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The metaphysics of Buddhist experience

       

发布时间:2009年04月18日
来源:不详   作者:Francis H. Cook
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·期刊原文
The metaphysics of Buddhist experience and the Whiteheadian encounter

BY Kenneth K. Inada
Philosophy East and West
Vol. 25/1975.10
P.465-487
(C) by the University of Hawaii Press


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P.465


In many respects, the metaphysics of Buddhism is
equal or even superior to that of Whitehead's. It is
so deep and implicated that, to date, no ample
philosophic justification has been accorded it. On
the other hand, it falls short of Whitehead's system
in terms of a consistent and systematic treatment,
that is, "to frame a coherent, logical, necessary
system of general ideas in terms of which every
element of our experience can be interpreted."'
Whitehead was blessed with a good mathematical and
scientific background and the time to mature his
thinking which arise from such a background to touch
upon the final things that count. For all intents
and purposes, his metaphysics was nearly complete,
such that he dared to articulate an exhaustive
categorical scheme.

With the Buddha, however, we see a different
story. Any treatment of any entity or aspect of
reality was suspect for he did not allow any
definitive metaphysicizing, generally referred to as
views or points of view concerning reality (d.r.s.ti
or ditthi).(2) Yet, despite strong condemnation of
metaphysical views, we note that in subsequent
Buddhist literature, both in the Theravaada and
Mahaayaana traditions, there is a vast array of
doctrines dealing with empirical or phenomenal
matters, together with the so-called nonempirical or
non-phenomenal matters, to suggest indeed a serious
attempt at a complete accounting of the nature of
things. This attempt becomes more prominent with the
Mahaayaana schools of thought, but the Theravaada,
or early foundational doctrines, are kept intact and
are only expanded.

In a rather strange way then there is a
convergence on a similar philosophical track by
Whitehead and Buddhism. But the convergence is, from
the Buddhist side, unintentional and places some of
us who are Western-oriented in an awkward position
of being a bit presumptive in the comparative
analysis. More than this, I suppose, a comparative
approach would be strained and pointless unless we
can present a fairly strong case for a Buddhist
metaphysics of experience along the general lines
delineated by Whitehead. Therefore, I shall first
try to construct a consistent Buddhist metaphysical
basis of experience, one which is based on the faith
and premise that the Buddhist view of reality is
complete and sufficient.

I. BUDDHIST REALITY

General Remarks

Within a few centuries of the Buddha's demise,
Buddhism distinguished itself from other "forsaken
ways" by the well-known Three Marks (tri-lak.sa.na),
that is, impermanence (anitya), non-self (anaatman)
and the enlightened state of existence (nirvaa.na).
Later on, universal suffering (du.hkha) was added to
make the Four Marks. Buddhist literature is replete
with references to these doctrines as a way of
extolling the Buddhist way of life, but there is
hardly any systematic accounting of them in ways
that would render understanding their true import
clear and unmistakable. In the highly metaphysical
treatment of dharmas, such as in the Abhidharma
section, the analysis turns out to be too


P.466


succinct, too abstract, and too presumptive of basic
Buddhist knowledge. Given this state of affairs, it
is indeed significant that Buddhism was able to
perpetuate itself by reaching down to the masses and
commanding their attention; given the same state of
affairs, on the other hand, it is indeed
understandable why there have been generated so many
variant and misleading conceptions in the name of
Buddhism. This certainly calls for a reexamination
of what we call Buddhist reality.

The four doctrines mentioned earlier are, to be
sure, crystallizations of Buddhist thought over the
years, but they are nevertheless good indicators and
guidelines to follow in any metaphysical
understanding. In many ways, they constitute the
marks of Buddhist reality, in the sense that any and
all entities or elements of experience must be in
conformity with them. To the non-Buddhist, it is
rather difficult to comprehend, without adequate
exemplification, the nature and function of these
marks.

The first factor to note is that the four
doctrines are not principles which govern or order
the nature of existence. They are purely descriptive
of true reality and never deterministic in any way.
Moreover, none is aloof from the empirical nature of
things. As a matter of fact, it is really the other
way around, that is, each is educible from the
empirical nature of things. The second factor is
that all four have the character of mutually
amplifying and defining each other. They involve or
implicate each other and are not separated or given
an independent status of whatever nature. For
example, the doctrines of impermanence and non-self
have a similar character in that as non-self is the
"ontological" opposite of self (aatman), so is
impermanence the opposite of permanence (nitya). As
such, both are antithetic to any persisting entities
and both point at the selfsame facet of reality. The
third factor is that nirvaa.na, as the enlightened
content, is at once in harmony, indeed identifiable,
with the nature expressed by the doctrines of
impermanence and non-self. These three doctrines, as
the Sanskrit language reveals, are negative terms
depicting the reality of things. The other side of
these negative terms, of course, is the fact of
universal suffering (du.hkha). Suffering has then an
unique function and meaning in Buddhism. It is the
starting point but a point that is not left behind
or completely obliterated without "traces" or
references. It remains just as much a part of
reality, albeit in a deficient sense. And herein
lies the basis for the inclusive and extensive
nature of Buddhist reality.

The Genetic Structure of Experience

No one intent on understanding the basic elements of
experience could ill afford to gloss over the
Abhidharma section of the Tripitaka [Three baskets
of knowledge]. As stated earlier, this section is a
very abstract presentation, which rambles on in
detail and repetition of the mass of doctrines and
factors of experience, including the subtle factors
leading to the enlightened realm; but

P.467

it must be granted that the section. being a later
development in Buddhist literature, does integrate,
focus on and give a structural analysis of
experience. It brings into focus the principal ideas
manifest in the Suutra (Discourses) and Vinaya
(Disciplines) sections.

It is to be noted that the structural nature of
experience is not forsaken by the Mahaayaana
developments, although some schools may show trends
of denying or not bothering with such a scheme. And
in time no doubt some modern scholars will take up
such trends and analyze only those unique features
beyond the basic Abhidharmic thought, in order to
confer independent statuses to the schools in
question. This is too simplistic and erroneous. It
runs counter to the Buddhist spirit of "unity and
diversity" and does not heed the advice enunciated
so clearly by the various patriarchs from
Naagaarjuna, Buddhaghosa, Hui-neng to Shinran that
they were only transmitting what the Buddha had
taught. One case in point is the philosophy of
Vasubandhu. He was an Abhidharmist converted to
Mahaayaana at the instigation of his brother
Asa^nga. But conversion was not abandonment of
previous doctrines. In the subsequent school which
Vasubandhu helped to establish, the Vij~naanavaada
(Fa-hsiang, Consciousness-only or Phenomenalistic
school) , the basic structure of experience is
retained but rendered more elaborate and
accommodative by way of the 100 dharmic analyses. In
the analysis, Vasubandhu was careful to give due
respect to the foundational elements but added new
elements or phases of experience in order to present
a more consistent and coherent nature of the highly
complex functions of the mental pole. Let us keep
this in mind and return to the discussion at hand.

The genetic structure of experience has been
described in different ways, from the general to the
more specific and detailed.

1. Five skandhas (constituents of being)

a. ruupa (corporeal nature of being)

b. vedanaa (sensitivity or general feeling
of being, in the sense that a being is a
"bundle of feeling")

c. ssamj~naa (integrated awareness of
perceptual objects)

d. sa.mskaara (activity in the being
relative to the perceptual objects)

e. vij~naana (discriminative play of ideas
or concepts based on the perceptual objects)


The five skandhas are listed serially to show the
genetic flow, the continuity, from the basic
corporeal nature and up to the conscious realm. Each
component implicates or flows into the other realm.
In the already complex organism that we are, the
inception of any particular experience is hard to
pinpoint or locate. because we must be mindful of
the doctrines of anitya and anaatman. The early
Buddhists spoke of sixteen moments of existence
before one becomes conscious of a perceptual object.
The moments in question are the momentary How within
the skandhas. Thus, according to this theory, we are
forever "looking" to the past moments for the thing
or object.

