The bodymind experience in Dogens Shobogenzo

·期刊原文
The bodymind experience in Dogen's Shobogenzo: A
phenomenological perspective
By David E. Shaner
Vol. 35 no.1
January 1985
p. 17-35
(c) by the University of Hawaii Press

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p. 17

I. INTRODUCTION--METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The purpose of this article is to develop an
interpretation of "bodymind" experience that will be
helpful in understanding a few prominent
philosophical doctrines described by Zen Master Dogen
Kigen(a) (1200-1253) in his Treasury of the Correct
Dharma-eye (Shobogenzo(b) ) . The term "bodymind"
denotes the oneness of body and mind. The absence of
the hyphen indicates that body and mind are
pre-reflectively experienced as one. Body and mind
can be interpreted as distinct entities only by
reflectively abstracting mental and physical aspects
of a person's original pre-reflective experience. The
choice of "bodymind" over "mindbody," reflects the
order in which these terms are usually written in
Japanese by Dogen (shin jin(c), bodymind).

The "relationship " between the mind and body
espoused in Dogen's philosophy may be explained in
Western phenomenological categories. Even though
people of different cultures may share the same
fundamental experiential structures, the way in which
these experiences are articulated and valued may vary
appreciably. Therefore, a central experiential
concern for one culture may be so peripheral to
another that it is ignored philosophically and
uncultivated as an ideal in everyday life. For this
reason, the phenomenological method can be employed
to describe the eidetic structure of the mode of
experience to which bodymind awareness refers in the
philosophy of Dogen. Accordingly, the thesis of this
article is not only that the phenomenological method
is a useful instrument for laying bare the structure
of the awareness of bodymind, but also that the
awareness of bodymind is a central theme through
which the complex philosophy of Dogen may be
penetrated.

It is important to emphasize Dogen's descriptive
phenomenological methodology in Shobogenzo.
Shobogenzo is a collection of Dogen's discourses,
given orally and written, from 1231 until his death
in 1253. The apparent phenomenological tenor of
Shobogenzo is characterized by Dogen's argumentation
based upon reference to everyday experience. Dogen's
foremost objective in Shobogenzo is to describe the
most primordial mode of experience in which the world
is presented to consciousness. He is concerned with
faithfully describing a mode of experience void of
unjustified presuppositions, metaphysical
conceptualizations, ontological presuppositions, or
any other impairment of an authentic direct encounter
with th world as it is originally given to
consciousness. Each fascicle focuses upon specific
aspects of experience, for example, its istructure,
temporal component, ethical dimension, and so forth.
Dogen's appeal to cultivate (shugyo(d)) an unimpaired
experience one's situation (jisetsu(e)) was intended
to justify his insistence on practicing zazen (seated
meditation). Dogen abandoned his initial description
of how to perform zazen (Fukanzazengi(f)) and
--------------------------
David E. Shaner is Assistant Professor of
Philosophy, Furman University, Creenville, South
Carolina. Philosophy East and West 35, no. 1 (January
1985).

p. 18

justification of its prominent role in the history of
Buddhist practice (Bendowa(g)) in favor of describing
the experience of zazen itself (Shobogenzo). Since
Dogen's endeavor is to describe the structure of
paradigmatic modes of experience that authenticate
Buddhist doctrines, a phenomenological interpretation
is a more appropriate methodology than, for example,
a historical or analytical approach.(1)

The thesis of this article will be limited to
making explicit the eidetic structure of bodymind
experience via phenomenological categories. These
categories merely serve to describe identifiable
characteristics of bodymind experience. Since the
analysis is performed exclusively within the
phenomenological epoche, there will be no attempt to
justify any ontological status associated with the
methodological categories. The structure of
experience articulated below is intended to reflect
the paradigmatic value given to bodymind experience
by Dogen.

Although the historical antecedents initiating
the primary significance of bodymind experience
exceeds the boundaries of this project, there is
textual evidence that suggests that the emphasis upon
body and mind inseparability was an inherited
tradition. When Kuukai (or Kobo Daishi(h) , A.D.
774-835) describes an ancient ma.n.dala, he refers to
the Sanskrit and says, "Unite your dhyaana with
praj~naa in an adamantine binding."(2) Unlike the
Cartesian paradigm suggesting that the body and mind
are ontologically distinct, for Kuukai and Dogen body
and mind are interpreted as one--bodymind. This
difference between these fundamental starting points
entails a difference in attitude toward mind and
body. In general, in the East, body and mind are
considered originally one, hence, the problem in
Buddhist practice is to verify empirically the
primordial "unity of dhyaana and praj~naa." In the
West the traditional mind-body problem arises as mind
and body are, by definition, ontologically distinct.
The problem is to theorize the manner in which they
interrelate. In short, the problem in the West is one
of understanding the principle of interconnection. In
the East the problem is to experientially realize or
authenticate original oneness of bodymind.

II. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF BODYMIND EXPERIENCE

Using examples of everyday experiences common in
the West, various aspects of bodymind experience will
be articulated. This is an important starting place
as we need to make explicit characteristics of this
mode of awareness with which we may identify. Even
though bodymind awareness is uncultivated as a
philosophical ideal or model for daily life in the
West, we may identify fleeting instances of this
experience and then, by extension, begin to acquire
an experiential insight into Dogen's perspective that
gives greater value and significance to bodymind
experience. The present phenomenological analysis
will unpack the essential characteristics of the
experiential correlates to which the terms body and
mind refer. It will be clear from the beginning that
the experiential correlates are unlike

p. 19

the abstract concepts body and mind. The
phenomenological methodology will direct our
attention to the primordial giveness of the act of
experiencing body and mind. Since this is achieved
within the phenomenological reduction of the natural
standpoint, a description of the eidetic structure of
the primordially experienced body and mind will
follow no presupposed criteria other than the act of
experience itself.

