Sinitic understanding of two truths theory

·期刊原文
Sinitic understanding of two truths theory in the Liang(a) dynasty (502-557):

Ontological Gnostieism in the thoughts of Prince Chao-ming(b)
by Whalen W. Lai
Philosophy East and West
volumn 28, no. 3 (July 1978)
P 339-350
(C) by the University Press of Hawaii.

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P339

The Maadhyamika philosophy of Naagaarjuna has been
appropriately called the "central philosophy" of
Mahaayaana.(1) This "Middle Path" philosophy (namely,
`suunyavaada, or Emptiness school) was the means by
which Mahaayaana criticized and undermined the
"atomist pluralism" of the "realist" thinkers in
northern Indian, especially the Sarvaastivaadins
within the general `Hinayanist' Abhidharmic circles.
The Emptiness philosophy was based on the
Praj~naapaaramitaa corpus and its basic insight into
the emptiness of all forms. Names and forms
(naamaruupa) are empty (`suunya); emptiness is itself
the raison d'etre of all phenomenal names and forms.
The articulated philosophy of Emptiness produced by
Naagaarjuna became the cornerstone of subsequent
Buddhist scriptures and commentaries in the Indian
Mahaayaana tradition. It is indeed the central or the
pivotal philosophy of Mahaayaana.

The impact of Maadhyamika in China was equally
significant. Despite the earlier familiarity with
the Praj~naapaaramitaa (Emptiness) Suutra, Chinese
Buddhist truly embarked on a "Mahaayaanist" phase
after the introduction of key Mahaayaana suutras and
key treatises of Naagaarjuna by Kumaarajiiva, the
central Asian translator in the Chinese court during
the early years of the fifth century A.D. Seng
Chao(c), an aide in the translation project, is
regarded as the first Chinese to master the
Maadhyamika's method of dialectical negation. With
him, however, also began the subtle transformation
of sinification of Maadhyamika. Taking an overview
of the Chinese Maadhyamika tradition, I would say
tentatively that the Chinese had faithfully
preserved the spirit, if not always the letter, of
the Maadhyamika critique. A full study of the
unfolding of the sinitic Maadhyamika tradition still
awaits diligent research and analysis of the nuances
involved in the transmission of this philosophy into
Chinese. The following essay will look into one
development in the Liang dynasty, through two essays
by the Buddhist devotee and prince, Chao-ming.

A word on the "fate" of the Maadhyamika
transmission is necessary to put the present study
into the proper historical context and to correct
some commonly held misconceptions about the
Maadhyamika lineage in China. Soon after the
introduction of the writings of Naagaarjuna by
Kumaarajiiva, the Chinese San-lun(d) (Three
Treatise, namely, Maadhyamika) tradition was
evershadowed by a treatise by Harivarman, the
Ch'eng-shih-lun(e) (Treatise to establish the real).
The value of this work and the actual role it played
in the history of Chinese Buddhist thought has been
overlooked by scholars, primarily because of a
crucial "hindsight condemnation" of it by the
San-run muster Chi-tsang(f) (549-623). The
Ch'eng-shih-lun dominated southern Buddhist
speculation during the fifth and the first half of
the sixth century. when it was used as the

P340

philosophical companion text to the highly valued
Mahaaparinirvaa.na Suutra. Harivarman was regarded
at that time to he the authoritative interpreter of
the Emptiness philosophy, and the Maadhyamika
philosophy was interpreted through the "exegesis" of
his text. By the middle of the sixth century,
however, there was a revival of the "purer"
Maadhyamika tradition by the San-lun masters
stationed in She-shan(g), a mountain outside the
southern capital. Conflict then grew out between
these new defenders of Naagaarjuna's supremacy and
the old Ch'eng-shih masters who held that they, in
their fashion, were "faithful" to the Emptiness
insight. In the end, Chi-tsang, acknowledged master
of the San-lun tradition, triumphed and his
polemical and critical condemnation of the
Ch'eng-shih tradition became dogma for all
subsequent times. It can be shown that Chi-tsang
intentionally misrepresented the intention of the
Ch'eng-shih school, and I believe that Kumaarjiiva
was even instrumental in actually popularizing
Ch'eng-shih's "noumenal Realism" (the term
"ch'eng-shih" was probably created by Kumaarajiiva
to designate the treatise's attempt to establish the
Real, shih-hsiang(h), as a necessary corrective to
the potential "nihilism" in the Chinese
appropriation of `suunyataa as k'ung(l) ,
voidness).(2) Current scholarship on the Chinese
San-lun tradition focuses attention primarily on
Seng Chao and on Chi-tsang.(3) What is over-looked
often is the fact that Chi-tsang did not count Seng
Chao as a member in the San-lun lineage that
Chi-tsang retrojected into the Six Dynasties. To
understand the philosophical roots of Chi-tsang, an
appreciation of his opponents is imperative.
However, the study of Harivarman and his followers
in China has hardly begun, and this article can only
claim to look rather obliquely into one aspect of
the missing link between Seng Chao and Chi-tsang.