P.468


2. Twelve aayatanas (bases of Being)
Six "internal'' bases: Six "objective" bases:
A. Sense faculties (indriyas) B. Objective realms (vi.sayas)
1.eye (cak.sus) 7. eye objective datum (ruupa)
2.ear (srotra) 8. ear objective datum (`sabda)
3.nose (ghraa.na) 9. nose objective datum (gandha)
4.tongue (jijhvaa) 10. tongue objective datum (rasa)
5.body (kaaya) 11. body objective datum (spra.s.tavya)
6.mind (manas) 12. mind objective datum (dharma)


The best way to describe the aayatanas is by
reference to the empiricist's (Humean) accounting of
perceptual process, that is, that one sees with the
eye, hears with the ear, etc., with the rise of the
respective attendant subjective-objective
components. In this way, there is no mere subject or
mere object apart from the ongoing process. The one
advance of the Buddhist, here, is the treatment of
the mind as just another sense faculty, an
integrative one, whose objective components are by
and large fed by way of the five senses. The mind is
never closed in this sense but always remains a
fluid force which integrates as well as gives
direction to the continuity of being.

3. Eighteen dhaatus (spheres or regions of being)

1. ear faculty 13. consciousness by way of the eye
2. ear faculty region or realm (cak.sur-vij~naana)
3. nose faculty 14. consciousness by way of the ear
4. tongue faculty region of realm (`srotra-vij~naana)
5. body faculty 15. consciousness by way of the nose
6. mind faculty region or realm (ghrana-vij~naana)
7. eye objective datum 16, consciousness by way of the tongue
8. ear objective datum region or realm (jihvaa-vij~naana)
9. nose objective datum 17. consciousness by way of the body
10. tongue objective datum region or realm (kaaya-vij~naana)
11. body objective datum 18. consciousness by way of the mental
12. mind objective datum objects (mano-vij~naana)


As can be seen, the dhaatus are further analysis of
the aayatanas. They detail the "conscious" realms of
the faculties and show the interpenetrative nature
of all. The movements can be seen in different ways,
that is, across numbers 1-7-13, 2-8-14, etc.,
downward numbers 1 through 6, 7 through 12, etc.,
any combination across and downward. or just number
18 as a collective organization of the whole
process. It is with the dhaatus that the philosophy
of Vasubandhu, Vij~naanavaada, begins by the
elaborate analysis of the Eight-Vij~naana Theory and
makes way for a greater cosmological reatment of the
nature of being.

4. Dharma theory (factors or forms of experience)(3)

I refrain from enumerating the number of dharmas
due to involvements of space and time. Suffice it to
say that they range from seventy-five for the
Sarvaastivaada to one hundred for the
Vij~naanavaada. In this genetic structuring of
experience, once again, the basic.skandhas,
indriyas, vi.sayas, dhaatus, and dhaatus, and

P.469

vij~naanas are incorporated and given their due
import, but it goes further in elaborately analyzing
the activities relative to the mental (caitasika or
cittasamprayukta-sa.mskaara) and nonmental
(citta-viprayukta-sa.mskaara) forms of experience.
For example, greed, ill will, anger, arrogance,
shame, idleness, etc., are considered to be mental
dharmic factors or forms; and acquisition,
lifeforce, subjective-objective components, life,
and aging are nonmental factors. In either case,
these dharmas describe and alter the nature of one's
being.

One of the greatest contributions or insights of
the early Buddhists (perhaps attributable directly
to the historical Buddha) and followed very closely
by the Mahaayaana, is to divide the dharmic factors
into the "constructive" or "creative"
(sa.msk.rta-dharmas) and the "nonconstructive" or
"noncreative" (asa.msk.rta-dharmas) realms. The
former is the category of the formed or that which
has been carved out, something done within the
existential process. There is a carving-out
phenomenon of existence in that it is the result of
appropriation by way of the dharmic forces, ending
in fragmentation of the process. The latter
(asa.msk.rta-dharmas) , however, is the exact
opposite of the former. It is the realm where the
existential process is not strained, hindered, or
hampered by any of the dharmic factors. Thus
although this category has also dharmic character,
it does not have it in the same manner as the
former. For example, one of the "nonconstructive"
dharmas is space. Space is an universal dharma in
the sense that it exists pervasively throughout the
total existential process. It is neither a locatable
nor manipulable dharma. It is not here or there but
always remains a vital component of any experience.
Another example is the nature of suchness or
thusness of being (tathataa), which is the result of
achieving enlightenment. Nevertheless, it functions
thereafter as a "nonconstructive'' dharmic force of
existence. Thus we observe that there must be an
internal consistency to all human experience, from
the ordinary du.hkha-bound realm to the unbounded
enlightened realm of existence. The Abhidharma
thought made it clear that no extraneous or
transcendental force or factor is introduced to
explain the seen and unseen factors of experience.
This is a basic position which shows up in force in
the subsequent developments of the Mahayana but
which scholars have tended to overlook.


We have now gone through a tedious abstract
analysis of the Abhidharma genetic structure of
experience but have left out the crucial examination
of the term, genetic. The term is what makes
possible the structural dynamics of experience or
what explains the nature of the experiential process
itself. The heart of the matter is to be seen in the
next important doctrine.

The Experiential process (pratiitya-samutpaada)

The Buddha, in a rather general way, explained to
his disciples the causal nature of experience: in
terms of the often quoted format (not formula) thus:
"This being, that becomes; from the arising of this.
that arises; this not becoming, that does not
become; from the ceasing of this, that ceases."(4)
The format is

P.470


applied to the famous Twelve-membered Wheel of Life
which begins with ignorance (avidyaa) and ends with
aging and death (jaraamara.na). So the popular
translation reads, "Conditioned by ignorance arise
the play of perceptual objects (sa.mskaara) .
conditioned by the play of perceptual objects arise
consciousness (vij~naana), etc."

The Wheel of Life is technically known as
pratiitya-samutpaada (Sanskrit) , or
pa.ticca-samuppaada (Paali). It is one of the most
crucial concepts in Buddhism. perhaps the alpha and
omega of life-concept. The term is referred to in
Early Buddhism as the nidaana doctrine because it
exhibits the linking of the different phases of
experience, thus indicating the basis or ground of
experience itself.

Pratiitya-samutpaada has been translated in such
various ways as, "causal chain, " "chain of
causation, " "causal genesis, " "dependent
origination." "theory of twelve causes." "relational
origination." "conditioned origination." "dependent
coarising," "dependently-coordinated-origination, "
etc. However, one thing is clear; it is not a strict
causality principle or a simple causation theory. It
is not a universal law or a formula that governs the
order or the cosmology of the world or the
individual. In essence, it only depicts the
multifacted dependent or relational nature of
ordinary experiential process, that is, how events
come and go or arise and subside. Most importantly,
it has reference to the concept of du.hkha
(suffering). In this respect, it is also synonymous
with the concept of sa.msaara, the du.hkha-bound
cycle of being. The cycle is usually referred to as
the life-death cycle of being, to emphasize the
incessant rounds of grasping for something in the
unenlightened realm of existence.

Let us pause here to examine the term in its
Theravaada (Hiinayaana, Abhiciharma) and Mahaayaana
senses. The great Russian Buddhologist, Th.
Stcherbatsky, made a remarkable distinction between
the two as follows: ''In Hiinayaana, in a word. we
have a radical Pluralism, converted in Mahaayaana in
as radical a Monism."(5)

I wish to take exception to this assertion which
has misled many since its publication. In a very
fundamental sense, Stcherbatsky has fallen into a
mental trap of his own making. He is eager to
classify both schools as belonging rigidly into the
camps of either pluralism or monism. His logic is
very simple. If a school does not assert the
categories of substance, quality, and motion but
admits the reality of sense data and the elements of
the mind (dharmas), then it must be a pluralistic
system.(6) If, on the other hand, a school looks at
reality as possessing a reality of its own
(sva-bhaava) , something. unproduced by causes
(ak.rtaka-asa.mak.rta) and not dependent upon
anything else (paratra nirapek.sa). then it must be
a monistic system.(7) His logic contains sweeping
generalizations, which may make sense from the
general standpoint, but foes drastically counter to
the nature of Buddhist experience. Let us examine
his point closely.