The distinction between abstract speculations
about body and mind, as opposed to describing the
eidetic essences of body and mind as-experienced,
reflects the methodology, scope, and limitations of
phenomenological inquiry. It is important to
distinguish phenomenoiogical description of eidetic
essences from abstract explanations of ontologically
posited entities or ontological explanations of mere
abstractions. First, phenomenological description of
eidetic essences exposes the a priori structures of
human experience by revealing the most fundamental
axioms of experience grounded upon apodictic
evidence. This is accomplished by the fact that
phenomenological description never strays from the
act of experience. By bracketing the natural
standpoint, those aspects of belief which tend to
cloud or distract one's attention from the actual
eidetic structure of experience, namely, the
ontological thetic positings, are suspended. In this
way experience is described as it is given to
consciousness. An immediate ramification of this
method is the recognition that the "what" aspect
precedes the "that" aspect in all experience, that
is, the essence precedes existence. Through
phenomenological description, eidetic essences are
shown to be primordially given to our consciousness
before ontological thetic positings.

Phenomenological descriptions of eidetic essences
are solely concerned with the modes or structures of
the act of experience. For example, belief in the
natural standpoint may lead us into making absolute
distinctions between subject and object as if there
were two separate worlds--one "out there" (objective)
and one "in here" (subjective). The phenomenological
approach demonstrates that these are only two modes
of experience, one that is private or unconfirmed by
others and one that is public, about which we receive
feedback from others indicating that this part of our
experience is shared. The phenomenological reduction
(epoche) does not detach one from the world but
focuses Upon the world as it is primordially
experienced before the ontological status of the
world is affirmed or denied. There is an explicit
assumption that since experience is our window to the
world, a rigorous phenomenological description of
eidetic essences will allow one to see the world not
necessarily as it really is, but as it is in the only
way which we can know it--as it is presented to
consciousness.

In contrast to the preceding, abstract
explanations of ontologically posited entities and
ontological explanations of mere abstractions must be
examined. Both the former and the latter violate the
spirit of the phenomenological reduction. To give an
abstract explanation of an already ontologically
posited entity is to have assumed a perspective, with
respect to that entity, before the investigation has
begun. For example, if I assume that body or mind
exist and then

p. 20

attempt to explain their existence via abstract
doctrines (causality or temporality), then I have
assumed from the start that which I am attempting to
prove. Or, if I were to argue for the ontological
necessity of an abstraction, I would be attempting to
give ontological status to something which has no
exact experiential correlate. There is nothing
inherently wrong with attempting to argue for the
ontological status of an entity or with defending the
ontological necessity of an abstraction. However,
this procedure sets both apart from phenomenological
descriptions of eidetic essences. The latter concerns
itself solely with the relations and process of
experience in an effort to become aware of the
fundamental axioms of experience. In short,
phenomenological description attempts to be true to
experience as it is given to consciousness, whereas
abstract explanations of ontologically posited
entities and ontological explanations of abstractions
attempt to be consistent with some criteria other
than the act of experience itself.

How then does one experience mind and body?
Phenomenologically speaking, one can never experience
an independent mind or body. Neither mind nor body
can become the noematic focus of a noetic glance.
This phenomenological observation is not intended to
imply that body and mind are meaningless terms, for
they may have a meaning that is abstracred from
experience. There may be a mental dimension or
"mind-aspect" of some complex experience, but a mind
may never be experienced as a noema completely
independent from the "body-aspect" giving meaning to
the background within which the noema is
circumscribed. Mind-aspects and body-aspects have
been abstracted from primordially given experiences
so frequently that there is a tendency to believe
that these terms have exact independent experiential
correlates. it is difficult, however, to isolate
either mind or body as perceivable noemata. Although
there may be mind-aspects and body-aspects within all
lived experience, the presence of either one includes
experientially the presence of the other.(3) In
short, in the act of experience neither mind nor body
is independently intended as a noematic focus of a
noetic glance.

For example, the significance of body-as-object
(der Korper) versus body-as- subject (der Leib)
hinges upon the "horizon" of the experience giving
meaning to the "privileged" noematic focus. (The
horizon of an experience includes the content and
meaning of everything within the experiential
periphery. The meaning of the horizon also includes
the accompanying assumptions that one may bring to
one's experience as a result of the historicity of
the noemata and the familiarity of the experiencer
with the environmental conditions. The noematic focus
is privileged as it is singled out as the intended
focal point within the horizon.) The body-as-subject
is valued as such because the mind-aspect is included
in the horizon of one's experience, thus giving
meaning to the body above and beyond the implications
of an inanimate object. The meaning and significance
of all intersubjective experience includes, in the
horizon, body-aspects and mind-aspects. Mind-aspects
and body-aspects may be separated from the context of
lived experience only through abstraction. It is only
through

p. 21

abstraction that mind-aspects and body-aspects may
become noematic foci, for example, in reflection,
imagination, or reverie, and so forth. Since
intersubjective experience includes, within the
horizon, mind-aspects and body-aspects, the presence
of these two aspects will henceforth be referred to
as "bodymind." This is necessary since our
experience, as it is given to our consciousness, is
not divided into various aspects. Rather we are
conscious, aware, and we act in a bodymind way. We
jump for joy, fidget in boredom, blush when
embarrassed, quiver when scared, shake when nervous,
slouch when tired, wrinkle our brow when angered, and
so forth. In our lived pre-reflective experience
there is no mediate relationship between body and
mind. Our language is full of idioms that presuppose
a direct, immediate relationship between a person's
physical appearance and mental condition. One might
say he "looks tired, " "seems nervous," "appears
unhappy," "acted unusual," "revealed emotion," "was
visabiy upset," "seems to carry a problem on his
shoulders, " "held back the tears, " "let his
inhibitions go," and so forth. In daily experience
people act as though the lived relation of mind and
body is one that is most accurately represented by
the term "bodymind."

The essential bodymind quality in all experience
may be classified as follows:

(a) First-Order Bodymind Awareness--only in this
mode of experiencing is there a direct awareness of
bodymind within the horizon. All thetic positings are
neutralized.(4) There is no specifiable noetic vector
towards a privileged noematic focus. There is only an
awareness of the horizon in toto. Example:
pre-reflective neutral consciousness in which there
is no intentionality.

(b) Second-Order Bodymind Awareness--in this mode
of experiencing there is only one specific noetic
vector directed towards a single privileged noematic
focus. This is, therefore, the most primordial form
of intentionality. The awareness of bodymind is
secondary to the awareness of the intended noematic
focus. Example: pre-reflective assiduous
consciousness characteristic of athletic or musical
artists.

