citta-originated', and that certain other rupa
dhammas, including the four primary elements, may be, when they are 'born
of citta', 'citta-caused' (citta-ja, citta-hetuka). Does this imply that
citta can actually create certain kinds of matter, or what?

The Patthana (Vol. I, pp. 22-23) holds that there are four ways in which a
rupa dhamma may 'originate': by citta, by karma, and by natural physical
processes related to 'nutriment' and temperature. Nevertheless, citta
cannot 'originate' matter on its own: citta-originated rupa arises
dependent on the primary elements, and skilful or unskilful mental
processes (ibid). This is because any 'derived' rupa depends on the primary
elements, and these always arise dependent on each other. Thus the position
of the Theravadin Abhidhamma seems to be that citta can produce or create
certain kinds of matter, but not literally 'out of nothing', for
'citta-originated' matter is also dependent on other forms of matter.

The kind of mental processes that can 'originate' rupa are said to include:
desire, energy, thought (citta), investigation (when concentrated these are
the 'four bases of psychic power'), volition, and meditative trance (jhana)
(Ptn. I, pp. 2, 7, 8). These act as conditions for the origination of rupa
dhammas by being conascent with them (i.e. born at the same time), and
supporting them by their continued presence (pp. 5, 8, 9).

As explained by Buddhaghosa (Vista. 624):

The citta-originated becomes evident through one who is joyful or grieved.
For the rupa arisen at the time when he is joyful is smooth, tender, fresh
and soft to touch. That arisen at the time when he is grieved is parched,
stale and ugly.

This clearly implies that mental states effect the kind of physical states
that arise in the body. As Asl. 82 says:

When a thought 'I will move forward or step back' occurs, it sets up bodily
qualities. Now there are eight groups of these bodily qualities: the four
primaries ... and the four depending on these: colour, odour, taste, and
nutritive essence [examples of 'derived' rupa]. Among these, motion
strengthens, supports, agitates, moves backward and forward the conascent
material body.

The Mind-made Body

While mental processes are normally seen as conditioned by physical ones,
there are said to be situations where this is less so than normal. Thus one
Sutta passage, after referring to an awareness of consciousness as
dependent on the physical body (see above, life-principle section), refers
to a meditative state in which the meditator applies himself to calling up
a 'mind-made body' (mano-maya kaya):

He calls up from this body another body, having form, mind-made, having all
limbs and parts, not deficient in any organ. Just as if, O king, a man were
to pull a reed out of its sheath, he would know 'This is the reed, this the
sheath. The reed is different from the sheath. It is from the sheath that
the reed has been drawn forth'. (D.I. 77)

This shows that that consciousness is seen as able to leave the physical
body by means of a mind-made body. Such a body could be seen as a kind of
'subtle body', for a being with a mind-made body is said to feed on joy
(D.I. 17), not on solid nutriment (D.I. 195): it thus lacks the four great
elements of the physical body (solidity, cohesion, heat and motion: D.I.
195). As such a body relates to the 'realm of (pure) form', the subtle
matter composing it can only be visible and audible matter (Vibh. 405).
However, the mind-made body is invisible to the normal eye (Pati. II. 209).
It occupies space, but does not impinge on gross physical matter, for the
'selfhood' of a certain god with a mind-made body is said to be as large as
two or three fields, but to cause no harm to anyone (A. III. 122). With
such a body, a person can exercise psychic powers such as going through
solid objects, being in many places at once, or flying (D.I. 78).

Psychic Powers

In the Suttas, there is a standard list of meditation-based 'psychic
powers' (iddhis). These include: multiplying one's form; going through a
wall as if through space; diving into the earth as if through water;
walking on water as if on the ground; flying, crosslegged, through the air
(M.I. 494). The Buddha is said to have claimed that he could do these
either with his mind-made body, or with his physical body of the four
elements (S.V. 283). At D. II. 89, for example, the Buddha crosses a river
by simply disappearing from one bank and instantaneously appearing on the
other.

Such powers, if one is to take them seriously, clearly involve remarkable
'mental' control of matter, whether this be the matter of one's own body or
of objects passed through, for example. In discussing such powers,
Buddhaghosa says that when, for example, diving into the earth, the earth
usually only becomes water for the performer (Vism. 396), but it can also
become water for others too. This suggests that, when psychic powers are
exercised by means of the 'mind-made' body, there is no effect on ordinary
matter, but that when it is done with the physical body, such matter is
affected.