He elaborates:

In Hiinayaana the elements, although
inter(de)pendent (sa.msk.rta-pratiitya-samutpanna),
were real (vastu) . In Mahaayaana all elements,
because interdependent

P.471

(Italics his) were unreal
(`suunya-svabhaava-`suunya). In Hinayana every whole
(raa`si-avayavin) is regarded as a nominal existence
(praj~naptisat) and only parts or ultimate elements
(dharma) are real (vastu). In Mahaayaana all parts
or elements are unreal (`suunya), and only the
whole, i.e., the Whole of wholes
(dharmataa-dharma-kaaya), is real.(8)

The most questionable interpretation in the
preceding passage is with respect to the term.
'"pratiitya-samupana, " which he translates as
"interdependent.'' This presents a strong relational
or coordinated connotation. He thinks that the
interdependent nature at once issues forth a kind of
reality. It is tantamount to saving that mutuality
(paraspara apek.sa) is sufficient to produce reality
in the Abhidharma or Hiinayaana system. Thus,
according to him, for the Hinayana the term
signifies a phenomenon of dharmas in such a state;
whereas, for the Mahaayaana, it becomes the basis
for the unreality (`suunya) of the dharmas.
Furthermore, he is satisfied with the definition
that dharmas are separate entities or forces, that
existence is an interplay of a plurality of subtle,
ultimate, and not further analyzable elements of
matter, mind, and forces.(9) These dharmas obey the
causal law of "dependently-coordinated-origination"
(pratiitya-samutpaada).(10)

It is clear that Stcherbatsky has centered on
the concept of ultimate elements of existence to
construct the basic Buddhist metaphysical position.
(Indeed, the title of his work, The Central
Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word,
"Dharma, '' says so much.) It was a convenient
position to arrive at, but one that had a basic
shortcoming, that is, a case of mistaken emphasis.
He saw or tried to see the elements (dharmas) first
and not the process (pratiitya-samutpaada). Or, he
placed the primacy of the elements over that of the
process. In a way one cannot be too harsh on his
oversight here. because he, as everyone else, is
accustomed to stress on the visible or tangible
nature of things. So, once establishing pluralism in
Early Buddhism, he had nowhere to turn but to monism
of the Mahaavaana type to account for the so-called
unreality (`suunya) of things.

The correct (proper) view of reality should be
(as has always been in Buddhism) on the experiential
process and that within which the attendant factors
or forms (dharmas) should be understood as defining
or characterizing that process. The reality of
experiential events is undeniable, but the manner in
which man describes his experience is in question.

By way of expansion, it should be noted that all
of Naagaarjuna's polemics against the Abhidharmic
views, starting with the initial chapter on Pratyaya
(Relational Condition), are lodged not so much on
the "elements" of existence (dharmas) per se as it
is on the manner in which the dharmas are foistered
into the dominant position in the experiential
process (pratiitya-samutpaada). Whether it is the
Abhidharmika or Maadhyamika the process is granted,
but the way in which it is explained shows up the
difference, The Abhidharmika stressed the evanescent
momentary dharmic states as they come and go, hence,
their

P.472

"realities." The Maadhyamika, on the other hand,
sought the basis for the coming and going phenomenon
with the "shadowy" existences of the various
dharmas. Thus, the fact of relational condition
(pratyaya) or interdependent nature
(paraspara-apek.sa) is not sufficient to explain the
unique experiential process. In the
Prasannapadaa(11), Candrakiirti explains that the
term pratiitya is a gerund signifying the phenomenon
of "reaching" or ''extending over." and the term
samutpaada means origination or manifestation of the
momentary event. Thus in conjunction,
pratiitya-samutpaada, refers to the dynamics of
momentary experiential existence.

The concept of du.hkha again enters at this
point. In a very significant sense. it has direct
reference to the experiential process in terms of
pointing to the inability to understand the nature
and function of the process. That is, any dharmic
reference to the Wheel itself or its twelve
components hampers understanding of the Buddhist
nature of existence. The Wheel is not to be seen in
terms of the components or segments but as the
continuity, the linking (nidaana) process itself. If
one is able to see the Wheel in the latter sense,
then the Wheel turns either clockwise (anuloma) or
counterclockwise (pa.tiloma) , or serially or
aserially, that is, it turns at a nondesignatable
referential point. This is indeed cryptic but not in
the sense of the transcendental or impossible.

The concept of du.hkha is basically in the
"constructive" or "creative" (sa.mskrta) realm of
existence.(12) As all dharmas are forms of grasping
phenomena, the dharmic reference is decidedly forced
or strained. As we know, basic Buddhist teaching
says that suffering is owing to desires or passions
(t.r.s.naa) and the attachments (upaadana) thereof.
Now, in the above analysis, the dharmas are the
mental conformations (sa.mskaara) which are adhered
to in the entifiable sense. Such adherence is, to be
sure. the very basis of consciousness (vij~naana,
vikalpa), where postulated entities must be clear
and distinct. However, the postulational is narrow
and limited as compared with the esthetic nature of
experience which goes beyond any circumscription.

Let us now expand on the inordinate nature of
the experiential process. It should not be doomed or
fated to du.hkha. Du.hkha, after all, only refers to
the sa.msaaric realm of existence. One need not be
tied down to it. In fact, as suggested all along.
the tying-down process is of one's own making due to
the upaadaana-objectifying phenomenon. Even the
Theravaada tradition made it plain that the grasping
of the skandhas entails a basic form of suffering
(pa~ncaskandhaupaadaana).(13) But it was Naagaarjuna
who gave the clearest expression to the bold insight
that the sa.msaaric realm is only the "covered" side
of reality (sa.mv.rtisatya), in the famous verses
treating the spheres and limits of the twin concepts
of sa.msaara and nirvaa.na.(14) The empirical world
of grasping and conceptual play are not foreclosed
to the states of release (nirodha) or rest
(upa`sama) .(15) They are the very ingredients
whereby the opening to the enlightened realin is
possible, since the Buddhist truth of existence
spans the relative as well as supreme

P.473


natures.(16) Thus in the classic verse on "doctrinal
equation," Naagaarjuna wraps up everything in the
following manner:(17)

We declare that whatever is relational origination
(pratiitya-samutpaada) is of the nature of emptiness
(`suunyata). It is a provisional name (thought
construction, praj~napti) for the mutuality of
being, and indeed, it is the middle path
(madhyamaa-pratipad).

The equation (pratiitya-samutpaada=`suunyataa=praj~n
The equahyamaa-pratipad) is the crystallized message
of Mahaayaana metaphysics. Subsequent developments
all take note of it, the supreme example being the
development of the Chinese T'ien T'ai School, which
centers on the Triple Nature of Truth: `Suunyataa,
Praj~napti, and Madhyamaa-pratipad.

Now, the concept of `suunyataa, or `sunyataa as
the basis of continued enlightened existence. is not
new to Naagaarjuna. He was heir to the mass of
Maahaayana literature known as the
Praj~naapaaramitaa Suutras.(18) These early suutras
of unknown authorship exhibit the shift from the
Theravaada view of the Arhant Ideal to the
Mahaayaana view, which is the practice of the
bodhisattva way of life (bodhisattvacaryaa). The
shift is underscored by a sweeping reassessment of
Buddhist doctrines and a reorientation of the nature
of experience. It is a basically revolutionary
accounting of the content of enlightenment. Let us
explore.

The A.s.tasaahasriskaa Praj~naapaaramitaa
Suutra, considered to be the oldest suutra in this
class, sets the tone of the Mahayana by raising
several questions:

(1) What is the meaning of Mahaayaana (The Great
Vehicle)?

"The term, Mahaayaana, is a synonym of
immeasurableness. 'Immeasurableness' means
infinitude. It is the same as space. As in space so
in this vehicle there is room for immeasurable and
incalculable beings. One cannot see its coming, its
going, and its abiding natures. Thus one cannot
seize its beginning, its end nor its middle."(19)

This accounting points to the fact that the
realm of existence is a totally open and extensive
affair. Nothing is left out, nothing is added on. In
a grand metaphysical sweep, the Mahaayaana wishes to
account for everything within the wide nature of
experience but such experience or knowledge can only
be attained by the truly aspiring Buddhist, the
bodhisattva, as distinguished from the lesser
aspirants called the `sraavaka (or `sraavaka-yaana,
the way of one who subscribes to Buddhist
principles) , and the pratyeka-buddha (or
pratyekabuddha-yaana, the way of intellectual effort
and understanding of Buddhist principles).