(C) Third-Order Bodymind Awareness--in this mode
of experiencing there may be many overlapping noetic
vectors towards a multiplicity of noematic foci. This
is the most complex form of intentionality. The
awareness of bodymind is filtered by a myriad of
noematic foci. Example: reflective discursive
consciousness.(5)

FIRST-ORDER BODYMIND AWARENESS

By maintaining the spirit of Husserl's
phenomenological endeavor (zu den Sachen selbst and
Wendung zum Objekt), one is led to a mode of
experience prior to intentional experience. The
awareness of bodymind is presenced within the horizon
of experience only when all thetic positings are
neutralized. (To presence is to be aware, without any
doxic modifications, of the horizon of experience. It
is the condition of being aware of the nonpriviledged
horizon in toto granted by the neutralization of all
thetic positings.) Bodymind may never occupy the
noetically intended noematic position in experience.
One is only aware of bodymind as one aspect within
the entire experiential periphery; it does not draw
attention to itself (alethia) as a privileged
noematic focus.

p. 22

This epistemic aspect of bodymind can be
clarified by further consideration of the
phenomenological method. Since phenomenological
reduction suspends the natural standpoint, one is led
to a description of the noetic and noematic aspects
of experience. The reduction leads one from a
description of ontologically posited objects to a
description of the eidetic components of thetic
experience. However, if the noetic/noematic
relationship is retained, the reflexive analysis of
experience cannot move beyond the limitations imposed
by second-order bodymind awareness in which there
remains "a specific noetic vector directed towards a
single privileged noematic focus." Therefore, an
additional reduction which leads one to the
primordial giveness of bodymind within the horizon is
necessary. This additional reduction is the means to
lay bare the level of "primary belief (Urglaube) or
Protodoxa (Urdoxa) "(6) upon which all doxic
modifications are posited. This reduction serves to
neutralize all thetic positings leading one from a
description of the noetic and noematic aspects of
experience to the primordially given nonprivileged
horizon. In this neutral, nonvectoral mode of
experience the awareness of bodymind within the
horizon is immediate and direct. Bodymind can never
be experienced as the noematic focus of experience
because this first-order awareness occurs prior to
the noetic/noematic distinction. Bodymind holds no
privileged position amidst the entire experiential
horizon (horizon in toto) . At this Urdoxic or
primordially given ground level, bodymind is
experienced as part of the horizon prior to thetic
judgmental positings.

The epistemology of bodymind just presented
indicates that one can be aware of bodymind only
during first-order awareness when the noetic/noematic
distinction is neutralized. Although bodymind can
never become the privileged noematic object of a
noetic glance, five characteristics of bodymind
awareness can be presenced amidst the horizon in
toto. First, the spatial size of one's experiential
periphery expands since one's awareness is not
concentrated in any specific direction. There is no
reflection, analysis, abstraction, wish, hope, fear,
and so forth. There is only the activity of
presencing the horizon in toto as it is given to
consciousness. This does not imply that I am merely
registering Humean patches of grayness and redness.
Insofar as one is familiar with the surroundings, one
presences the horizon in a gestalt. The horizon
includes within it, as distinguished from the spatial
periphery, the meaning and historicity of familiar
objects. The horizon is given a structure in accord
with the experiential history of its contents.

A second characteristic of this mode of
experience is that it is immediate and spontaneous;
there are no mediate intentions which attribute any
meaning to the situation. The situation is presenced
as it is given primordially to consciousness,
Tensions and intentions are like mud put into a clear
stream of first-order experiencing. They dam the flow
of presencing and muddy one's direct awareness of the
nonprivileged horizon. When tensions and intentions
are neutralized, one's responsiveness to the
situation may be immediate.

A third characteristic of first-order bodymind
awareness is that it serves as the

p. 23

condition for noetic and noematic relations. The
relation between noesis and noema is one in which a
change in the meaning bestowing noesis creates a
change in the meaning of the noema. One may ask how
is it that these changes can be so sensitively
experienced? Such determinations are ascertainable
only against a background of bodymind awareness. The
presence of noesis and noema already entail a
second-order experience. Given an initial
second-order experience, it would be difficult to
utilize additional second-order experiences in order
to ascertain subtle shifts between the noesis and
noema within the initial experience. Such additional
intentional vectors would only serve to cover(7) the
initial second-order experience. Additional positings
and reflective perspectives would serve to focus our
attention upon specific abstracted aspects of the
initial experience. This process, however, would not
serve to describe the subtle relation within the
original experience. A description of the subtle
changes between the noesis and noema within a
second-order experience requires a description of the
entire context within which the changes occurred. The
changes themselves are experienced against a
background of neutral bodymind awareness wherein the
horizon in toto is presenced clearly. Being neutral,
the horizon surrounding the privileged intentional
vector reflects all the changes clearly. In this way,
first-order bodymind awareness of the nonprivileged
horizon serves as a backdrop against which
noetic/noematic changes, characteristic of second-
and third- order intentional experience, may be
understood.

A fourth characteristic of first-order bodymind
awareness is that it is dynamic, not static. Since
bodymind can never be the noematic object of a noetic
glance, except in abstraction, it cannot be
thoroughly grasped. Bodymind can never be experienced
in toto because of its dynamic nature within the
horizon. Since the entire horizon, in which bodymind
is included, is thetically neutral, it is not static.
The horizon is given no intended structure during the
act of presencing. The meaning of the horizon is
given to consciousness as it is. Bodymind is
primordially given as the dynamic ground for all
experience. This dynamism expresses itself in the
awareness of the myriads of possible ways in which
one may focus one's second- and third-order
intentions At such times one is aware of bodymind as
the ever changing dynamic reservoir from which an
infinite number of intentional vectors may be
posited.

This dynamic nature of bodymind underscores the
positive and lively character of first order
awareness. When one has neutralized all thetic
positings this does not mean that one "does not do
anything" (a negative thetic positing) or "strips
away every meaningful thing" (a nihilistic attitude).
Rather one could liken neutralizing all intentions
with positing only one intention, namely, nothing.
This approach underscores the active and dynamic
feature of first-order bodymind awareness, thus
further clarifying the important difference between
neutral experience and negative intentions. Whereas
negative intentions serve as noetic attitudes that
deny the world, neutral experience may be seen as an
active Positing of nothing. One is doing nothing as
one intends (noesis) no specific thing

p. 24

(a privileged noema). By doing nothing the dynamism
of the horizon is presenced in toto.