Prince Chao-ming of the Liang dynasty (502-557)
was by no means the leading authority on Buddhist
philosophy at the time, but he was one of those
gentry aristocrats famous for his layman's devotion
to the Dharma. He was well informed of the basic
issues in Buddhist thought. His essay "On the Two
Truth(j) " has been collected in the
Kuang-hung-ming-chi(k) (Taisho Tripitaka(l), vol.
52.) This essay, though brief, represents one
Chinese attempt to come to terms with Naagaarjuna's
two-truths theory.(4) The questions and answers
following this essay further provide an insight into
the frame of mind of the court Buddhist thinkers at
the time.(5)

The doctrine of the two truths can be found in
the early canonical writings and is by no means the
invention of Naagaarjuna, but Naagaarjuna surely
gave it articulated expression by his writings. It
was inherited by `Sa^nkara in the later Hindu
Advaita Vedaanta tradition.(6) The two truths refers
to the higher truth, paramaartha-satya, and the
mundane or lower truth, sa^mv.rti-satya. The former
is nondiscursive and defies all conceptual
comprehension while the latter, the mundane
"everyday" truth, belongs to the realm of logical
discourse. By this distinetion, Naagaarjuna points
out the erucial characteristic of dharmataa.
Reality-as-it-is cannot be grasped by the egoistic
framework of human concepts.

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All discursive thought and expression, including
even the four noble truths that Gautama taught,
belong to the lower level of truth. Naagaarjuna,
however, did not simply assign the higher truth to
the AAryan (noble) silence. He believed that the
higher truth can he pointed to by recourse to the
lower truth. His own dialectical negation of his
opponents' obsession with the "necessary"
ontological correspondence between words and reality
which words refer to is perhaps the classic example
of how logic can he used to destroy logic and reveal
directly the doctrine of Emptiness (of
self-existents) .(7) The Chinese Ch'an (Zen(m) )
masters might be less patient with all the
dialectical proofs Naagaarjuna perfected, but their
method of "using words to destroy words" would be
another example, mote romantic perhaps, of how to
point beyond the very limits of conceptualization.
Says the Ch'an tradition: The finger that points out
the moon is, after all, not the moon itself.(8)

Naagaarjuna's negative philosophy is like a
chameleon. The moment one thinks one has a grasp of
it, it not only slips away but it also makes one
feel uneasy about the "grasping-of-it" itself. I
would, therefore, not go into what Maadhyamika
means, for it seems that consensus was lacking in
Naagaarjuna's followings as it is lacking among
modern scholars.(9) The fact that Naagaarjuna is
hard to grasp should alert us to the fact that it
was no easy task for the Chinese in the fifth and
sixth centuries to come up with the "definitive"
understanding of his philosophy. The Chinese
language then was even more ineffective than our
present-day English as a tool to convey all the
nuances of the Sanskrit original, and it is not
surprising that some of the intricate Indian logic
was lost to the Chinese.(10) Nevertheless, if the
Chinese learned anything, it was the technique of
prasa^nga, the art of exposing the antinomies
involved in any philosophical position. In their
way, the Chinese adopted the technique to their own
milieu or problems. The Chinese were interested more
in the totalistic issues of being (yu) and nonbeing
(wu(n)), activity and inactivity, the one and the
many, the concrete (shih) and the vacuous (hsu(o)).
These issues are more Taoist than Indian. If we
stand back and look at the general Chinese results
after they have exercised their dialectical
reasonings, we would find that, for certain strange
reasons, the Chinese would allocate being,
inactivity, concreteness and the one to the
so-called higher truth, assigning their opposites,
the "unreal" nonbeing, the actively "responding,"
the vacuously delusive and the Many to the Lower
Truth. This Chinese conclusion is somewhat ironic,
considering the fact that Indian Buddhism as a whole
and Maadhyamika especially would hardly associate
itself with such ontological absolutes like being,
reality, and the one changeless essence. The whole
intention in Maadhyamika was to affirm emptiness,
impermanence, selflessness, and
nonsubstantiality.(11) This is not to say that there
were no Indian traditions leaning toward the Chinese
view; scholars now recognize the role played by the
Tathaagatagarbha tradition, in both Indian and
Chinese Buddhist history. Nevertheless, keeping a
purist stand, one can still legitimately wonder how

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the Chinese often came up with such numenal realism
as the "higher truth"!