(2) What is the bodhisattva? Again the suutra
says: "Nothing real is meant by the word,
`Bodhisattva.' Because a Bodhisattva trains himself
in non-attachment to all dharmas. For the
Bodhisattva, the great being, awakes in
non-attachment to full enlightenment in the sense
that he understands all dharmas."(20) Further, "A
Bodhisattva is called a 'great being' (Mahaasattva)
in

P.474

the sense that he will cause a great mass and
collection of beings to achieve the highest (state
of existence)."(21) Then `Saariputra. a disciple
with a Theravaada background, is made to say. "A
Bodhisattva is called a great being in the sense
that he will demonstrate dharmas so that the great
errors should be forsaken--such erroneous views as
the assumption of a self (aatman), a being (sattva),
a living soul (jiiva), a person (pudgala), of
becoming (bhava) , of not-becoming (abhava), of
annihilation (uccheda) , of eternity (nitya) ,
etc."(22)


(3) What are dharmas? After all, it is said that
the bodhisattva trains or disciplines himself in the
praj~naapaaramitaas. The paaramitaas refer to the
six (or ten) so-called spiritual excellences
that,(23) if practiced properly, will bring about
the nature of irreversibility, that is, the movement
from one stage to the next without retrogression
until full enlightenment is attained. In the
spiritual development, the bodhisattva courses in
the paaramitaas but does not tre at them as dharmas,
as objective factors, or as components of existence.
The suutra says, "He does not go near any dharma at
all, because all dharmas are unapproachable and
unappropriable."(24) It is the foolish, untaught,
and common people who are accustomed to treat the
dharmas as realities. But these people "have
constructed all the dharmas. And, having constructed
them, attached themselves to (the idea of) the two
extremes (i.e., existence and non-existence)."(25)
Because of the adherence to the concepts of
existence and nonexistence, (is or is not
framework) , ordinary people attach the three
temporal moments...past. present and future--to the
dharmas. But dharmas do not go anywhere nor remain
in a place. Finally, having established or
constructed their own limits (ko.ti) of being,
ordinary people are not able to expand, extend, and
realize the true realm of existence
(bhuuta-ko.ti).(26) The dharmas are not objects of
manipulation (anupalambha, anupalabdhi). They are
not made (sa.msk.rta) nor are they brought about
(anutpaada) . They do not have self-nature of
own-being (savbhaava).(27)

Another suutra belonging to the same genre, goes
on to say that the bodhisaatva "does not see any
dharma as conditioned (sa.msk.rta) nor unconditioned
(asa.msk.rta) ; he does not see existence as
conditioned, or non-existence as unconditioned; he
does not see the sign as conditioned, or the
signless as unconditioned; he does not review the
beingness or non-beingness of any dharma, except in
such a way that he does not transgress against the
suchness (tathataa, `suunyataa) of all dharmas."(28)

A word of caution is in order here. The
`suunyataa of all dharmas spoken of so frequently in
the suutras is not really an imputation of the
nature of suchness or emptiness of the dharmas
themselves as independent of the experiential
process. `Suunyataa is a unique experience arrived
at and has reference to the experiential process as
a whole and not to any of its constituent parts. The
Buddhist is not saying that each skandha or each
dharma is empty or void, nor is he saying that all
these are grounded in the nature of `suunyataa. On
the contrary, they become empty or void as a result
of enlightenment whose content is `suunyataa.


P.475

Their "appearances" or signs (nimitta, lak.sa.na)
are recognized by the bodhisattva but "he surrenders
himself completely to the signless (animitta, ,
alak.sa.na) in the end."(29) Thus, the signless
state which is another characterization of suchness
(`suunyataa) means that the bodhisattva has no
particular abode and is therefore free and
unlimitable.

In sum, the bodhisattvacaryaa is to realize at
once both the "constructive," appropriating nature
and the "nonconstructive", nonappropriating nature
of all dharmas. When this is done, there is a
further relinquishment of all signs and the desiring
process in order to gain full knowledge of all modes
of being (sarvaakaaraj~nataa). Thus, all outflows
(aasravas) cease, and one thrives in the state of
nonstraining outflows (anaasrava-dharmas).

The bodhisattvacaryaa has two basic facets: one
is the strong vow to become a buddha, and the other
is to have concern for the welfare of all beings. On
the one hand, there is the path to full or complete
knowledge (sarvaj~nataa, praj~naar), and, on the
other, the extensive nature of love, compassion
(karu.naa). Both facets are mutually involved and
are thus unique simultaneous developments. For the
Buddhist, the most basic question is: What is wisdom
without compassion and what is compassion without
wisdom? Or, put another way, he would say, Aren't
the two aspects really depicting the self-same
reality?

In correcting perverted views on/of reality, the
bodhisattva is skillful-in-means (upaaya-kau`salya),
not only in leading ordinary beings into the right
path (the classic example is given in Chapter II of
the Lotus Suutra, where the father succeeds in
leading his children out of the burning house), but
also in developing his own existential (ontological)
purity by increasing his wholesome forms of
existence. With respect to his own development. he
moves from the conditioned to the unconditioned,
from the sign to the signless, from the dharmic to
the nondharmic nature of existence. In short, the
bodhisattva sees the dharmic signs. that is.
understands the cause of their formations
(sa.msk.rta-dharma), but he is not caught up in them
since he strives for the `suunyataa aspect of all
dharmas. The skillful-in-means also entails the fact
that the bodhisattva cannot abandon or will not
realize for himself the true realm of existence
(bhuuta-ko.ti), while in the midst of his practice
(paaramitas) unless all dharmas have been realized
within the context of `uunyataa.(30) This is the
philosophic expression of Dharmaakara bodhisattva's
vow, as expressed in the Larger Sukhaavatii-vyuuha
Suutra, that he will not forsake the sentient
creatures of the world until all enter the
Buddhafield (Buddha-k.setra) . At each state of
development, the bodhisattva, without losing sight
of the Buddha-held, works at the identification or
assimilation (samataa) process. This is the meaning
of the term, abhisamaya, a term central to the host
of commentarial suutras based on the
Praj~naapaaramitaa Suutras.

In the foregoing discussion, we have witnessed
the standard doctrines of early Buddhism displayed
but interpreted in a different sense. The main focus
should be on the manifestation of dharmas in the
experiential process. In the conditioned realm, all
dharmas are "real" from one standpoint hut from

P.476

another they are illusory, imaginary, and
misleading. In the nonconditioned realm, however,
all dharmas are nonproductive. nonarising,
nonseizable, and noncharacterizable. It is another
way of asserting that' the Wheel of Life both turns
and does not turn, neither affirms nor denies the
dharmic structure of things. The Wheel or
pratiitya-samutpaada, in this sense, is deep and
profound (gambhiira) as are the natures of
`suunyataa and bhuuta-ko.ti (true realm of
existence). Rightly seen, it is the supreme realm of
existence in the potential and actual sense.

It is hoped that the discussion so far has
brought on some understanding of the early or basic
ideas relative to the Mahaayaana in a way that also
leads to better understanding of its subsequent
developments in the various forms. So it is time to
assess the ideas and derive some of the metaphysical
implication expressed therein.

(1) Reality in the Mahaayaana. as the name
indicates, is an open, unbounded (but not infinite)
realm of existence. Every doctrine in Buddhism must
be framed within it. For example, the nature of
`suunyataa is deep and profound from the standpoint
of the individual's ontology, but it is vast and
extensive in terms of the nonindividual or social
ontology. Or, the concept of Bodhisattva Ideal is
synonymous with the concept of Mahaayaana Reality
(bhuuta-ko.ti).

(2) `Suunyataa is the state of clear
(ontological) being. Contrary to accepted views on
it, it is not what makes existence possible in the
sense of a principle or a substratum of existence.
Rather, it is the foundation of true reality when
that clear state of being is achieved. When that
happens, it becomes the ground for the extensive,
relational nature of all things. Thus it can be
asserted that `suunyataa is the ontological
principle of Buddhism. It "brings" the various
dharmas togehter by not allowing the dharmas to
assert their false natures; thus I have at times
referred to it as the supreme experience of
ontological togetherness.