In this way, first-order bodymind awareness helps
explain why perceptual objects given to consciousness
are never completely known. This is due to the fact
that (1) intended experience is perspectival and
therefore limited, and (2) experience is a dynamic,
ongoing process with a seemingly infinite reservoir
of possibility. Similarly, it is impossible to be
totally knowledgeable of bodymind as it is only
directly presenced amidst the dynamic horizon in
toto. Bodymind may only be presenced within
first-order experience as part of the dynamic ground
of subsequent thetic positings.

Finally, the fifth characteristic of bodymind
awareness is that it is the condition for the
spatio-temporal character of experience. Bodymind is
experienced as that aspect of experience which
enables us to know that it is ours. The periphery of
our experience is always given to consciousness
located in some "place." (8) If some noetic attitude
were to arise as an intentional vector, then this
vector's point of origin would be this same
place--bodymind. Bodymind is the phenomenological
ground for all experience, since all experience is
both located and directed. Phenomenologically, an
individual is nothing more than the place through
which dynamic experience flows. Intentional
experience is thus seen as issuing from a dynamic
reservoir that serves as the spatial ground of
experience. If one chooses to focus one's attention
upon the door, flower, picture, or reflexively upon
the self, then the intentional vector is directed
from "here" to "there."(9)

Bodymind is also experienced as the temporal
ground of experience as it is recognized as a dynamic
function that binds our experience together in time.
Within a completely neutral horizon, the primordial
continuous stream of experience is presenced without
interruption. At this time, the past and future have
no meaning apart from the now in which they are
presenced. One becomes aware that just as the mind
and body have no exact one-to-one experiential
correlate, the past and future have no correlate
other than their meaning as abstracted from the
stream of present experience. The past and future can
only be experienced as present memories or
anticipations, respectively. By focusing upon the
primordially given time-as-experienced, one is able
to describe the experiential ground of temporality
itself--bodymind,

During first-order experience, past, present, and
future occur simultaneously. Since the horizon is
experienced in toto, there is no succession of
moments. There is no tl, t2, t3 in which a series of
before and after may be constructed. Moreover, there
is no noematic object which is given a status unique
to the rest of the horizon. Once intended, a noematic
object may be seen as something which stands apart;
it is something capable of undergoing relative change
in space and time. Spatial change is possible, for a
noematic object may be observed to move across the
periphery relative to the rest of the horizon. This,
in turn, is possible because one is aware of a
specific moment (tl) in which the noema became the

p. 25

specific object of our attention. Once intended it
may acquire a history relative to the rest of the
horizon; it may do X at tl, Y at t2, and Z at t3.
However, in first order experience, wherein the
horizon is presenced in toto, there is no recognition
of anything specific. Therefore there is no
recognition of something changing relative, in space
or time, to everything else. The horizon in toto is
presenced as it is in a simultaneous manner. Since
nothing stands apart from the horizon, there is no
experience of relative space or time. Only the
dynamic simultaneity of the horizon is experienced as
the reservoir of possible relative spatio-temporal
distinctions. When no noematic object is posited,
there is nothing against which relative
spatio-temporal distinctions may be determined. Space
and time are therefore recognized as conditions which
accompany only thetic experience.

In contrast, primordial neutral experience is
characterized by bodymind awareness, which serves as
the condition and ground (simultaneity) for the
spatio-temporal dimension of thetic (second- and
third-order) experience. Consistent with the
phenomenological methodology, space and time are
interpreted solely as components of our experience.
Accordingly, space and time are experienced as
qualities that allow for the possibility of
intentional experience. As such they provide the
structure by which the noemata may be distinguished
from the rest of the periphery. Without such a
structure all experience would be first-order and one
could not move beyond the primordial awareness of the
dynamic bodymind ground pervading a simultaneously
given horizon in toto.

Thus far the analysis has focused upon
first-order bodymind awareness because this mode of
experience is given tremendous value and significance
by Dogen. It is possible to utilize first-order
bodymind awareness as a common thread linking various
philosophical doctrines espoused by Dogen.
First-order bodymind awareness can be interpreted as
an implicit feature of a number of different
doctrines. Once this link is exposed, the rationale
behind a few of Dogen's philosophical doctrines may
become more clear.

III. ZAZEN AWARENESS FIRST-ORDER BODYMIND AWARENESS

Since Dogen was one of the earliest Buddhist
scholars to write in Japanese, his works constituted
a contributing factor to the growth of the Soto sect
during the Kamakura period (1185-1333). And, since
his philosophy was guided by experience rather than
theory, a form of radical empiricism began to emerge
as a characteristic of later Japanese Buddhism.
Dogen's contribution to the demystifying of Buddhist
practice--by underscoring the experiential basis of
complex doctrines--was monumental. His philosophy may
be understood as a response to an apparent
incongruence that Dogen had detected yet could not
assimilate. The relationship between the theories of
original enlightenment (hongaku(i) ) and acquired
enlightenment (shikaku(j) ) achieved through
cultivation seemed to be incompatible. In short, if
we are originally enlightened, why do we cultivate
that which is already innate? What is the meaning and
purpose of cultivation? The apparent inconsistency
between the doctrinal teachings found

p. 26

in the suutras and the practical disciplines of Tendai
cultivation haunted Dogen until he left Mount Hiei,
the center of Japanese Tendai Buddhism, in search of
a resolution.

The rift between theory and practice became
dissolved when Dogen suddenly achieved enlightenment
when he heard his Chinese Zen Master Nyojo(k)
(Chinese, Ju-ching(1), 1163-1268) explain, "In Zen,
body and mind are cast off." Dogen had learned the
importance of strict discipline and persistent zazen
practice, and that proper cultivation (shugyo)
included "casting off body and mind." Henceforth,
casting off body and mind became the central
principle of Dogen's practice and philosophy.(10)
Since Dogen's Shobogenzo is based upon a description
of the zazen experience, and since casting off body
and mind is its goal, the casting off of body and
mind may be interpreted as a key to understanding
Dogen's philosophical positions.