The late canonical text the Patisambhidamagga goes into some detail on how
the powers are developed. They require that a person has attained one of
the meditative jhana states and has developed the four 'bases of psychic
power': concentration of desire, of energy, of thought and of investigation
(Pati. II. 205). As seen above, these four states are listed in the
Patthana as mental states which can 'originate' rupa states. To develop the
power of diving through the earth, the meditator attains meditative
concentration by focussing on water, then makes water appear where there is
earth (p. 208). To walk on water or fly, meditation is on earth, then earth
is made to appear in water or the air (ibid). The implicit principle, here,
is that by focusing on, investigating, and gaining knowledge of an element
(e.g. earth/solidity), one can gain power over it, and change other
elements into it. The later tradition, though, holds that all physical
matter contains all four primary elements, though in different 'intensity'.
Thus to change water into earth, the solidity element in it becomes
predominant rather than the cohesion element.

All this suggests that, in the Buddhist view, the mind purified, calmed and
tuned by meditative concentration has great transformative power over
matter, and that the physical world is not as stable as is normally seen.
Its transformation is not seen as 'miraculous' or super-natural, though,
just super-normal. It is done in a law-like way by drawing on the power of
the meditative mind.

The Formless State

However much the mind is seen as normally inter-dependent with body,
Buddhism also accepts that there are levels of existence where only mental
phenomena exist, with nothing whatever of rupa. These are the four
'formless' (arupa) rebirths:

i) the sphere of infinite space;

ii) the sphere of infinite consciousness;

iii) the sphere of nothingness;

iv) the sphere of neither-cognition-nor-non-cognition.

They correspond exactly to four meditative states, with the same names,
attainable from the fourth jhana. The first is attained by transcending any
cognition of rupa; that is, by abandoning the metal image that was
previously the object of concentration, and seeing that space is infinite.
In the second state, the focus is on the consciousness that had been aware
of infinite space. In the third, this object is dropped, and the focus is
on the apparent nothingness remaining. In the fourth, this object is
dropped and the mind is in an attenuated state where it is hardly
functioning (Vism. ch. x).

In these rebirth realms, there are feelings, cognitions, constructing
activities such as volition, and mind-consciousness. There are none of the
five forms of sense-consciousness, nor even mind-element (mano) (Vibh.
407). The 'beings' of such a level are clearly seen as totally bodiless,
but this means that their mode-of-being is far from normal. Their 'mode of
personality' (atta-patilabha) is said to be 'formless, made of cognition'
(D.I. 195), and their predominant awareness is of such things as infinite
space. Thus, while they can be seen as composed of mind separated from any
matter, this separation leads to a transformation in their nature: mind
cannot be separated from matter without this having an effect on mind. A
'formless' being has thoughts devoid of any kind of sense-perceptions.

The State of Cessation

From the meditative sequence described above, going through the 'formless'
attainments, it is also held that a further state can be attained by a
meditator. This is the 'cessation of feeling and cognition', or simply the
'attainment of cessation'. This is an anomalous state that, by the
combination of profound meditative calming, and of meditative insight, all
mental states come to a complete halt. The mind totally shuts down, devoid
of even subtle feeling and cognition, due to turning away from even the
very refined peace of the fourth formless level. In this state, the heart
and breathing stop (M.I. 301-02), but a residual metabolism keep the body
alive for up to seven days. Only an Arahat, the highest saint who has fully
attained Nibbana, or a Non-returner, the second highest saint, can
experience cessation (A. III. 194; Vism. 702); they emerge from it
experiencing the 'fruit' of their respective attainment (Vism. 708). It is
thus one possible route to experiencing Nibbana.

In the Suttas, it is said that, while a dead person is without vitality and
heat, and their sense-organs are 'scattered', a person in cessation still
has vitality and heat, and his sense-organs are 'purified' (M.I. 296). In
other contexts (D. II. 334-5), it is said that a living person is one
endowed with 'vitality, heat and consciousness'. At M.I. 296, it is notable
that there is no reference to consciousness. In the Theravadin view, as
expressed by Buddhaghosa in chapter 23 of Vism. (pp. 702-9), cessation is
'the non-occurrence of citta and mental states as a result of their
successive cessation' (p. 702). A person in this state is 'without citta'
(p. 707). Not even the latent form of mind present in dreamless sleep,
bhavanga, is said to be present. A person in this state is seen as only a
body, with no mental states whatever.