(3) Following from the preceding. the ground of
reality is not given but evolves out of a serious
consideration and aspiration for the true nature of
things (true experiential process), which in turn
involves an inordinate effort by way of proper
disciplinary training and practice, the
Bodhisattvacaryaa. `Suunyataa is not everywhere.
unless one is speaking about the enlightened nature.
The initial von; (pra.nidhi-citta) of the
bodhisattva is an exhibition of a strong, faith in
the "other side" of what we normally assume to be
reality. But this does not entail any form of
duality or dual nature of being or of reality.
Parenthetically, there is no flat, undifferentiated
aesthetic continuum, for such a continuum cannot be
an "unproduced" gift of nature.

(4) Full knowledge of the modes of being or
simply wisdom is not an isolated but a total affair.
The best exemplification of the inclusive nature of
any knowledge or act is the concept of compassion
(karu.naa). Nothing is left alone or behind, for
everything is accountable however dim or
inconsequential the force may seem to be.

P.477

(5) Individual ontology or the dynamic
cosmological construction (that is, the genetic
structure of being) is always coterminus or
coextensive with the rest of nature, The problem
with unenlightened beings is that they do not
realize the nature of the terminus and extension:
their understanding of the terminus and extension is
inherently closed or self-limiting. Therefore. their
efforts are usually misdirected. The Kaa`syapa
Parivarta(31) says in a graphic manner that the
clear nature of being or `suunyataa striven for by
the Sraavaka or Pratyekbuddha is like a hole made in
a wood by a termite, whereas, the bodhisattva's
`suunyataa is like the infinite space (aakaa`sa).
The former achievement is known as
pudgala`suunyataa, the `suunyata a limited to the
individual only, whereas the latter, as
dharma`suunyataa, is the `suunyataa of all dharmic
elements or dharmic framework of being and thus
extends over and beyond the nature of the
individual. In consequence, for the Mahaayaana,
reality that extends beyond the individual process
remains a potential ground for the process of
enlightenment.

(6) From the foregoing, it can be asserted that
the metaphysical and ethical grounds are one and the
same. There is a sense of the idealistic, but this
is not metaphysical idealism so far as it is known
in the West, Buddhahood or nirvaa.na is the summum
bonum. but it entails an expansive nature which
"transcends" local or individual cosmologies. Or
that moral questions or morality must take on larger
dimensions beyond the individual or individuals
concerned, if there are to be any binding effects in
the interrelational sense.

(7) The suffering or du.hkha that the Buddhist
speaks of is basically an ontological problem.
Du.hkha is much more than what is related to the
mere physical or mere mental poles, or a combination
of the two, It arises in a subtle way by virtue of
the inability to come to terms with the impermanent
nature of being as well as the inability to resolve
the dharmic factors at play. It is in the karmically
enforced realm of existence (sa.msk.rta) . The
question of good and/or evil is not really germane
to Buddhist ethics unless it is tied in with the
metaphysical and ontological nature of things.
"Evil'' for oneself and the resolution thereof are
activities that involve more than the self.

(8) Buddhahood, as the realization of the
enlightened realm, is also characterized by peaceful
calm (`saanta) and the feelings of freedom and bliss
(`siva). As such it is far from mere quietism or
indifference. It is in fact an extension of the
Bodhisattvacaryaa where, in having concern over the
welfare of sentient creatures, he develops a feeling
of ultimate pity (anukampaa). But as Buddhahood is
attained, the former bodhisattva, now a buddha,
expresses his satisfaction in total or whole
ontological terms of peace. calm, and joy or bliss.
Herein lies the nature of complete or full freedom
because it is now the abode of no dharmas, no
dharmic framework, no outflows, no du.hkha of
whatever kind. It is the realm of suchness
(tathataa) , the receptacle of all beings
(Tathaagata-garbha) , and the embodiment of all
dharmas (Dharmakaaya, Dharmadhaatu). Despite all of
this, Buddhism is not a philosophy advancing an
Absolute or an Absolute Realm of Existence in the
prexising as well as postexisting senses.


P.478


(9) Despite the foregoing analysis, which has
bordered on the mystical and the impossible at
times, Buddhist metaphysics is, nevertheless,
consistent and coherent within the nature of things.
The one doctrine that has always been at the core,
whether in the unenlightened or enlightened sense,
is relational origination (pratiitya-samutpaada). It
is a doctrine that one begins with in terms of the
du.hkha-oriented nature and ends up with in terms of
the `suunyataa-oriented nature. The doctrine is
pervasive but makes its curious (or unique) Buddhist
turn in the process from the conditioned to the
unconditioned nature of things. Subsequent
literatures. such as the La^nkaavataara Suutra,
speak of that turn as a revulsion (paraav.rtti) or a
transformation (pari.naamana) of being; it is a
turning over of the du.hkha-oriented outflows
(aa`sraya-paraav.rtti). The result of such a turn
has inspired such men as Naagaarjuna to spell it out
in the famous "doctrinal equation" seen earlier (pra
(pratipaad). Such an equation is quite baffling even
to the Buddhist; how much more to the non-Buddhist?

II

Whitehead says that metaphysics is nothing but the
description of the generalities which apply to all
the details of practice.(32) And in terms of the
foundation of metaphysics, he says that it "should
be sought in the understanding of the subject-object
structure of experience, and in the respective roles
of the physical and mental functionings."(33) This
also implicates metaphysics into two contrasting
terms. that is, "appearance" and "reality." Their
distinction arises in the process of self-formation
of each actual occasion.(34) "Reality" according to
Whitehead, is the objective content as given in the
antecedent world of that occasion.(35) It is from
which the occasion advances creatively,
"Appearance," on the other hand, refers to the
"difference between the objective content of the
initial phase of the physical pole and the objective
content of the final phase, after the integration of
physical and mental poles."(36) It is the effect of
the activity of the mental pole."(37)

There is thus an intimate interplay or bond
between "reality" and "appearance" in the
subject-object perceptual process of the actual
occasion. Parenthetically, it must be understood
that Whitehead refers to the human individual as a
grouping of occasions, a society of occasions, a
person or personal, but the manner in which a single
occasion and a society of occasions are involved in
process is essentially the same. Whitehead is keen
on understanding the proper function of the
percipient subject. He says, "the living organ of
experience is the living body as a whole."(38)
Further, "there is inheritance of sense-perception
from the antecedent members of the personal
succession."(39) And he cautions that "a mere
sensationalist perception does not account for our
direct observation of the contemporary world. There
is some other factor present, which is equally
primitive with our perception of sensa. This factor
is provided by the

P.479

immanence of the past in the immediate occasion
whose percipience is under discussion."(40)

The foregoing metaphysics of experience bears
striking resemblance to that of the basic Buddhist
genetic structure of being that was delineated
earlier. In both at least three factors are
prominent: (1)there are no mere subject and no mere
object in the percipient process; (2) the process is
not an isolated phenomenon but extends beyond the
living organism: and (3) the process, in its
internal activities, must be seen as movement from
past states to the present where much of the
activities lodges within the organism. the human
body. There is, in short, relatedness that extends
beyond the percipient as well as within the
unnoticed process that makes up the percipient
itself.

In Buddhism, the continuity in terms of the
skandha-members is inviolable. Corporeal nature
(ruupa) may be taken to be the initial phase, but
its content of percipience is passed on to the
high-grade activities called consciousness
(vij~naana) by way of the visceral conditions
(vedaana) manifesting themselves throughout the
organism. In the further analysis by way of the
eighteen realms (dhaatu) of being or the dharmaic
structuring of experience. the sensa derived from
the sense faculties are granted but they are not
dominant in the analysis since there is something
more important, more supreme in experience, that is,
the relational nature of being, both externally and
internally but. in our discussion at hand, more
internally. In early Buddhism, the relational nature
was described in terms of the twenty-four paccayas
(pratyayas). Beginning with hetu, the "root cause"
(for example, the root of a tree), the Buddhist
elaborated on the very minute relational conditions
present with respect to the rise of the nature of
ordinary (unenlightened) experience as well as to
the development of the path leading to
enlightenment. The Sarvaastivaadins or later
Abhidharmikas reduced the twenty-four paccayas to a
more manageable Doctrine of Ten Causes.(41) Whether
the latter is an improvement over the former is a
moot question, however. The doctrine is divided into
six major causes (hetu) and four subsidiary
relational conditions (pratyaya). They are minute or
microscopic facets, which describe the rise and
subsidence of the experiential events or of the
process itself. The Mahaayaanist's pet metaphor here
is the conditions relative to the rise and
subsidence of a wave (or waves) in the ocean. A
single wave or an aggregation of waves is not an
isolatable or independent phenomenon. Each has a
relational structure as well as a content, both of
which are dynamically involved such that the mere
sensationalist perception is wholly inadequate in
accounting for the nature of things.