This is where a basic Chinese misappropriation
of the two truths theory occurred, and this is where
the significance lies of the Ch'eng-shih school in
the historical development of Chinese Maadhyamika
sophistication. Although Seng Chao might be an
ardent interpreter of Naagaarjuna and has received
supposedly the seal of approval from Kumaarajiiva
himself, it should be noted that Seng Chao barely
just touched on the two truths. The "attractiveness"
of the Ch'eng-shih-lun for the Chinese, I think, was
due to its exploration of this theory. These
Ch'eng-shih masters mediating Seng Chao and
Chi-tsang developed various theories of the two
truths. Without these speculations, the mature
San-lun tradition in Sui would not be possible. (In
fact, Chi-tsang himself built his unique "Fourfold
Two Truths" upon the shoulders of the Cheng-shih
master he vehemently and justly attacked.) The basic
mistake among the masters in the Six Dynasties who
interpreted the Two Truths theory is confusing what
originally was an epistemic issue with the native
Chinese concern for ontological matters. The Two
Truths (that is, two ways of discourse) became in
China two realities, that is, a higher reality and a
lower reality. With the hangovers of a "Hinayana"
outlook, the Chinese Buddhist in the Six Dynasties
then aligned the higher reality with nirvaa.na and
the unborn, and the lower reality with life and
death or sa.msaara. This basic misunderstanding was
well noted by Chi-tsang. Chi-tsang is right in
insisting that the "Two Truths" pertains to chiao(p)
(teaching, discourse) and not--emphatically not--to
li(q) (principle, reality).(12) However, Chi-tsang
was virtually the only Chinese master who harped on
this issue and his warning, for all practical
purposes went, unheeded in his time and beyond.

The Chinese mistake was natural, and they were
hardly the last Maadhyamika scholars (in the world)
to follow that misguided interpretation. When a
person hears that Naagaarjuna had discovered that
words do not describe reality, the person can easily
draw the conclusion that the words do not describe
an Ultimate Reality beyond phenomenal realities. The
Chinese having learned from the I Ching(r) (Book of
Changes) and Wang Pi(s) (who commented on it) that
"Language cannot exhaust the (ultimate) Meanings...
and one can forget the Forms (hsiang(t)) when the
Meaning is attained." would naturally assume that
there is an ultimate reality--the Tao(u), the One,
Real--behind the phenomenal realities of the many
and the illusory. By so "assuming" the existence of
an ultimate reality behind phenomena, the Chinese
disrupted the original Maadhyamika intent to show
that all is phenomenal, all is empty, all is
insubstantial.(13) `Suunyavaada does not subscribe
to any subsisting ultimate reality beyond the
phenomena. Name-and-form (naamaruupa) is emptiness
itself. Tathataa or the "real nature of Reality"
(Chinese; chu-fa shih-shiang(v)) is none other than
Emptiness.

It is necessary to add that Chinese were not
always ignorant of the fact

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that "Emptiness itself is name-and-form." Prince
Chao-ming and his con-temporaries all knew this
basic dictum from the Praj~naapaaramitaa corpus.
However, their inability to be consistent and their
repeated relapse into the ontological framework is
responsible for the tangles in their thoughts.
Chi-tsang and, to a certain extent, the T'ang
masters were more sophisticated in this regard. The
following analysis of an essay of the prince will
show both his venture beyond Seng Chao and his
shortcomings.

The term paramaartha-satya is given by the
Chinese then as ch'en-ti(w) or real truth or as
ti-i-i-ti(x) or highest truth (literally, truth of
the number one/highest significance) . The term
sa.mv.rti-satya rendered as su-ti(y) or common truth
or as shih-ti(z) or worldly truth. The prince
regards the first of these two set to pertain to the
"substantive realm" (that is, as the two realities)
and the second of the two pairs to pertain to
"evaluative judgment" (that is, two forms of
knowledge that correlate with the status of the sage
wisdom(aa) and the common man without wisdom). These
distinctions by the prince are based on the Chinese
words used in the two alternative translations of
the one term in Sanskrit. In that sense, he
exercised poetic license not possible in the
original Sanskrit. Furthermore, by splitting up the
words, the prince speculated on the word "i"(ab)
(meaning, significance) in the Chinese compound,
ti-i-i-ti, for paramaarthasatya.

Translation of ON THE TWO TRUTHS (ERH-TI)

The principle of the two truths is indeed profound
and mysterious. Unless one has reflected upon it
deeply and with reverence, one cannot comprehend its
breadth. There is, indeed, not one single way to
appreciate the Tao. Essentially (there are two
ways): one can approach it either by way of the
(objective) ream (ching(ac) ) or by way of
(subjective) wisdom (chih(ad)). At times, one can
understand the meaning by way of the realm (aspect).
At times, one lets the actions manifest by way of
the wisdom (aspect).