Shinjin datsuraku(n)

Shinjin datsuraku is a phrase traditionally
translated as "cast off body and mind."(11) The
importance of this phrase cannot be underestimated.
It occurs throughout Shobogenzo, works by Dogen not
included in Shobogenzo, and is most evident in
Shobogenzo zuimonki, which was edited by Dogen's
disciples shortly after his death. The importance of
this phrase was punctuated by Dogen as he considered
it to be the "one great matter of Zen practice for my
entire life."(12) As the key to practice, it became
the key to understanding Buddhist theory as well. In
fact, Dogen stated explicitly that this is all you
need to understand Buddhism.

From the first time you meet your master and
receive his teaching, you have no need for either
incense-offerings, homage-paying, nembutsu, penance
disciplines, or silent sutra readings; only cast off
body and mind in zazen.(13)

Dogen states that he became enlightened when he
heard his master Nyojo shout at a sleeping monk,
"Zazen is to cast off body and mind! Why are you
sleeping? " Dogen subsequently prostrated himself
before his master and said, "I have come here with
body and mind cast off." Nyojo confirmed his
enlightenment saying, "Now cast off body and
mind!"(14)

On numerous occasions Dogen uses the metaphor of
the pole to explain casting off body and mind. One
such instance is as follows:

Students, cast aside your bodies and minds and
enter fully into Buddhism. An old Master has said,
`You've climbed to the top of a hundred-foot pole.
Now keep on going'.... Resolve to cast aside both
body and mind.(15)

"Casting off," interpreted phenomenologically, is
parallel to the neutralization of thetic positings
characteristic of first order bodymind awareness.
Dogen is emphatic in his emphasis that casting off is
not a denunciation (negative positing) of body and
mind. One must cast aside all thetic positings, for
example, "accepting good" and "rejecting evil."(16)
To cling to such "preconceptions"(17) or "personal
views,"(18) is like clutching on to the top of the
pole. One must "let go with both hands and feet,(19)
thus suspending all relative thinking and worldly

p. 27

opinions. In words reminiscent of a phenomenological
epoche, Dogen teaches his students not to fear the
opinions of others when one has given up worldly
views (the natural standpoint). The monastic life is
not a denunciation or negation of the world for it
allows the monk to be in a community of men seeking
to experience the world as it is with tensions (body)
and intentions (mind) cast off. In short, Dogen hints
at neutralization, versus negation, when he says
forget body and mind and all preconceived notions
about Buddhism.

Dogen states that understanding the Buddhist
doctrine of impermanence is contingent upon casting
off body and mind. In the work entitled Shoji (Life
and Death), Dogen teaches neither to hate nor desire
life or death. Such thetic attitudes cloud one's
ability to experience life as it is and death as it
is. Moreover, one should "not attempt to measure
[life and death] with your mind or employ them with
words." Rather, Dogen describes the neutral
(first-order) attitude, saying that one must "achieve
detachment from life and death... without effort or
using your mind." (20)

Similarly, Dogen states that casting off body and
mind allows the zazen practitioner to verify the
doctrine of original enlightenment (hongaku(p)) .
Dogen sought to describe this primordial (first
order) mode of experience because of his conviction
that even the theory of hongaku ought to be grounded
in apodictic experiential evidence. In order to
articulate the unique features of this thetically
neutral experience, Dogen interlaced concrete and
poetic images, pushing language to its most
expressive levels. Although he uses expressive
language to describe the enlightened character of all
things," (21) he cautions his readers not to attach
themselves to such metaphors. Such expressions are to
be understood as mere symbols (not metaphysical
realities) that describe the experience of becoming
concretely aware of original enlightenment. Using an
excerpt from the fascicle shinjingakudo(q) (Learning
[through] the body and mind) as a case in point,
Dogen poetically describes the mode of experience
that confirms the originally enlightened character of
all things. This attitude is consistent with
first-order bodymind awareness described above.

There is a ground of the soil, a ground of the
mind, and a ground of the treasure as well. Even
though they are of many kinds, it does not mean that
they can not be without a ground. There should be a
world with emptiness as its ground. There is a
different human and celestial view with respect to
the sun, moon, and stars. These views of various
kinds are not the same. But regardless of what it is
the view of the undivided mind puts it on one plane
[unifies it].(22)

In the first sentence Dogen suggests that every
perceptible entity seems to Possess its own defining
essence. Yet, he then cautions, simply because there
may be many instances when one could make this
assumption, it need not be the case. Rather than
assigning (positing) specific essences for each
thing, there is another Perspective from which all
things share a common ground--emptiness. This
Perspective of the "undivided man" (first-order
bodymind awareness) is thus Contrasted with "views of
various kinds" (sekond- and third-order bodymind

p. 28

awareness). These latter views, casting different
noetic attitudes ("human" or "celestial"), posit
different noematic meanings upon, for example, "the
sun, moon, and stars." The view of the undivided
mind, on the other hand, puts all the various views
on a plane and thus unifies them. Phenomenologically
speaking, experiencing from the view of the undivided
mind entails a neutralization of all intentional
perspectives, thus laying bare the bodymind ground
within the horizon in toto. The horizon can be
perceived with no specific noemata possessing a
privileged position. A nonprivileged horizon
constitutes experiential verification of the notion
of emptiness. Since the undivided mind depicts the
sense of shared essence (ground), it also verifies
the original enlightenment which all beings equally
share. By relying upon the cultivation of the
undivided mind (first-order bodymind awareness) ,
Dogen was able to come to terms with the question
which originally inspired his religious quest. The
theory of enlightenment is true and insistence upon
practice is also true. Cultivation and authentication
are one and the same (shusho ichinyo(r) ). The
cultivation of zazen awareness (first-order bodymind
awareness) is synonymous with the act of
authenticating or empirically verifying the doctrine
of hongaku, precisely because one's thetic intentions
are neutralized.