Whitehead focuses on the same problem. He says,
"the basis of experience is emotional. Stated more
generally, the basic fact is the rise of an
affective tone originating from things whose
relevance is given."(42) This is crystallized into
the doctrine of prehension whose mode of activity is
defined as follows. "An occasion is a subject in
respect to its special activity concerning an
object; and anything is an object in respect to its
provocation of some special activity

P.480

within the subject."(43) While datum becomes the
prehended object, the subject is thereby affected
and develops a subjective form in regard to the
datum. The prehending subject is the way experience
occurs.

The notion of a subjective form, the affective
tone. strongly suggests a relationship to the
Buddhist dharmic analysis of experience. For, each
dharma is a definite form or mode of being
expressing a particular evnet whether in the
conditioned or nonconditioned realm of existence. As
seen earlier. even a particular skandha is a form or
dharma, so are the sense faculties. the different
kinds of consciousness, and the various mental
conformations But in Buddhism: a form or mode in and
of itself ii nor self-generative nor
self-sustaining, because it has to give way to the
relational nature of being as well as the larger
context in which the concept of being ultimately
appears. A dharma, being evanescent. still exerts
itself long enough to exhibit a certain
characteristic to an experience or of the
percipient.

Both Whitehead and Buddhism converge upon
several crucial elements of experience as a way of
accommodating the larger aspects of things. There
are three aspects in particular worth mentioning:

(1) An actual occasion or an event is never
independent. As an actual occasion prehends other
entities, so is it influenced by them The doctrine
of mutuality or mutual immanence holds Tar both
systems.

(2) An actual occasion is never "vacuous." Part
of this idea naturally comes from the above.
Whitehead says that "the term vacuous actuality'
here means the notion of a res vera devoid of
subjective immediacy."(44) This notion is closely
allied with the notion of "inherence of quality in
substance" which is also denied by him" The "other
side" of vacuous actuality will then be an actuality
which is vitally related to the rest of nature
including its own self-enjoyment....the subjective
immediacy which takes on the dynamic nature of a
subject-superject structure But this entails a
reassessment of the notions of presentational
immediacy and extensive continuum, both of which are
elaborate descriptions of the so-called orizontal
(or serial) and vertical relationships with respect
to the concrescent process. This type of description
is not alien to the whole scheme of Buddhist
experiential process.

(3) Given the nature of muruality and nonvacnous
actuality. Whitehead goes on further to complete his
cosmology. As he says, "the cosmological story, in
every part and in every chapter, relates the
interplay of the static vision and the dynamic
history."(46) The interplay of course reveals the
paradoxical nature involved that is. permanent
factors in the impermanent nature of things: in
general the play of the ideal opposites in process,
For example, he says that the ultimate facts of
immediate experience are the actual entities,
prehension and nexuus.(47) Although these exhibit
the facts of the concrescent process, they are at
the same rime pail and parcel of the dynamic nature
of that process itself. But the process is extensive
since it "is an individualization of the whole
universe."(48) By saying this. Whitehead is cautious
and does not wish to advance the Platonic concept of
a receptacle since the latter is "bare of all
forms...void, abstract from all individual
occasions."(49) He wishes to work not from the
abstract notion of a container but from the concrete
facts of experience as they are related to the
whole. He says that the "connectedness of things is
nothing else than the togetherness of thins in
occasions of experience."(50) But in the interplay
of the static vision and the dynamic history there
in a sense of the "unbound permanence."

P.481

As seen earlier. there is no difficulty here in
relating to the metaphysics of Buddhist experience.
Although the Whiteheadian concepts of actual
entities, prehension and nexus are nut precisely
formulated in Buddhism, they seem to be implicit in
the metaphysics and are quite relevant for our
discussion. For instance, the Buddhist doctrine of
anaatman (non-self) is a kind of correlate of the
concept of actual entity for there is no way in
which a self can ever be given a definitive
(continual) status within the impermanent nature of
things. Whitehead, in turn, is saying about the same
thing when he asserts that..."how an actual entity
becomes constitutes what that actual entity is: so
that the two descriptions of an actual entity are
not independent. Its `being' is constituted by its
becoming."(51)

The becoming process is expanded by the concept
of prehension with regard to the three factors. (1)
subject, (b) datum, and (c) subjective form. These
prehensions can either be physical (other actual
entities) or conceptual (cternal objects). And they
are also positive or negative in nature with their
respective subjective forms.(52) In Buddhism the
closest overall concept to prehension is t.r.s.naa,
the desiring process.(53) It may take on positive
and negative characters with their respective forms
(dharmas). Each dharma, as I understand it, is a
kind of (subjective) form of experience which
specifics what that experience is about. but it
single dharma or a set of dharmas is still
inadequate to describe fully the becomingness
(bhava). So just as Whitehead introduced the third
ultimale fact of experience, nexuus, Buddhism also
introduced the concept of paccayas (pratyayas) to
account for the interrelated nature of things. But,
as seen earlier again. Buddhism stressed on the
foundation of all experiences as a unique process of
relational origination (pratiitya-samutpaada) .The
understanding of this latter concept war the key to
grasping the depth and breadth of being, from the
microscopic to the macroscopic realm of existence.
This concept. I believe, is nearly identical to the
Whiteheadian concept of creativity "Creativity is
the universal of universals characterizing ultimate
matter of fact it is that ultimate principle by
which the many, which are the universe
disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which
is the universe conjunctively."(54) Thus creativity
is the way all experiences arise in a novel sense.

Whether Buddhism would interpret relational
origination as the principle of novelty as Whitehead
doer is not clear. hut both would agree on the fact
that their respective doctrines are central or
ultimate concepts with respect to experience In
Buddhism. relational origination has two aspects:
one the du.hkha-bound turning of the Wheel and the
other. the non-duhkha or released (nirodha) aspect
in the turning of the Wheel. From the standpoint of
the former, there is no novelty of experience in the
strictest sense since the flow of existence is
interrupted by the dharmic seizures, as it were and
from the latter, there is nothing hut novelty since
there is no interruption of whatever kind and life
is co-incident (harmonious) with the larger
framework of nature.

On the other hand, Whitehea in turn seems to be
suggesting it type of

P.482

Buddhist du.hkha (dukkhu in Paali) in his analysis
of the concept of evil. He says, "the ultimate evil
in the temporal world is deeper than any specific
evil. It lies in the fact that the past fades, that
time is a `perpetually perishing'.... The present
fact has not the past fact with it in any full
immediacy."(55) This concept of the ultimate evil is
very close to the early Buddhist concept of
viparinaamadukkh a, that is, evil or suffering due
to the inability to accommodate changes in the
existential flow. This concept also extends over
into the other more complicated concept of suffer
ing, sankhaata-dukkha, that is, suffering due to the
"constructive" nature of mental play which in
Whiteheadian terms might he the indulgence in
abstractive (conceptual) analysis or with reference
to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

Whitehead goes on to say that, "the nature of
evil is that the characters of things are mutually
obstructive."(56) This comes about because of "three
metaphysical principle: (1)that all actualization is
finite; (2) that finitude involves the exclusion of
alternative possibility; (3) that mental functioning
introduces into realization suhjective forms
conformal to relevant alternatives excluded from
completeness of physical realization."(57) While
these metaphysical principles are nor mentioned or
elaborated in Buddhism, still, the basis for the
rise or evil or suffering seems to focus for both on
the same aspect of existence, that is, the inability
to a ccommodate the finite within the infinite
nature of things or the clash arising between the
two. In Buddhism, we have noted that despite du.hkha
the ultimate experiential process must be known or
felt in terms of its empty(`suunyataa) aspect. It
enables the process to "entertain" all entities
without being caught up (obstructed) in their
dharmic natures.