Concerning the theory of the Two Truths, it is
the tool to understand the meaning by way of the
realm (aspect). If this point is missed (by the
reader), then the person would be lost forever in
(wrongly) thinking that there are Three Truths.
However, if he sees the point, the myriad problems
will disappear.

The two truths refer to the real truth (chen-ti)
and the common truth (su-ti). The real truth is
called also the truth of the highest meaning
(ti-i-i-ti). The common truth is also known as the
worldly truth (shih-ti-). The (terms) "real)" and
"common" are established to refer to substance (that
is, reality). The (terms) "highest meaning" and
"worldly" are chosen to refer to attributes of
praise and depreciation.

Firstly, we should say that the one corresponds
to the real truth and the two (dualities) to the
common truth. When the one and the two are added
together, there will be three. However, there are
really only two truths [not three truths]. In
nominal designations the terms "higher" and "lower"
are used, but they often create confusion concerning
the meanings intended. [Therefore they are explained
later.]

The real exists (as the real) not becuase of the
common. The common is born (as common) not becuase
of the real. Precisely so can one be designated as
the real and the other as the common. By the real is
meant the concrete

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(shih), where all things attain the same-ness and
where differentiations dividing them would not be.
By the common is meant the compounded (realities of
the world) that gives rise to fleeting illusions and
activities.

The (term) "highest meaning" is additional
appreciation heaped onto the reality of the unborn.
(The term) "worldly" describes that which has
differentiations, life and death (samsaric
characteristics), flow and movements, where nothing
is ever permanent. The Mahaaparinirvaa.na suutra
says: "The knowledge of those people who have
transcended the world is known as the truth of the
highest meaning; the opinion of those men who are
still in the mundane realm is known as the worldly
truth." This is the scriptural basis for regarding
"highest meaning'' and "worldly'' to be terms of
appraisal.

These terms used to render the two truths are
chosen for specific reasons. "real," "common."
"worldly" share one intention, but the term "truth
of the highest meaning" has another meaning. The
principle is this: Insofar that the te(af) (virtue,
power, [pertaining to the higher truth]) is the
highest, its "meaning" is also the highest. The
(mundane) world is but a fleeting illusion--it
cannot claim to have any "meaning." Therefore we
only say "truth of the world" [never "truth of the
world's meaning."]

Truth is that which comprehends the concrete
(shih). The real truth examines the concrete and
finds it to be real. The common truth examines the
same and finds only the common. The real truth is
beyond being and nonbeing. The common truth sees
(that there are) being and nonbeing. (The
distinctions between) Being and nonbeing constitute
false names (subjective ideas). Neither being nor
nonbeing reveals the middle path. The real is the
middle path and has the unborn as its substance. The
common is false names and has the born realities as
its substance.(14)

In the preceding essay, the prince explicitly
defined the two truths to be pertaining to the
objective realm, that is, as two realities. However,
the two realities are, in one sense, epistemic
realities since they are correlated with the
subjective wisdom and opinions of the sage and the
commoner. In this way, the Prince did solve the
paradox of the two truth-realities by suggesting
that there is ultimately one reality with two
perspectives. However, his solution was not always
perfect and in the questions and answers collected
after the essay (the prince solicited these
responses), the problem emerged of how the two
"substances" of the two "realms" can be related to
one another. It is a problem that plagued the
Ch'eng-shih masters who tried to use the (Taoist)
paradigm of "substance" and "function" to analyze
the relationships between the two realities (sic).
The following exchange shows the awareness of this
thorny issue.

Q: The rising (of the fleeting nonreality is the
common while that which is beyond being and
nonbeing is the Real. Now, are the fleeting
nonreality and the Real one in substance or are
they two (in substance)?

A: The people of the world regard the horn realities
to be the substance. The people who have
transcended the world regard the unborn as
substance. These opinions are due to their
different perceptions. Knowledge of the real
is the insight into Emptiness-in-Being itself.
The common people mistake the [same] emptiness to
be being. So considered, nonreality and reality
are not different in substance.

Q: If the two truths are one in substance, would not
the real truth go through life and death
(sa.msaara)...?

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A: The real principle is quietistic and is never
aroused. It is only the confused consciousness of
the common men that arbitrarily sees movements
(where there is none).

Q: But is there movement that the common men
arbitrarily see? Or there being no movement and
the common people arbitrarily "see" it?

A: If there is movement as such, then we would not have
called the common people's seeing "arbitrary"....