The philosophical problems this raises is: when the meditator emerges from
this state, and mental states recommence, how does this occur? If there are
only physical states occurring in cessation, does this mean that mind
re-starts thanks to these alone? This issue is discussed by Griffiths
(1986), looking at the Theravadin, Sarvastivadin, Sautrantika and Yogacara
views on the matter.

The Suttas emphasise that no thought 'I will emerge' immediately leads up
to emergence from the state, but that this occurs simply because the mind
of the meditator has been 'previously so developed' (M.I. 302). For the
Theravada, Buddhaghosa explains that emergence occurs due to the intention
made before cessation was entered. Cessation then lasts for a
pre-determined time unless interrupted by death, the call of the monastic
community, or of a person's teacher.

Now in Buddhist Abhidhamma theory, mental states only lasts for a
micro-moment before decaying and being replaced by other mental-states.
Physical states last for slightly longer moments. If this is so, it would
seem that the only way an intention can effect a future event is if it sets
in train a causal chain culminating in that event, During cessation, the
components of that chain can only be physical states. This implies that it
is these which lead to the emergence. Griffiths sees this as an implication
which the Theravada does not want to embrace, due to its 'dualism', in
which mental events are not seen to directly arise from physical ones
(1986, p. 37). This overlooks the fact, though, that the Theravadin
Abhidhamma does talk of a physical 'basis' for mentation-consciousness and
mentation-element (see above). While normally these are also dependent on
prior moments of the same type, 'cessation' is clearly not a normal-type
state, and so may acceptably be seen as one in which the physical 'basis'
alone, thanks to a prior intention, leads to the arising of
mentation-consciousness and mentation-element, at emergence from the state.
As even Griffiths admits, the Theravadins see at least one physical
event--death--as leading to emergency from cessation. This is because
bhavanga, a state of citta, occurs at the moment of death, so that
cessation is no longer operative then. As to how the call of the community
or a teacher ends cessation, this is not stated. It could be either through
stimulating the body to re-start the mind, or perhaps a more direct
'mental' stimulation of the organism.

The Sarvastivadin view of emergence from cessation is that it is directly
produced by the last moment of mind before entering cessation. This is
possible, in their view, because past, future and present dharmas all
'exist' in some sense. Thus A can directly affect B even if they are
separated in time. The Sautrantikas, on the other hand, held that the body
alone leads to emergence from cessation, as it has been 'seeded' by prior
moments of mind. The Yogacarins (a Mahayana school) hold that a form of
residual consciousness remains in cessation. This is the
'store-consciousness' (alaya-vijnana), a concept in some ways similar to
the bhavanga citta of the Theravadins.

Conclusion

Pali Buddhism's overall understanding of the mind-body relationship is thus
as follows:

i) There is a clear differentiation between dhammas which are intensional
(part of nama) and those which pertain to material form (rupa).

ii) Nevertheless, not all rupa dhammas can be sensed by a physical sense
organ; some must be inferred or clairvoyantly known: thus rupa does not
refer simply to that-which-is-(physically)-sensed, as some have held
(Johansson, 1979, p. 34).

iii) While nama is centred on citta and rupa is centred on the 'four great
elements', there is no dualism of a mental 'substance' versus a physical
'substance': both nama and rupa each refer to clusters of changing,
interacting processes.

vi) The processes of nama and rupa also interact with each other, from the
moment of conception, mutually supporting each other.

v) For a life to begin, there must be the coming together, in the womb, of
appropriate physical conditions and a flow of consciousnss from a previous
life.

vi) Life continues while there is 'vitality, heat and consciousness' in a
person, these comprising a conditioned, empirical life-principle that is
neither identical with nor entirely different from the mortal body, but is
(normally) dependent on and bound to such a body.

vii) In the normal situation, mental processes are affected by physical
ones in that the physical sense enables there to be types of consciousness
that would not otherwise exist (the five sense-consciousnesses), and give
specific kinds of input-content to the mind; the physical mind-basis also
support the occurrence of mentation (that which is aware of mental objects)
and mentation-consciousness.