It is difficult to find a correlate term in
Whitehead for `suunyataa. However, its implications
are nor lacking. For this, we are invariably led to
Whitehead's own religious orientation. He says: "The
task of Theology is to show how the World is founded
on something beyond mere transient fact, and how it
issues in something beyond the perishing of
occasions..... We ask of Theology to express that
element in perishing lives which ii undying by
reason of its expression of perfcctiuns proper to
our finite natures. In this way we shall understand
how life includes a mode of satisfaction deeper than
joy or sorrow."(58) The undying is the everlasting
nature of things, which "is the content of that
vision upon which the finer religions are built....
the `many' absorbed everlastingly in the final
unity."(59)

It is in religion then that Whitehead's
philosophy or metaphysics comes to full fruition and
exposition. The seeming clashes of doctrines, such
as the metaphysical opposites, all arrive at a
harmonious accommodation. From the minuscule actual
occasion to God, he has finally dared to seek the
basis of the everlasting undying nature and for the
deeper ultimate satisfaction of the universe. In his
last lecture on "Immortality," Whitehead is quite
explicit concerning the two aspects of the universe,
that is, the World of Fact and the World of Value,
which require each other.(60) On the former, he also
describes

P.483


it as the World of Activity, of Change, of
Origination and of Creativity. But of the latte, he
describes ii as the world which emphasizes
persistence.(61) Value. according to him, is
independent of any moment of time; it is timeless
and immortal.(62) Yet, without the passing world of
facts, value cannot exist it is relevant to the
process of realization in the World of Activity,
which there is modification of events whose process
of judgment is called evaluation. So the process of
evaluation exhibits an immortal world of coordinated
value.(63) Whitehead sums up: "Origination is
creation, whereas Value issues into modification of
creative action. Creation aims at Value, whereas
Value is saved from the futility of abstraction by
its impact upon the process of Creation. But in this
fusion. Value preserves its Immortality."(64)

Close observation reveals that Whitehead's
terms. origination and creation (creativity), are
quite similar in intent to the Buddhist concept of
relational origination, which covers the whole range
of events from the simple to the complex. In both,
the respective concepts refer to the total nature of
change or the creative process Moreover, the
Whiteheadian term, value or valuation. can he
related to the concept of `suunyataa. Though
normally translated as empty or emptiness (voidness)
due to its etymological origin, `suunyataa actually
refers to the state of completeness or fullness of
being It gives the "permanent" nature or flavor to
the process. and- in this sense, it is the supreme
value of existence. As we have seen. the world of
dharmic factors must eventually be transformed into
a world of nondharmic factors without disrupting the
general flow of existence, a state of existence
which takes on. as in Whiteheadian analysis, a
"permanent" or immortal character. Thus for the
Buddhist he who embodies `suunyataa by attaining
enlightenment lives immortally. This has a definite
correlate in Whitehead He employs such terms as
personal ] dentity and personality and asserts that.
"Personality is the extreme example of the sustained
realization of a type of value."(65)

There are, of cours,. problems involved in
correlating the concepts of `sunyataa and value,
Although both refer to the "supreme essence" of the
experiential or creative process, the method by
which the concepts are arrived at differ
drastically; one as a result of meditation. the
other without such aids Where one is a description
of the mirrorlike state of existence where all
relative plays cease. the other is not exactly that
but the outcome of the intimate play of the physical
and mental poles.

Whitehead was not satisfied with the concept of
Personality unless he could relate it to the vision
of the infinitude. After fumbling about for an
appropriate term. he settled for "Peace." He says,
"I choose the term 'Peace` for that Harmony of
Harmonies which calms destructive turbulence and
completes civilization."(66) He elaborates. "It is a
broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some
deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and yet
momentous in its coordination of values. Its first
offect is the removal of the stress of acquisitive
feeling arising from the soul's preoccupation with
itself. Thus peace carries

P.484

with it it surpassing of ersonality. There is an
inversion of relative values."(67) A few pages down
he says that peace is the intuition of
permanence.(68)

These passages certainly could have been uttered
by a Buddhist, only substitute the word peace with
nirvaa.na. As a matter of fact, he introduces the
terms "Buddhist Nirvaa.na" later on but in a
different and mistaken context.(69)

Although. Peace is what Whitehead concluded
with, in terms of the ultimate status of things, it
would seem that the concept was in reality a
crystallization of the successful incorporation of
the concept of God as the highest form of actuality.
Peace is the conformation of Appearance and Reality.
much the same way that Nirvaa.na is the conformation
(collapse of the relative and supreme statuses at
truth. But the conformation in Whitehead's case must
be a participation of God for "he is not before all
creation but with all creation."(70) He goes on to
say that, "analogous to all actual entities, the
nature of God is dipolar. He has it primordial
nature and a consequent nature. The consequent
nature of God is conscious; and it is the
realization of the actual world in the unity of his
nature, and through the transformation of his
wisdom. The primordial nature is conceptual, the
consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical
feelings upon his primordial concepts."(71) While
the primordial side is infinite, free, complete,
eternal, actually deficient and unconscious, the
consequent side is determined, incomplete,
'everlasting', fully actual and conscious.(72)

We have finally arrived at the ultimate concepts
in the comparative exploration. If God is the finest
entity, is there something in the Mahaayaana to
match it? One could easily present a whole array of
cognate terms, to be sure but one must he extremely
wary of easy correspondence. What follows must be
taken as a conjecture with measured qualifications
to go alone with it.

It seems that Whitehead's God is a combination
of several concepts derived from the Mahaayaana
tradition. For example, looking at it from the
dipolar aspect, the buddha(s) or tathaagata(s)
represents the primordial nature, and the
bodhisattva(s) represents the consequent nature The
Buddha-field or realm (k.setra) it a potential
ground of existence, a lure for all beings. The
various types of buddhas or tathaagatas, such as
Vairocana (Infinite Light) and Amitayus (Infinite
Life) depict the total universal nature of
existence. But the Buddha-field is not alien to or
transcendent of the world for, in a meaningful
sense, it manifests the world in terms of the
Bodhisattva Ideal. The Ideal, as delineated earlier,
refers to the concern for the welfare of all beings
and the utilization of skillful means to fare beings
across in the other shore. This is exemplified by
the unselfish act or acts of the Bodhisattva
Dharmaakara, who patiently post-pones his entrance
into the nirvaanic Realm or the Buddha-feild until
or unless all beings are enlightened. Another
graphic example is that of the Bodhisattva
Abalokite`svara, the God(dess) of Mercy, that is,
literally, the God who looks down on the sentient
creatures. This bodhisattva, one of the most popular
deities in the East, has become the object of
worship in a multipurpose sense. such as,
supplication for health, wealth, cure of illness,
and the general well-

P.485


being of society it is the personification of the
faith and embodiment of the realms of ideality and
actuality, and the ultimate concern for the
individual and society at large.

There is another set of concepts in the
Mahaayaana which can be correlated although specific
details are lacking. This is the doctrine of
Trikaaya, that is, Dharmakaaya (Realm of Truth or
Principle), Nirma.nakaaya (Realm of Transformation),
and Sambhagakaaya (Realm of Bliss, Enjoyment or
Peace). These are three aspects of existence, that
is, the descriptions on the slater of existence or
forms of truth. Thus, the Dharmakaaya expresses the
general status of existence, the Nirma.nakaaya the
possibility of change in the dharmic existence, and
the Sambhogakaaya the nature of total enjoyment in
the world, all of which have related aspects in
Whitehead's God.

Whitehead's characterization of God's nature
shows striking similarities to the Bodhisattva
Ideal. God has concern for his purpose is "the
attainment of value in the temporal world."(73) In
the universe's crealive act, "we conceive of the
patience of God tenderly saving the turmoil of the
intermediate world by the completion of his own
nature."(74) or, "He does not create the world, he
saves it; or more accurately he is the poet of the
world with tender patience leading it by his vision
of truth, beauty, and goodness."(75) And finally,
"What is done in the world is transformed into
reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes
back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal
relation, the love in the world passer into the love
in heaven, and floods back again into the world In
this sense, God is the great companion... the
fellow-sufferer who underrtanda."(76) Such a
creature is indeed no less than it bodhisattva.