Q: Is "arbitrary seeing" itself a thing (a reality)
or not?

A: The misconception is on the side of the
perceiver.... The (real) dharma is passive and
therefore it cannot prevent such human faults
from arising.(15)

If the exchange is not as keen as that between
Indian logicians, it still reflects a sophistication
that goes beyond the native tradition of logical
debates. The clever distinction made between subject
and object, realm and wisdom, the perceiver and the
perceived is due clearly to Indian influence. The
naive assumption that words necessarily describe
realities (as per the ontological theory of
language) is refuted by the prince. The one weak
point in the prince's perception of the real dharma
is that it is passive and not empowered to help
misguided men toward a truer vision. In mature
sinitic Mahaayaana thought, a more active
absolute -- the omnipresent and omnipotent
tathaagatagarbha--is admitted as the agent of
enlightenment itself.(16)

The passive/active distinction is a traditional
Taoist distinction. It has been used by Seng Chao in
his thesis. The sage view is that which "seeks the
non-moving in the midst of movement" while the
common view is that which "seeks activity in the
realm of the inactive."(17) So too, the Prince said:
"The wise sees Emptiness in Being while the foolish
sees Being in Emptiness." The exchange recalled Seng
Chao's thesis again when the following question
arose:

Q: What the Sage sees (according to Seng Chao) is
that things actually do not move. What the Common
People see is that they apparently do. Movement
and non-movement are different. How can they be
one [that is, occupying the same space]?

A: It is not said that movement and non-movement
each has one substance. It is only that the
common people see movement when there is none....

Q: ... If there is only One Reality, there cannot be
Two Truths.

A: ... According to Sagehood and Commonness, there
are the two.(18)

The prince acknowledged, correctly, that there is
only one reality but two perceptions of it. He
recognized that the label "truth" is given to the
common men's knowledge because for those
people, it is "true." Truth becomes relative to the
person. This theme runs through the discussion. The
emphasis put on the subjectivity of truth and the
importance placed on the personality of the attainer
himself has been regarded by one Japanese scholar to
be a Chinese "humanistic" trait.(19) Naagaarjuna was
less interested in the personalism of truth and more
intrigued by the impersonal structure of language
and conception. But if truth is a function of
personality and not a function of different ways of
knowing, then a predictable (and amusing) question
emerged:

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Q: Does the Sage (then) see the Mundane Truth or
not?

A: The Sage knows of the Common People and therefore
he knows (vicariously) the existence of the
Common Truth. (Alone) by himself, he does not see
the Common Truth.... (The Sage) speaks of the Two
Truths (only) in accordance with the feeling of
(common) men.(20)

According to this Chinese formula, the sage would
not really be functioning in the everyday world, a
world in which discursive logic and discriminated
realities are apparently "real." The sage only
lowers himself to participate in the mundane world
of affairs. The questioner pursued another avenue:

Q: The (objective) realm known to the Sage is the
Real Truth. Now is the wisdom that knows it part
of the Real or the Common Truth?

The question is whether subjective wisdom (chih)
belongs to any objective realm (ching). The prince's
answer is faithful to Maadhyamika:

A: What knows is called wisdom. What is known is
called realm. When wisdom appears, the (normal
subject-object) realm disappears. In that sense,
the wisdom can be said to be with the Real.

Praj~naa, the nondiscursive wisdom, is strictly
speaking not a "thing" in a "realm," but insofar as
the real (`suunyataa) is known nonobjectively
through praj~naa, praj~naa and `suunyataa belong to
the same company. The questioner persisted:

Q: What about the person with the wisdom. Is the
person with the wisdom in with the Real Truth or
the Common Truth.

A: As long as you say it is the "person" of wisdom,
then the "person" belongs to the common
realm.(21)

What about the mind that is beginning to comprehend
the real? Is this mind resident of some intermediate
area that can be designated the third truth (realm)?
To these questions, the prince answered with a
realistic "no."(22) The mind is on the way toward
enlightenment. On the basis of this, the prince
rejected the idea of sudden enlightenment.(23) In
this, he was only sharing the dominant view of his
time.

The prince had demonstrated, up to this point, a
high degree of clarity even if he was limited by his
vocabulary and understanding. At times, he seems to
share the misguided notion of two realities with his
questioners. However, his answers were less than
satisfactory on two other issues. It is not
accidental that mature Chinese San-lun
philosophizing was yet to come, The first issue
involves the issue of the origin of realities:

Q: The common Truth sees Being and Nonbeing,
therefore it has born realities as its substance.
Now I can see that Being-dharmas can give birth
to realities, but Nonbeing-dharmas implies an
absence of dharmas (realities). How can the
latter give birth to realities?