viii) In the normal situation, certain mental processes also lead to the
origination of certain types of physical processes (which are also
dependent on other physical processes), and some of these (mind-originated
motion- and solidity-elements), in turn, may be modulated by mental
processes so as to lead to specific bodily movements or vocal
articulations.

ix) Death leads to the break-up of the normal mind-body interaction, such
that consciousness, and certain accompaniments, flow on to another life.

x) Four of the many forms of rebirth are anomalous in that they remain
totally free of physical form: but when there is thus nama unaccompanied by
rupa, nama itself occurs in a different way from normal. The mind cannot be
simply separated from the body without it undergoing change.

xi) Another anomalous state is that of 'cessation', where there is
temporarily a living body and yet no consciousness whatsoever. Again, when
nama restarts after cessation, it does so in a new way, with a deeper level
of insight. A plausible route for the restarting of mental processes is the
physical mind-basis.

xii) Other non-normal patterns of interaction between mind and body are
found in the cases of development of the 'mind-made' body and the exercise
of psychic powers. As in the cases of the formless rebirths and cessation,
these non-normal cases are dependent on the power of meditation to bring
about transformations in the normal pattern of nama-rupa interaction.

The 'mind-body' relationship, then, is seen as a pattern of interaction
between two types of processes. The interactions which take place between
these two sets of processes are part of an overall network of interactions
which also include mental-mental and physical-physical interactions.
Neither the two sets, or the processes they comprise, are independent
substances, for they are streams of momentary events which could not occur
without the interactions which condition their arising. Meditation has the
power to alter the usual patterns of interaction into non-normal
configurations, which accordingly affect the type of process-events that
arise.

As I have argued elsewhere, however, the Pali Suttas (though not later Pali
material) includes indications that the early Buddhists regarded
consciousness (vinnana) as able to 'break free' of the network of
interactions (Harvey, 1989; 1990, pp. 61-68, 58). Indeed, the Suttas often
see personality as a vortex of interaction not between nama (including
consciousness) and rupa, but between consciousness and nama-rupa (D. II.
32, 63-4, S. III. 9-10). By turning away from all objects, seen as
ephemeral and worthless, consciousness could become objectless. 'It' would
then not be a limited, conditioned process, but the unconditioned: Nibbana.
Unlike the situation of cessation, this would not be the complete absence
of consciousness, but the timeless experience of a 'consciousness' which
had transcended itself by dropping all objects.

REFERENCES

GRIFFITHS, PAUL, J. (1986) On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the
Mind-body Problem (LaSalle, IL, Open Court).

HARVEY, PETER (1989) Consciousness Mysticism in the Discourses of the
Buddha, in: K. WERNER (Ed.) The Yogi and the Mystic--Studies in Indian and
Comparative Mysticism (London, Curzon Press).

HARVEY, PETER (1990) An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and
Practices (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).

JAYASURIYA, W. F. (1963) The Psychology and Philosophy of Buddhism
(Colombo, YMBA Press).

JOHANSSON, RUNE E. A. (1979) The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism
(London, Curzon Press).

KALUPAHANA, D. J. (1976) Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu, Hi, University
Press of Hawaii).

KING, WINSTON (1964) In the Hope of Nibbana--An Essay on Theravada Buddhist
Ethics LaSalle, IL, Open Court).

ABBREVIATIONS

References are to the Pali Text Society's editions, except in the case of
Ptn., where reference is to the Pali Publication Board's edition.

A. Anguttara Nikaya: part of the Canonical Sutta
collection.

Asl. Atthasalini: Buddhaghosa's commentary on Dhs. (qv.).

CR. Conditional Relations, U. Narada's translation of Ptn.

D. Digha Nikaya: part of the Canonical Sutta collection.

Dhp. Dhammapada: part of the Canonical Sutta collection.

Dhs. Dhamma-sangani: part of the Canonical Abhidhamma.

M. Majjhima Nikaya: part of the Canonical Sutta collection.

Pati. Patisambhidamagga: part of the Canonical Sutta
collection.

Ptn. Patthana: part of the Canonical Abhidhamma.

S. Samyutta Nikaya: part of the Canonical Sutta collection.

Thag. Theragatha: part of the Canonical Sutta collection.

Vibh. Vibhanga: part of the Canonical Abhidhamma.

Vism. Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa.

~~~~~~~~

By PETER HARVEY

Peter Harvey, School of Social and International Studies, University of
Sunderland, Sunderland SR2 7EE, UK.
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