In the foregoing discussion. we have seen where
both systems of metaphysies have made way for a
consistent treatment of the actualities or events in
nature. The Buddhist has a firm foundation in the
experiential process anti allows it to expand
further into the extensive nature of things by way
of resolving the realm of Appearance, the
"constructed" nature of things, into Reality
(tattva, tathataa, buddhataa, etc.). And in the
process, it permitted the yogic and devotional
aspects of life to nourish ones grasp of the great
metaphysical heights which are the two aspects or
wisdom and compassion (praj~naa and karu.naa). the
final status or things. With Whitehead, again the
metaphysics, grounded in a consistent constitution
of the tinest actual entity, was carried through to
its logical conclusion in the nature of God, the
greatest and highest exemplar. Whitehead, however,
had no need for the strictly devotional discipline
but he pointed, time and again, at the
translinguistic vision to see things in the deeper
sense.... the permanence in the flux, the infinitude
in the finitude, and the value in the valuational
process.


P.486


NOTE

1. Alfred North Whilehead, Process and Reality
(New York: Macmillan, 1927), p.4: hereafter cited as
PR.

2. The Brahmajaala Sutta of Diigha Nikaaya, I,
treats the "Sixty-two Theories," such as, to hold
that the world is eternal, noneternal, infinite,
finite; that the soul is in the body, it is
different from the body; that the truth is destroyed
at death, it continues despite death, etc.

3. Dharma(Sanskrit) or dhamma (Paali) is derived
from the verb dharati, wihch means to hold, carry,
bear in mind, endure, and lasting. (Cf. Paali Text
Society Paali-English Dictionary. Edited by Rhys
Davids and William Stede, p.175.) The root of these
terms is dh.r which signifies the phenomenon of
holding or supporting. Generally speaking, the
dharma in terms of this penomenon reveals the basis
for the structured nature of each monent or event.

4. Majjhimaa-Nikaaya, II, 32; Samyutta-Nikaaya,
II, 28; Anguttara-Nikaaya, V, 184, etc, Imasmin
sati, idam hoti, imass' uppadaa, idam uppajjati;
imasmin asati, idam na hoti; imassa nirodhaa, idam
nirujjhati.

5. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvaana
(Leningrad: Publishing Office of the Academy of
Sciences of the USSR, 1927), p.41.

6. The Conception, p.39.

7. The Conception, p.40.

8. The Conception, pp.40-41.

9. Th. Stcherbatsky: The Central Conception of
Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma,"
Second Printing (Calcutta: Susil Gupta Ltd., 1956,
pp.60-61.

10. The Conception, p.39.

11. Prasannapadaa, 5.1. Stcherbatsky, The
Conception, p.85.

12. Buddhaghosa, the great Theravaada patriarch,
crystallized all sufferings into three categories:
(1) ordinary phsical suffering (duhkha-duhkha), (2)
suffering due to the inability to accommodate change
(vipari.naamadukkha) , and (3) suffering due to
mental constructions or dharmic analysis
(sankhaata-dukkha) . All three are, off course,
incorporated in the Mahaayaana way of thinking.
Confer Buddhabhosa's Visuddhimagga, XVI, 499-502;
Bhikkhu ~Naanamoli's translation as The Path of
Purification, published by R. Semage, (Colombo,
Ceylon: M. D. Gunasean & Co., Ceylon: 1956) ,
pp.567-571.

13. Samyutta-Nikaaya, II, 20f, 31; Paali Text
Socieyt trans. Kindred Sayings, III, p.20f, p.30.

14. Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa, XXV, 19, 20;
hereafter cited as MK.

15. MK, XXV, 24.

16. MK, XXIV, 8, 9, 10.

17. MK, XXIV, 18.

18. Edward Conze has done the most extensive
work in this area by way of editing and translating
the bulky major works. Cf. especially his The
Praj~naa-paaramitaa Literature (The Hague: Mouton &
Co., 1960), which analyzes the known works and their
contents.

19. A.s.tasaahasrikaa Praj~naapaaramitaa, i,
23-24; Edward Conze, The Perfection of Wisdom in
Eight Thousand Slokas (Calcutta: The Asiatic
Society, 1958); hereafter cited as AP. pp.9-10.

20. The Perfection of Wisdom, p. 7.

21. The Perfection of Wisdom, p. 7.

22. The Perfection of Wisdom, p. 7.

23. The six paaramitaas are: daana (charity or
generosity), `siila (virtuous conduct), k`saanti
(forbearance, patience), viirya (mental energy),
dhyaana (concentration), and praj~naa (wisdom). The
four supplementary paaramitaas to make up ten in all
are: upaaya or upaaya-kau`salya (skillful in means),
pra.nidhaana (strong resolution), baala (strength,
power), and j~naana (knowledge).

24. AP, p.5.

25. AP.

26. AP, p.6.

27. Edward Conze, The Large Suutra on Perfect
Wisdom with the Divisions of the
Abhismayaala^nkaara, Parts II and III (Madison,
Wisconsin: College Printing and Typing Company,
1964),p.513.

28. The Gilgit Manuscript of the
A.s.taada`sasaahasrikaapraj~naapaaramitaa, Chapters
55 to 70 Corresponding to the fifth Abhisamaya. Ed.
and trans. Edward Conze (Rome: Instituto Italiano
per II Medio Ed Estremo Oriente, 1962), pp.288-289.

P.487

29. AP, p. 136.

30. AP, p. 147.

31. I am indebted to Nalinaksha Dutt for this
reference. Cf. his Aspects of Mahaayaana Buddhism
and its Relation to Hiinayaana (London: Luzac &
Company, 1930), p.133.

32. PR, 19; also Alfred North Whitehead,
Religion in the Making (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1929), p.84, fn. 1; hereafter cited as RM.

33. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas
(New York: Macmillan, 1933), p.268; hereafter cited
as AI.

34. AI, p.269.

35. AI.

36. AI, p.270.

37. AI.

38. AI, p.289.

39. AI, p.276.

40. AI, p.279.

41. The Doctrine of Ten Causes:

1. kaara.na-hetu (the main effectuating cause,
for example, speaker speaks)
2. sahabhuu-hetu(coexistent or coevolving cause,
for example, speaker-listener relationship)
3. sabhaga-hetu (similar nature cause, for
example, relationship among listeners)
4. samprayukta-hetu (concomitant cause, for
example, consistently present cause such as
the room or lighting)
5. sarvatraga-hetu (universally present cause,
for example, in Buddhism, this referto the
universal nature of du.hkha)
6. vipaaka-hetu (maturing or fruition cause,
for example, listener understands)

Four Subsidiary Relational Conditions (pratyaya):

1. hetu-pratyaya (principal condition)
2. samananiara-pratyaya (sequential condition)
3. aalambana-pratyaya (objective or objectifying
condition)
4. adhipati-pratyaya (overtuning or dominant
condition)

42. AI, p.226.

43. AI, pp. 226-227.

44. PR, p.43.

45. PR.

46. PR, p.254.

47. PR, p.30.

48. PR, p.250.

49. AI, p.381.

50. AI, pp.299-300.

51. PR. pp.34-35.

52. PR, p.35.

53. T.r.s.naa is the general concept for the
questioning or thirsting phenomenon. It is what lies
at the basis of the aatman or self-formation
process. Within t.r.s.naa proper, there is also the
grasping or clinging phenomenon known as uppaadaana,
a term which points up the staticizing or
permanentizing activity, and which is at once
antithetical to the fluency of life itself. There
are also other terms used by the Buddhist to point
at some kind of a subjectivist principle, for
example, graahaka (percipient, subject) and graahya
(datum, object) interaction. However, ike all other
Buddhist doctrines, the final aim is toward a
nonbifurcated state of being, where there is neither
graahaka nor graahya in the percipient process.

54. PR, p.31.

55. PR, p.517.

56. PR.

57. AI, p.333.

58. AI, p.221.

59. PR, p.527.

60. The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead,
ed. Paul A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing
Company, 1951), p.683; hereafter cited as PANW.


P.488

61. PANW, p.684.

62. PANW.

63. PANW, pp.684-686.

64. PANW, p.686.

65. PANW, p.690.

66. AI, p.367.

67. PANW.

68. PANW, p.369.

69. PANW, p.373.

70. PR, p.521.

71. PR, p.524.

72. PR.

73. RM, p.100.

74. PR, p.525.

75. PR, p.526.

76. PR, p.532.

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