A: In the realm of Common Truth, Being and Nonbeing
are relative (interdependent). Becuase they are
interdependent, they both can give birth to
realities(24).

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One suspects the prince was equating being and
nonbeing with yin-yang(ag). The Buddhist notion of
relativity is turned into the Chinese yin-yang
complementation. From the "interdependence" of
yin-nonbeing and yang-being, things are born.(25)

In another similarly unconscious adoption of
Chinese cosmological outlook, the prince permitted a
strange notion of a "dependent absolute" to be. This
is in sharp contrast with Chi-tsang's idea of an
absolute Void as the "nondependent Void."(26) The
Prince was very probably misled into his strange
theory by the I Ching's distinction between "above
form" (hsing-erh-shang) and "below form"
(hsing-erh-hsia(ah)). For him, the higher truth as
hsing-erh-shang is relative to and dependent upon
the lower truth of physical forms, hsing-erh-hsia.

Q: Is the term i (Meaning) in the term ti-i-i-ti
(Truth of the Highest Meaning) dependent on form
(hsing(ai)) or not?

A: It is dependent on form.

Q: It is without hsiang(aj) (phenomenal
characteristic). How can it be dependent on any
form?

A: Since it is called the Highest (literally, Number
One), how can it not be dependent on (relative
to) other (lower) things?(27)

Apparently for the prince, the higher truth was
defined in part by its cosmogonic sequence. It is
prior to hsing (form). Although it is above hsiang
(lak.sa.na in Sanskrit, it can also refer to the
"emblems" in the I Ching which are "below form"), it
is not truly free from being related to hsing as
such.

The prince's philosophy represents the view of a
well-informed gentry Buddhist of sixth-century A.D.
China. The prince had digested an admirable amount
of the Maadhyamika logic. He was not totally free
from an ontological understanding of the two truths,
but he had recognized the perspectival nature of
the two realities. Like most gentry Buddhists in the
southern courts, there was a "gnostic" bias in his
thinking, a trust in wisdom of a quietistic type, a
lack of sensitivity to the more dynamic aspect of
compassion (karu.naa) and an infatuation with the
"formless". Anything less than this abstract
absolute would be a betrayal of the vision of
Mahaayaana. This "ontological gnosticism" prevented
the southerners, their piety and Buddha-worship
notwithstanding, to develop the faith side of
Mahaayaana. I will support this observation with a
translation of another even shorter essay by the
prince on the dharmakaaya. In this essay we can see
a "colorless" absolute, a god of the philosophers,
giving little comfort except to the cerebral
pietists or philosophers.

Translation of ON DHARMAKAAYA(ak)

The dharmakaaya is empty and quiet, far away
from the world of being and nonbeing, being alone
liberated from the forces of karman. It cannot be
known by wisdom or cognized by consciousness, being
beyond all discourses. However, I cannot remain
silent in showing its principle. Because we have to
use words, therefore it is called the law-body,
dharmasariira in Sanskrit and fa-hsin

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in Chinese. In substance, it is its own self-nature.
It only becomes relative in verbal discourse. The
word fa (dharma) has as its Principle the conformity
to the rule. The word hsin (body) means that it has
a physical body. The body that adheres to the rule
or norm is the fa-hsin. Briefly to explain its
substance: It is called the eternal body, the
diamond body, but upon scrutiny, it is shown to be
invariable. To call it "diamond is to give it name
and form; to label it "eternal" is to assign to it a
space. Invariability or permanence is only a
description; diamond is only a metaphor. Its real
substance is union with the unborn. Thus it is said
that the body of the Buddha is wu-wei(al) and that
it never (truly) falls into the worldly realm. The
Nirvaa.na suutra says: "The Body of the tathaagata
is a Non-body, without limits, quantity, trace,
knowledge or form, being totally pure and
unknowing." Since it has the positive attribute of
purity, it cannot be said to be (simply) nonbeing.
It is said to be subtly existent and yet not
existent. Beyond being and nonbeing, that is the
Dharmakaaya.(28)

The prince's description of the Dharmakaaya is
not incorrect by Mahaayaana standard. The
Dharmakaaya is indeed formless and eternal, pure and
cannot be catalogued as being or nonbeing. However,
in the following exchange we can see the danger of
such abstractions.

Q: ... I do not know if the Dharmakaaya responds (to
mankind) or not.

A: The Dharmakaaya does not respond.

Q: I thought that the Dharmakaaya is Dharmakaaya by
virtue of its ability to respond to changes.

A: The nature of the Dharmakaaya is to follow the
dharma's substance. (The dharma being
changeless,) any talk about it responding or
changing would not be following the proper
"tracks."(29)

Doctrinally correct, the prince allows little leeway
for the active role of the saving Buddha. In this
regard, one should be grateful for the later
articulation of the trikaaya (three bodies) theory
by Asa^nga, for the second body (sambhogakaaya) can
fill this conceptual vacumn.

Q: If there is no response and no change, how can
the Dharmalaaya follow the "tracks"? By "tracks"
we must mean the tracks of the world. If so, how
can it not respond to things in the world?

A: Sentient beings hope and look for blessings,
therefore the Dharmakaaya can go along with
things and transform the karman of man. Thy is
not (really) response and change.

Q: But if it can bless sentient beings, it must be
responding and changing.

A: (No,) if the hopes and expectations are born,
then the track (rhythm) of things will take care
of these hopes and expectations. Why bother the

In this last line (italies mine), we see surfacing
the Confucian "agnosticism" --
why drag the spirits into the ethical affairs of
men? Why bother the Dharmakaaya, the impersonal
absolute, with matters for which we are ultimately
responsible ourselves? Like heaven, the Dharmakaaya
will "respond" but only through the ethical
symbiosis of what the Han Confucians called
kan-yin(am), "stimulus and response." The hopes and
the expectations initiated on the person's part will
effortless of the Dharmakaaya qua Heaven. This is
the minimal intervention the prince would allow for
the

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Dharmakaaya-Buddha. It would appear would appear
that the sentiment here is similar to the Neo-Taoist
fascination with the Tao.

Q: If the Dharmakaaya gives hope and expectation,
how can it not be responding and changing? If
there is no response and change from the
Dharmakaaya, then all hopes will be in vain.

A: (No.) The World Honoured One (the Buddha) is
extremely numinous, such that he can evoke the
hopes which will then self-fulfil. If there can
only be a result after he (actively) reacts (to
man) then why would (the Classics) say: "The
Ultimate Gods never respond and yet the greatest
beauty is accomplished." If you still insist that
the Buddha (i.e. Dharmakaaya) must respond, then
the Dharmakaaya would hardly be any different
from the bodhisattva (as ruupakaaya).

Thus the prince's "two-bodies" theory (basic to
Naagaarjuna too) awaits the trikaaya theory to come
for a more faithful articulation of the fuller
Mahaayaana ideal.(30)

NOTES

1. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of
Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955).

2. On the fate of the Ch'eng-shih school, see
Takakusu Junjiro, Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1947), pp. 74-75
and my manuscript, "The intended Meaning of the Term
`Ch'eng-shih,' A Hypothesis."

3. See Takakusu, Essentials, pp. 99-110 and
translations from Chi-tsang in W. T. de Bary, et
al., ed. The Buddhist Tradition (New York: Random
House, 1972), pp. 143-150. On Seng Chao, see Waiter
Libenthal, The Book of Chao (Peking: Catholic
University, 1948) , and Richard Robinson, Early
Madhyamika in India and China (Madison: University
of Wisconsin, 1961).

4. Chi-tsang reviewed and criticized those
theories concerning two truths proposed by thinkers
that came before him in his work San-lun hsuan-i(an)
(Taisho Tripitaka, 45, pp. 1-11, 19); see also his
Ta-ch'eng hsuan-lun(ao) (T. 45, p. 25).

5. Taisho, 52, pp, 247c-250b.

6. `Sankara is known to have adopted the
"four-cornered dialectics" of the Madhyaamika
philosophy as well as the distinction between the
discursive and the nondiscursive (two) truths.

7. Dharmataa, "reality as it is, " or
dharma-ness, implying a "common" characteristic of
all phenomena, the "whole" as over against the
parts, figured often as the absolute in
Naagaarjuna's philosophy; see Murti, The Central
Philosophy.

8. The moon is the Zen symbol of enlightenment.
Another analogy used is the act of shouting
"Silence!" to secure silence--the word "Silence" is
then the instrument effecting the wordless quiet.

9. Among Western scholars, three studies on
Madhyamika are available, each giving a slightly
different slant to the phenomenon studied. Beside
Murti's work, there are Stcherbatsky's The Conception
of Buddhist Nirvana (Leningrad: The Academy of Science
of the USSR, 1927) and Frederick Streng's Emptiness
(Nashville: Abington, 1967).

10. See my analysis of the Chinese understanding
of the Buddhist theory of pratitya-samutpaada in
"Chinese Buddhist Causation Theories" Philosophy
East and West 27, no.3 (1977).

11. The development in China of a
counter-emptiness philosophy, underlining the
positive doctrine of A`suunya (not-empty) as
developed by the `Srimaalaa suutra and the
Ratnagotravibhaaga, is touched upon in my thesis
"The Awakening of Faith in Mahayana: A Study of the
Unfolding of Sinitic Motifs," (Harvard University,
Ph. D. dissertation, 1975).