Just as the neutralization of all thetic
positings (first-order bodymind awareness) clarifies
Dogen's description of the undivided mind, hongaku,
and shusho ichinyo, the dynamic character of
presencing the horizon in tote (first-order bodymind
awareness) clarifies Dogen's description of sokushin
zebutsu(s) and the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence.
Sokushin zebutsu ([This very] mind is Buddha) is the
title of a fascicle in Shobogenzo and an important
concept used throughout Dogen's philosophical scheme.
Sokushin zebutsu emphasizes the fact that
enlightenment is attained in this lifetime. Dogen
emphasizes mind (shin(t)) to punctuate the dynamism
of neutral (mind-aspect) bodymind awareness. For
Dogen the dynamism of cultivation, that is, the act
of casting off body and mind, enables the
practitioner to participate in, and directly
experience, impermanence. Sakushin zebutsu is
utilized to demonstrate the futility of searching for
a source of permanence within oneself. Dogen makes it
clear that the act of neutralization (casting off)
eliminates any conception of static, permanent "mind"
or fixed "Buddha." In this way, Dogen lays the
groundwork for his thesis that sokushin zebutsu
([this very] mind is Buddha) refers to the act of
experiencing in an authentic manner. The act of
cultivation authenticates the Buddhist doctrine of
impermanence. There is nothing substantial to seek in
oneself, in Buddhahood, or within the periphery of
first-order bodymind awareness. It is during this
mode of awareness, when all thetic positings are
neutralized, that the dynamic ground of subsequent
noetic glances is presenced. The dynamism of "this
very mind" ('this very' referring to the most simple,
most primordial condition of awareness), which is
said to be equivalent to a Buddha's experience, most
clearly approximates the structure of first-order
bodymind awareness.

p. 29

In his summary of Sokushin zebutsu, Dogen places
his emphasis upon the need to achieve the mode of
experience in which "this very mind is Buddha" is not
separated from cultivation and authentication. He
says, "to not yet have aroused the mind, cultivated
it, authenticated it, and achieved enlightenment is
not `this very mind is Buddha'." "If," he continues,
"for even one instant one were to cultivate and
authenticate the aroused mind, it would be `this very
mind is Buddha'."(23)

Shinjingakudo(u)

In the fascicle Shinjingakudo (Learning [through]
the bodymind), Dogen concentrates upon describing the
inseparability of bodymind. Although he discusses the
body-aspect and the mind-aspect individually, he
prefaces his explanations by stating that each aspect
represents a focus of concentration for the purposes
of learning. Dogen begins his analysis by discussing
"learning through the mind"-hotsubodaishin(v)
(hotsu(w) , `departure, radiate, start from', +
bodaishin(x), 'devout disposition, aspiration for
Buddhahood'; hence this term is interpreted as
"learning through the mind." This translation
captures the notion that hotsubodaishin is the key
term signifying the mind-aspect of shinjingakudo
[learning (through) the bodymind]). Dogen describes
this "learning through the mind" as follows:

These [sun, moon, and stars] are already mind.
Are they inside or outside of it [mind], coming or
going? Coming and going is simply one or two thoughts
of mind. And one thought or two thoughts are one
mountain, river, and the great earth or two
mountains, rivers, and the great earth. Since things
like mountains, rivers, and the great earth are
neither existent nor nonexistent, they are neither
big nor small.... You should decisively accept in
faith that learning through the mind means regular
practice of personally studying this kind of
mind.(24)

There are a number of characteristics of learning
through the mind-aspect ascertainable from the
passage just given. Dogen instructs that it is wrong
to assume that things ("sun, moon, and stars") exist
either "inside" (idealism) or "outside" (materialism)
this "mind" (first-order bodymind awareness). To make
such ontic judgments are merely thetic acts which are
reducible to "one thought" or "two thoughts." Dogen
acknowledges that for each noetic act (one
thoughtght, there is a corresponding noematic meaning
(one mountain). This correspondence is, however, only
applicable during second- or third-order experience
when noemata are intended as either existing or not
existing. During a mode of first-order presencing
when noemata are intended as neither existing nor
nonexisting, Dogen concludes that even mountains,
from this perspective, are not "big or small." This
may be phenomenologically interpreted as presencing
the mountain, river, and great earth from a
first-order perspective. Only during firstorder
bodymind awareness is the horizon presenced in toto,
wherein all possible noemata share a nonprivileged
position. No relative distinctions (big or small) can
be accessed. There is no fixed (privileged) standard
by which such judgments

p. 30

could be ascertained. One can interpret "learning
through the mind" as a reflection of the condition of
the mind-aspect during first-order bodymind
awareness. The mind-aspect (intentions) is thetically
neutral, allowing for the occurrence of a mode of
experience structurally consistent with Dogen's
description just given.

Similarly, Dogen utilizes another term which
describes the condition of the body-aspect (tensions)
during first-order bodymind awareness. He says that
"learning through the mind" must be united with
"learning through the body"-- shinjitsunintai(y)
(shin(z) , `truth, " + jitsu(aa) , `reality', +
jintai(ab), `human body-- literally, `the real human
body'. This translation is intended to reflect
Dogen's use of the term as representative of the
body-aspect of shinjingakudo [learning (through) the
bodymind]). Learning through the body is said to be
the goal of Buddhist practice. To embody,
internalize, or sediment this paradigmatic mode of
perpetual casting off is to presence
things-as-they-are (genjokoan(ac)) throughout daily
life. The ongoing activity of neutralization is most
important to Dogen. Whereas hotsubodaishin refers to
the dynamic activity of the mind-aspect,
shinjit-sunintai is concerned with the dynamic
activity of the body-aspect.

The last fascicle to be examined is called
Kaiinsammai(ad).(25) It is particularly relevant to a
phenomenological study since Dogen enumerates
explicitly the relationship between body and mind
as-experienced during cultivation.

Kaiinsammai

Kaiinsammai (umi(ae), `sea, ocean', + in(af),
'seal, imprint', + sammai(ag), Sanskrit samaadhi,
'self-effacement, concentration, meditation', hence
`Ocean Imprint Meditation') is a term which
traditionally names the `Sakyamuni, Buddha's highest
form of experiential insight. The title itself
depicts a mode of awareness where in the dharma is
imprinted (experientially sedimented or internalized)
as clearly as if it were an image cast by a quiet
sea. Dogen metaphorically describes this experiential
condition as one which "breaks through the chain [of
delusions]" (thetic positings). He says this process
of "clearing away... is like all rivers confluently
flowing [back] into the great ocean,"(26) that is,
all things-as- experienced give up their privileged
noematic status, thus appearing to "flow back"
reflexively to a mutual nonprivileged status amidst
the horizon in toto.

Dogen focuses on the relationship between
"clearing away" and the body and mind. "Clearing away
and breaking through" can be interpreted as the
neutralization of thetic positings (casting off body
and mind). He says,

In the honorable words of Shakyamuni, "This body
is composed merely by means of all dharmas. At the
time of generation there is only the arising of
dharmas, and at the time of extinction, there is only
the disappearing of dharmas. At the time when dharmas
arise, one does not say that an `I' is generated. And
when dharmas disappear, one does not say that an `I'
perishes' Earlier thoughts and later thoughts do not
depend on each other, nor do they oppose each other.
This is what I call the ocean imprint meditation.(27)

p. 31

If the body and mind are posited as separate
entities, they are "generated" as abstractions
(body-aspect, mind-aspect). Once this separation is
"generated" (affirmative thetic positing) or
"extinguished" (negative thetic positing), even in
the form of a hidden presupposition, the groundwork
is set for the arising of "later thoughts" (thetic
positings), creating a more explicit gap between
noesis and noema, "they oppose each other." If the
body and mind are cast off, the groundwork for
additional thetic positings are simultaneously cast
off. Dogen's emphasis upon shinjin datsuraku is
stimulated by his contention that positing a
distinction between body and mind is the initial,
sometimes hidden, presupposition which precedes more
obvious forms of intentionality when noematic foci
appear as receptors of noetic vectors.

Dogen metaphorically describes this phenomenon by
saying, "suddenly a fire starts."(28) Things
"suddenly" (thetically) appear as distinct from one
another and arise from a ground that is itself
distinctionless. If no "dharmas" (noemata) thetically
"arise" with a privileged position with respect to
the rest of the horizon in toto, then the relative
distinction between the "earlier" and "later
thoughts" would be eliminated. In this regard, the
eidetic structure of the ocean imprint meditation
shares a basic feature of first-order bodymind
awareness-- simultaneity. Given a nonprivileged
horizon, no temporal distinctions regarding "earlier"
or "later thoughts" could arise (there is no
privileged standard to serve as a criteria for such
temporal judgments). In Dogen's words,

The very temporal fruition of the ocean imprint
meditation is a temporal fruition [brought forth]
"solely by means of all dharmas, " and is an
expression "solely by means of all dharmas." This
body is nothing but an aspect of one unity which is
composed of dharmas. Do not regard this body merely
as an aspect of the composed but rather regard it as
being composed [of all dharmas].(29)

The body, therefore, as "an aspect of one unity"
(bodymind), is presenced within the horizon in toto.
That is, it appears as sharing the nonprivileged
horizon wherein "all dharmas" are presenced equally.

Casting off body and mind undercuts the
foundation for thetic intentions. The presence of a
thetically separated body and mind covers the
bodymind ground allowing for the possibility of more
obvious forms of separation amidst the horizon in
toto, namely, noetic/noematic distinctions. It must
be remembered, however, that Dogen is not speaking of
any metaphysical separation of body and mind. He
merely describes a thetic separation that appears as
an initial doxic modality that prepares one for a
transition from first-order awareness, where the
bodymind ground is directly experienced within the
horizon, to second-order awareness where the bodymind
ground is hidden by thetic intervention. The ocean
imprint experience, like first-order bodymind
awareness, names the mode of experience which
verifies implicitly the presence of bodymind
inseparability at the base of all experience. Dogen
describes this primordial mode of awareness as
follows:

p. 32

Between the temporal fruition of not saying the
generation which I am, and the temporal fruition of
not saying the disappearance which I am, there is a
simultaneous birth of not saying. But it is not the
not saying of a simultaneous death. (The
disappearing) is altogether a disappearing of the
earlier and later dharmas. It is the dharmas of
earlier thoughts and the dharmas of later thoughts.
These are the performing dharmas in the earlier and
later dharmas as well as in the earlier and later
thoughts. The non-interdependence is the performance
of dharmas and the nonopposition is the dharmas of
performance. Having the performance of dharmas be
noninterdependent and having the dharmas of
performance be nonopposing are expressing
authentication in a near perfect manner.(30)

This quotation discusses a mode of awareness
which parallels the phenomenological structure of
first-order bodymind awareness and the temporal
structure of the ocean imprint experience. When all
thetic positings have "disappeared all together" the
experiencer is left presencing the simultaneity of
the horizon in toto. Dogen suggests that this mode of
awareness arises when all "thoughts" (noesis) and all
"dharmas" (noema) "disappear" (are neutralized). When
this occurs, the dharmas are presenced as
"noninterdependent'' and "nonopposing." In other
words, all dharmas are experienced as sharing equally
a nonprivileged horizon. In conclusion, Dogen offers
a rare explicit statement equating the forementioned
characteristics with those of "near perfect
authentication."

IV. CONCLUSION

The seat of Soto(ah) spiritual life is thus
associated with a mode of experience that empirically
authenticates the meaning of the theoretical
doctrines through the sedimentation of first-order
awareness in daily life. By neutralizing intensions
and tensions one becomes one's own vehicle through
which the enlightened mode of awareness is eventually
internalized. Dogen accentuates the central role of
bodymind awareness in religious life when he says,

You should consider carefully that the
Buddha-dharma has always maintained the thesis of the
non-dual oneness of body and mind. Nevertheless, how
can it be possible that while this body is born and
dissolves, mind alone departs from body and escapes
from arising and perishing? If there is a time when
they are not, the Buddhist teaching must be false
indeed.... you should see the truth that as all the
Buddhas of the past, present and future are awakened
and practice the Way, they do not leave out of our
bodies and minds. To doubt this is already to slander
them. As we reflect quietly upon this matter, it
seems quite reasonable that our bodies and minds
enact the Way....(31)

The awareness of bodymind is thus tantamount to
the internalization of an enlightened mode of
experience. Cultivating first-order bodymind
awareness allows the practitioner to authenticate the
experiential correlates of the philosophical
doctrines. By presencing the phenomenal world as it
is given primordially to consciousness, the
practitioner can react to the situation rather than
situating his reactions by imposing his own
presuppositions upon the environment.

Finally, this article's thesis may be
underscored--the act of presencing things-as-they-are
(genjokoah) is cultivated by sedimenting a mode of
experience that is

p. 33

structurally not unlike first-order bodymind
awareness. Since the greatest value and significance
is given to this mode of awareness, it becomes the
object of philosophical investigation and the goal of
religious life. The above phenomenological analysis
has worked as a vehicle to clarify the structure of
first-order bodymind awareness. This, in turn, has
facilitated a clarification of the relation between
the philosophical doctrines and the eidetic structure
of the religious experience to which they refer. This
analysis does not purport to secularize the
enlightenment experience. The method has simply
defined the phenomenological categories of the mode
of experience associated with enlightenment.