12. Among Chinese Buddhist schools, only San-lun
so regarded the two truths; see Bukkyo gakkai(ap),
ed., Hasshuu Kovo koi(aq) (Kyoto: Bukkyo gakkai,
1927), p. 300.

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13. It should be added that the Buddhists do
recognize something (nirvaa.na) which is "unborn,"
"uncreated," and so on.

14. Taisho, 52, p.247c.

15. Taisho, 52, pp. 247c-248a.

16. In the thoughts of Fa-tsang, the Hua-yen(ar)
patriarch, the Absolute (Suchness, chen-ju) is both
unchanging (pu-pien) and changing (sui-yuan(as) ,
following the conditioning factors that create the
phenomenal world, that is, participating in the
world of change); see Whalen Lai, "The Awakening of
Faith." Fa-tsang actually incorporated the Taoist
concept of wu-wei, active-inactivity, into his
interpretation of the nature of chen-ju.

17. The categories of the sage and the commoner,
strictly speaking a pair of Chinese concepts, can be
found in all the Chinese Buddhist schools and are
especially crucial to the Pure Land tradition. Seng
Chao utilized this distinction in his writings, The
Immutability of Things (Taisho, 45, p. 151).

18. Taisho, 52, p. 248ab.

19. See essay on Hui-yuan and Lao-Chuang
philosophy in Kimura E'ichi(at), ed., Eon kenkyuu
(Kyoto: Kyoto University, 1962) , II, Kenkyuu
hen(au) . According to this interpretation, the
Chinese Buddhists placed more emphasis on the role
of the person, the bodhisattva in the form of the
Chinese notion of the sage. The shen-jen(av), man of
spirit, can abide with the eternal Tao and yet be a
citizen of the world.

20. Taisho, 52, p. 248b. The next two quotations
are continuations of this.

21. Taisho, p. 249c.

22. Taisho, 52, p. 250a.

23. The "suddenism versus gradualism" debate,
which began among the southerners with Tao-sheng and
Hui-kuan in the fifth century, had ended with the
victory going to the latter. The prince followed in
this realist tradition. However, in the Ch'en
dynasty (557-589) the suddenists made a "comeback"
and eventually dominated the scene in the T'ang
period, especially among the Zen circles.

24. Taisho, 52, p. 249bc.

25. This yin-yang logic recurred later in
Hui-yuan (523-592) and found its way into Fa-tsang's
philosophy.

26. The Chinese term used then was
chueh-shih(aw) and not the present Chinese term of
chueh-tui(ax) (without opposition). The concept of
the nondependent void was apparently drawn from the
notion of atyanta-`suunyataa, pu-ching kung(ay),
"utter void." Of the so-called twenty Emptinesses,
the Chinese seemed to have selectively underlined
atyanta-`suunyataa and `suunyataa-`suunyataa for
their apparent absolute and positive (sic) values.
For a listing of the twenty Emptinesses, see Garma
Chang, The Buddhist Teaching of Totality (University
Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1971), note
119. Sec note 27 herein.

27. Taisho, 52, p. 249c. I must admit that the
passage here is difficult and confusing. The passage
can be read in another way, namely, whether things
are dependent on the "Highest." However, considering
the fact that the prince admitted that the Highest
is "dependent" later, I would adhere to my
translation instead. The whole use of the word
"shih" (dependent) in this discussion is drawn more
from a usage in Chuang-tzu than from an Indian
usage. Chuang-tzu, in his discussion on the Tao and
freedom, used the term "wu-shih" (independent,
nondependent) to describe the absolute freedom of
the Great Man who roves with the Tao. Everything
else is "yu-shih(az)," that is, dependent on the
Tao. Kuo Hsiang, in his commentary on the
Chuang-tzu, was most alert to this distinction. The
Chinese Buddhists, including Chi-tsang, then
inherited this style of discourse. See Chuang-tzu,
chaps. 1 and 2.

28. Taisho, 52, p. 250bc.

29. Taisho, 52, p. 251b. The next two quotations
continue from this.

30. Indeed, in more mature Chinese thought, the
relationship between the three bodies(trikaaya) is
better understood and the role of the sambhogakaaya
(in which many bodhisattvas manifest themselves) is
intrinsiely tied up with the dharmakaaya; see, for
example. Awakening of Faith in Mahaayaana attributed
to A`svaghosa, trans, by Yoshito Hakeda (New York:
Columbia University, 1967) . In so fat that
Naagaarjuna himself also worked with a two-bodies
theory, perhaps the gnostic limitations of the
prince should not be judged to harshly.

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