The phenomenological categories utilized in this
analysis clearly reflect Husserl's ontological
presuppositions and Weltanschauung. This orientation
is not, as Husserl maintains, an entirely
presuppositionless "rigorous science." Husserl's
project reflects his own facticity, historicity, and
philosophical assumptions. The crucial point here is
that Husserl's existentialist/ phenomenological
position (zu den Sachen selbst) is one strikingly
similar to Dogen's reflective orientation.
Differences in facticity account for vast differences
between Husserl and Dogen. Nevertheless, it is their
quest for "presuppositionlessness'' that constitutes
an important shared presupposition. By acknowledging
explicitly their shared assumptions (above), the
phenomenological method may be employed as a
pedagogic tool for further comparative studies. Early
studies of this type run the risk of exaggerated
oversimplification. However, if eidetic categories
can indeed be laid bare, then common denominators may
penetrate the differences in facticity that
understandably hinder studies in comparative
philosophy.

NOTES

1. The compatibility of the phenomenological method
and Japanese philosophy has been underscored in
the following manner:
.. Japanese philosophical thinking may be found
in its ontological apprehension of man's
existence and the world... Japanese philosophy,
in fact, never accepted the ultimate reality or
its principle as "existing" apart from and
independent of the concrete, lived world of
experience, although they are separable in our
theoretical thinking. (Yoshiniro Nitta and
Hirotaka Tatematsu, eds., Analecta Husserlina:
The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, vol.
8, Japanese Phenomenology (Dordrecht, Holland;
Boston, Massachusetts; London: D. Reidel
Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 5-6).
2. Yoshito S. Hakeda, Kuukai: Major Works (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 220.
3. A similar conclusion could be reached by following
Naagaarjuna's reductio ad absurdum urguments
(Muulamadhyamakaarikaas) applied to the concepts
mind and body. Then terms body and mind can be
seen as empty (`suunya), since they are relational
and have no independent verifiable referents.
Similarly, Nietzsche would argue that such terms
as body and mind are mere interpretations that
have, through history, erroneously acquired an
assumed independent ontological status.
4. An account of this thetically neutral mode of
experience is acknowledged by Edmund Husserl in
his Ideas I, chapter 10, section 109, titled
"Neutrality-Modification."
5. These abstract classifications are not intended to
imply an implicit value judgment. The use of the
terms "first, " "second," and "third" merely
denote the chronological order by which our
experience unfolds from the most simple to
subsequent complex thoughts. The terms "primary,"

p. 34

"secondary, "tertiary" might have been employed
if it were not for their cumbersomeness. The
concentration on first-order bodymind awareness
merely reflects the value and significance given
to this primary mode of awareness cultivated in
the practice of zazen according to Dogen.
6. "Urglaube" or Protodoxa" designate the ground of
all belief modifications. These terms represent,
for Husserl, "primary" belief insofar as they are
the ground, or "intentional back-reference," for
all doxic modalities. The realm of primary belief
is experienced apodictically. (See Ideas I,
chapter 10, section Modifications"; compare sections 102-105.)
7. For the purposes of clarification, some readers
may wish to think of a similar relationship
between sammati, sa.mv.rti and praj~naa. For
Naagaarjuna "concepts" (sammati) (second- or
third-order intentions) may "cover" (sa.mv.rti)
the noumenal realm of paramaartha, hence the
Praj~naapaaramitaa literature emphasis upon
direct intuition (praj~naa) (first-order neutral
awareness). See David J. Kalupahana's Buddhist
Philosophy: A Historial Analysis (Honolulu,
Hawaii: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976),
pp. 129-139.
8. "Place" (Creek, topos; Japanese, basho(ai) )
refers to a region; it designates an area of
space. Nishida Kitaro uses this term in his
Intelligibility and the Philosophy of
Nothingness, trans. Robert Schinzinger (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976). For Nishida
"something is logically defined, when its `place'
is shown. Nishida's logic is a `logic of place,'
in contrast to the conventional logic of
subsumption, where a thing or a term is defined
'per genus proximum et differentiam specificam'
"(p. 249).
9. Such an interpretation is consistent with the
philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, who believed that
the Self was fundamentally unknowable when
analyzed, and therefore significantly changed, by
intentional experience. The second reduction that
has been employed in this article has, however,
enabled us to move beyond the noesis/noema
distinction to first-order neutral experience. In
this first-order mode of experience the Self may
be presenced as the dynamic bodymind ground of
all subsequent thetic experience. This reduction
prohibits one from ascribing any ontological
status to this bodymind ground as it is presenced
within the horizon in toto.
10. For this insight I am indebted to Hajime Nakamura
(Professor Emeritus, Tokyo University) , who
brought this to my attention in a conversation on
November 5, 1979, at the Toho Kenkyukai,
Tokyo,Japan.
11. In keeping with the terminology utilized
throughout, it would be more accurate but also
more cumbersome to translate shinjin datsuraku as
"cast off the mind-aspect and body-aspect." In
other words, cast off all abstractions in order
to become aware of the bodymind ground at the
base of all experience.
12. Norman Waddell and Masao Abe, trans., "Dogen's
Bendowa," The Eastern Buddhist N54, no. 1(1971):
130.
13. Ibid., p. 133.
14. Matsunaga, Foundation, vol. 2, p. 239. In this
work it is suggested that shinjin datsuraku is
peculiarly Japanese and would be a most unlikely
phrase for Nyojo to utter. It is interesting to
note that some scholars hypothesize that Nyojo
most likely used "dust" (Japanese, jin(aj) ;
Chinese, ch'en(ak)) rather than "body" (Japanese,
shin(al); Chinese, shen(am)).In other words, Nyojo
may have said, "cast off the dust of mind," which
has been a typical zen idiom since the days of
Hui-neng(an) . Dogen's possible deliberate
misconception, typical of his manner of
interpretation, only serves to underscore the
importance of bodymind with respect to the
enlightenment experience.
15. Masunaga, Reiho, trans., A Primer of Soto Zen: A
Translation of Dogen's Shobogenzo Zuimonki
(Honolulu, Hawaii: