The immediate successor of Wang Yang-ming:

·期刊原文
The immediate successor of Wang Yang-ming:
Wang Lung-hsi and his theory of ssu-wu
Mou Tsung-san
Philosophy East and West
Vol. 23 (1973)
pp. 103-120
Copyright 1973 by University of Hawaii Press
Hawaii, USA

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p. 103

I. Ssu-Yu and Ssu-Wu
The thought and teachings of Wang Yang-ming, although widespread and popular in Ming China, had only three important branches or schools, namely, T'ai-chou, Chiang-yu, and Che-tsung. These schools were not classified according to a particular system of thought but rather by the dominance of geographical regions. The many thinkers within each school differed in philosophical nature and achievement; nevertheless, they all propagated Wang Yang-ming's ideas, or at least their interpretations. The T'ai-chou school, which originated with Wang Ken, was influential for a long period. A mixed unorthodox lot, the members of this school were, for the most part, uninhibited and of an untrammeled spirit. In the fourth generation, Wang Ken's philosophy was transmitted to Lo Chin-hsi, whose brilliant thoughts are taken as the predominant strain representative of the T'ai-chou school. The members of the Chiang-yu school were the most numerous, the three main figures were Tsou Tung-kuo, Nieh Shuang-chiang, and Lo Nien-an. Tsou's philosophy was essentially in accordance with Wang Yang-ming's, but Nien and Lo, both of whom held views rather divergent from Wang Yang-ming's, became the prime figures of this school. Ch'ien Hsü-shan and Wang Lung-hsi were the main proponents of the Che-tsung school. While the former's philosophy is plain and solid, it was Wang Lung-hsi who aroused controversy and became the central, outstanding thinker in the school. This article will attempt to present and analyze certain aspects of his philosophy. [1]

Wang Lung-hsi was famous for his theory, pithily expressed as ssu-wu, which can be more fully rendered as "the mind, the volition, liang-chih, and the thing are nothingness (in the state of nothing)." This theory is a counterpart to Wang Yang-ming's well-known doctrine in four statements, abbreviated as ssu-yu, which in effect mean that the four items -- mind, volition, liang-chih, and thing -- are in the state of being. Actually both of these doctrines arise from Wang Yang-ming's concept of the "thing" which he defined in two ways: from where the volition intends, and from the transcendental affection of enlightenment (of liang-chih). From the former came the doctrine of ssu-yu, and from the latter the doctrine of ssu-wu. Wang Lung-hsi's doctrine, as will be seen, is not baseless or discrepant from Wang Yang-ming's own philosophy.

What does the statement mean that the four items are in the state of being? What does it mean that they are in the state of nothing? Wang Yang-ming's doctrine was originally put forward in four sentences:

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1. This article, presented at the Conference on Wang Yang-ming held in June, 1972, at the University of Hawaii, is in large measure a translated segment from my much longer essay, in Chinese, that covers not only Wang Lung-hsi's philosophy but also has an exposition of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy and that of the other branches in the Yang-ming tradition. The complete essay can be found in the New Asia Academic Annual [Hsin-ya Shu-yuan hsueh-shu nien-k'an], 14 (1972).

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That which has no good and evil is the mind-in-itself. [2]
That which has good or evil is the activity of volition.
That which knows good and evil of the activity of the volition is the liang-chih.
And to perform good and get rid of evil is the rectification of things (our actions).

Constituting Yang-ming's teachings on chih-liang-chih (the development of liang-chih), these four statements are in fact a synopsis of his explanation of the doctrines in the Great Learning on the rectification of the mind (the recovery of the mind-in-itself), the sincerity of the will, the development of liang-chih, and the rectification of things. [3] Some people believe the four statements to be a summary made by Ch'ien Hsü-shan, Whatever the truth may be, the statements nonetheless do not run contrary to the fundamental tenets of Yang-ming's thought. Therefore, it is totally credible that the Instructions for Practical Living (chüan 3), the Chronological Biography of Yang-ming, and the Recorded Conversations of Wang Lung-hsi (chüan 1) all-record this doctrine in four statements as being Yang-ming's own words.

Exceptionally intelligent and perceptive, Wang Lung-hsi explained the: four statements as follows:

Master (Yang-ming) sets up his teaching whenever he likes: This is called expediency that must not be fixed and prescribed. Substance and function, and the manifest and the subtle are from the same incipience. The mind, the volition, liang-chih, and the thing are one event. If we realize that the mind is the one without good and evil, then the volition is the one without good and evil, the knowing (of liang-chih) is the one without good and evil, the thing is the one without good and evil. For the mind without the form of the mind [4] is concealed

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2.The phrase hsin-chih-t'i should not be translated as "the substance of mind" but as "mind-in-itself." A full explanation for this has been given in the first part of the Chinese version of this article, cf. note 1.

3. The different explanation and interpretation of the two terms chih-chih and ko-wu mark the fundamental split between the Ch'eng-Chu School and the Lu-Wang School. Unfortunately we cannot ascertain the original meaning of these terms in the Great Learning. According to Chu Hsi's explanation these two terms should be rendered as "the extension of knowledge" and "the investigation of things."
For the sake of uniformity and logical consistency in this essay, I have adopted Wang Yang-ming's explanation of these two terms. In the Chinese version, I have fully explicated these terms.
It would be both interesting and significant to compare the concept of "Conscience" in Kant's philosophy with the concept of liang-chih in Yang-ming's philosophy. The difference between these two amounts to the crucial difference between the Confucian approach and the Kantian approach to moral philosophy. Of course, we cannot translate liang-chih as "Conscience." But other translations such as "innate knowledge," or "original knowledge," would be even more inadequate than "Conscience."

4. Wu-hsin chih hsin. This phrase should be more freely and appropriately translated as "the mind without the form of mind." Wu-hsin does not mean that there is no mind; instead it means that in our moral practice we do not mindfully, but rather mindlessly, reveal the mind. "Mindfully reveal the mind" means there is the idea of mind in our mind, and this is tantamount to the idea that there is the form of mind in our mind. The term "form" (hsiang) is not used, as in Aristotle's or Kant's writings, to refer to a formal condition of something, which is analytically posited, but only signifies the idea of mind itself. "Without the form of mind" means "mindlessness," or "no attachment to mind itself." The opposite concept is "mindfulness (mind with form)."

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in profundity, the volition without the form of volition is round (perfect) in its transcendental affection, the knowing without the form of knowing is tranquil in itself, the thing without the form of the thing is unfathomable in function. The nature ordained by heaven is purely and supremely good. The incipience of its transcendental affection is ceaselessly active; there is no good to be named. Where there is originally no evil, there is no good. This is the meaning of beyond good and evil. If there is good or evil, then the volition is motivated by the thing and, not being spontaneous activity, is tilted to the state of being. What is active by nature is motivated without the form of motivation; what is attached to the state of being is motivated with the form of motivation. The volition is what the mind motivates. If the volition has good and evil, then the knowing of liang-chih and the thing are simultaneously in the state of being, and the mind cannot be said to be in the state of nothing. (Recorded Conversations of Wang Lung-hsi, chüan 1, "Witness of Tao at the T'ien Ch'üan Bridge.")

Lung-hsi's explanation of' Yang-ming's four statements is much more detailed than any other appearing in the Instructions for Practical Living and in the Chronological Biography. For this article we are adopting Lung-hsi's statement as the standard.

But what does the last sentence of his explanation mean, particularly the phrases "simultaneously in the state of being" and "cannot be said to be in the state of nothing"? The underlying meaning of the term wu, 'without' (for example, in "the mind without the form of the mind" or "the volition without the form of volition"), appears to be obscure, but in fact is readily comprehensible. This "without" means "without form" in function, which is similar to the Zen (Ch'an) Buddhists saying that "the mind is Buddha; and the mind without the form of mind is the way (praj~naa)," with the first sentence indicating the state of being, and the second sentence, the state of nothing. If the meaning of wu, 'without form' or 'having nothing', is definite, then the meaning of the phrase "simultaneously in the state of being" is also definite. However, this conclusion requires still further explanation.

II. Explanation of Ssu-Yu
In the first place, where the volition intends is the thing. There is good and evil in the activity of the volition. Then there is certainly good and evil, that is, right and wrong, in the thing where the volition intends. But we cannot say that there are also good and evil in the knowing that knows good and evil. It is absurd to mention good-knowing and evil-knowing, because this amounts

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to the negation of liang-chih. Neither can we say that "not being good and evil" ("without good and evil") means that the supremely good "mind-in-itself" has good and evil, for to speak about good mind-in-itself and evil mind-in-itself is to negate the supremely good "mind-in-itself."

The above analysis reveals the different meanings of the term "being" in "the state of being of the mind-in-itself and liang-chih" and in "the being good and being evil of the volition and the thing." Being good and being evil means that the volition and the thing have good and evil. But, to say that the mind-in-itself or liang-chih is in the state of being does not mean that there are good mind-in-itself and bad mind-in-itself, or good liang-chih and bad liang-chih. When we talk about the "being" of the mind-in-itself or of liang-chih, its meaning must be understood on another level. If we say that the volition is motivated by the mind and that there is good and evil in what the mind motivates, then the root or fountain that motivates the volition cannot be pure and clean; thus, the mind has definitely the seed or inclination to become good or evil. By this straightforward inference, the mind-in-itself becomes neutral in nature with both good and evil not yet motivated to be differentiated. But this is not what Yang-ming meant when he said that not being good and evil refers to the supremely good mind-in-itself; neither is this what Lung-hsi meant. For Lung-hsi said, "The nature ordained by heaven is purely and supremely good. The incipience of its transcendental affection is ceaselessly active; there is no good to be named. Originally there was no evil, so there could not be good." Hence, to speak of volition from the motivation of the mind is an indirect, oblique inference. According to this, we have to affirm that the mind-in-itself is the transcendental mind itself, which is transformed into the volition under sensory conditions when it alienates from its own nature, thereby becoming attached to or blurred by the thing. The volition and the mind-in-itself are very much different. We should not draw the conclusion that the mind-in-itself has good and evil from the fact that the volition does.

If the volition and the mind-in-itself are not correlative, why and how should we say that the volition is what the mind motivates? The reason is that the volition belongs, ultimately, to the mind, just as a wave belongs to the water. The volition is the wave dependent on the mind. Solely owing to selfish desires and dispositions, the volition pursues the thing and diverges from the mind-in-itself to become an independent volition. Without this interdependent relationship, the volition cannot be transformed to return to the mind. For instance, when the wind ceases blowing, the wave disappears and there becomes nothing but water. Such interdependence is oblique (indirect). Hence, there is the necessity to show that the mind-in-itself is transcendental, while the activity of the volition is sensory, and that this is not the result of a straightforward inference.

If this explanation is accepted, the meaning of "being" in the saying that

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the mind-in-itself, liang-chih, and the thing are "simultaneously all in the state of being" also becomes definite. This "being" is, analytically speaking, positive "being" that appears with "forms" in correlation with different levels. For, as far as the volition is concerned, if we wish to perform moral practice to transform evil into good, it is necessary to have a transcendental standard as well as an activating force for the sake of this transformation. This is tantamount to the affirmation of the mind-in-itself and liang-chih. This affirmation is analytically and transcendentally established with reference to the volition and the thing. But the volition is analytically expressed through a factual point of view. (Logically speaking, it may be said to be established; but morally speaking, it must merely be said to be expressed but not established.) So is the thing. The four items are spoken of individually and positively. These are the problems of "what is." All problems of "what is" pertain to "being": the volition is in the state of being in one manner, the thing is in the state of being in another manner, while the mind-in-itself and liang-chih are in still other manners. The volition and the thing are sensory beings on the empirical level, whereas the mind-in-itself and liang-chih are intelligible beings on the transcendental level. The levels of these beings are different; however, they are all in the state of being. What is said positively and analytically is meant to establish or to express being. Once established or expressed, the being has the form of "being." This, as far as moral treatment in moral practice is concerned, [5] is to reveal the "forms" of the four items in respect to their being a being.

Liang-chih as the being knowing good and evil is to reveal the form of knowing good and evil through the volition being good or evil, instead of the knowing without the form. Lung-hsi says: "The knowing without the form of knowing is tranquil in itself." But the knowing that reveals the knowing with its form shows a determined form, or displays a determined form of knowing. Then the knowing-in-itself is not tranquil, and the knowing is in the state of being, which means being with "form."

Likewise, that the mind-in-itself has no good and evil means that the

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5. Moral treatment. I translate the Chinese tui-chih, with this term which bears analogy to medical treatment. When a doctor treats a patient, he must prescribe the medicine according to the sickness. In curing this illness, the nature of the medicine and the symptoms of the illness will be contradistinguished.
In our moral practice, the main problem is how to transform the evil of volition into the good. Since the activity of volition can be good or evil, it is this problem with which we must cope. According to Wang Yang-ming, liang-chih is the ideal standard against which this problem is treated and is also the inner transcendental force for resolving the problem. "To render the will sincere by the development of liang-chih" is the moral treatment in our moral practice. In this moral treatment, we not only accomplish our moral practice but also contradistinguish the nature of volition and of liang-chih. To contradistinguish the natures of the volition and liang-chih is to contradistinguish their being a being and ultimately to have a form (idea) of "being" in our mind. Hence, in moral treatment we say that the four items are in the state of being.

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supremely good being reveals, through the volition with good and evil, its supremely good form, which is different from volition. Therefore, it is not the mind without the form of mind. Lung-hsi says: "The mind without the form of mind is concealed in profundity." But the mind that reveals the form of supreme good displays a determined form of the supremely good mind. Then its concealment is not profound. That is why the mind is also in the state of being, which is also the being with "form."

The thing as in the state of being is through the volition as in the state of being. Moreover, this being is the being in being right or wrong. The right thing has the form of the thing and so does the wrong thing. These two are not the thing without the form of the thing. Lung-hsi says: "The thing without the form of the thing is unfathomable in function." But this thing with the form of the thing is intended by the volition. The function of this thing is then handicapped but not unfathomable.

To be not unfathomable reveals, in turn, that the volition with good and evil is the volition with the form of volition instead of the formless volition. Again Lung-hsi says: "The volition without the farm of volition is round (perfect) in its transcendental affection." But the volition with form is motivated by the thing, and attached to the thing, and then is incapable of being perfect and round in its transcendental affection.

Therefore -- from the point of view of the activity of the volition -- it is owing to moral treatment that the mind, the knowing, and the thing have form, having it simultaneously as a result of the fact that the volition has form. This lengthy foregoing discussion reveals the reason why Lung-hsi regarded the four-sentence teaching as the four items in the state of being. His brief discussions of this profound topic contain many complications and levels, which have not been clearly expressed. Nevertheless, based on Lung-hsi's original context, what he meant has to be so.

III. Explanation of Ssu-Wu
Having explained the reason why the four items are in the state of being, we can easily understand the aspect of "nothing" in Lung-hsi's view, which is similar to the meaning of the Zen statement that "the mind without the form of mind (mindlessness) is the way (praj~naa)." Analytically speaking, the mind, the volition, liang-chih, and the thing are in the state of being in a certain manner; then, regarding the mind-in-itself and liang-chih, we should, in moral practice, present them according to their respective natures. If we do so, we should not stick to their state of being. If we adhere to their state of being, our mind in moral practice has "forms," and so, we become unable to present them fully as in the state of being without form (formless being). As the mind, that in moral cultivation actualizes the substantial being (mind-in-itself), has forms,

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the formless substantial being is concealed but not revealed. Thus, the mind in moral cultivation is merely the mind of ideation. Insofar as the mind in moral cultivation is formless like the formless substantial mind, the latter can fully present itself. Then the mind in moral cultivation and the substantial mind are perfectly unified to become the full presentation (without the least attachment) of the formless mind analytically affirmed beforehand. Thus, the so-called nothing, functionally having no attachment or form in moral cultivation, differs in level from the ontological, substantial formless being. This is analogous to the situation that the praj~naa that is analytically explained is the praj~naa in the state of being. But, if we want to fully realize this praj~naa, it is necessary to know that "the praj~naa which has no form of praj~naa is praj~naa." "Having no form of praj~naa" means the functional nothing in the realization of praj~naa. Without this function, praj~naa cannot fully present itself. Therefore, the statement "the mind is Buddha" is a positive explanation of the mind in the state of being. However, in addition to this, the Ch'an Buddhists also say that "it is neither mind nor Buddha," which means that "the mind without the form of the mind is the way," or praj~naa. This is spoken from the point of view of the formlessness in the realization of "the mind is Buddha" and so is in the state of nothing. It is only owing to such "nothingness," such "formless praj~naa" ("praj~naa but not praj~naa is called praj~naa"), such "dwelling on praj~naa but without attachment to anything, even to praj~naa itself" that buddhahood, the full realization of the pure mind-in-itself of the tathaagata-garbha can be made possible. The meaning here is similar to the one embodied in Ch'eng Ming-tao's saying that "the constant principle of Heaven and Earth is that they pervade all things with their mind, and yet no function or form of the mind appears; the constant principle of the sage is that he responds to all affairs with his feelings and yet no operation of feelings appears." "With their mind" refers to the state of being, whereas, to "pervade all things and yet no form of their mind appears," or, in other words, to pervade all things spontaneously without being mindful in the process, refers to the state of nothing. Only this kind of nothingness characterizes the mind of Heaven and Earth.

The foregoing analysis has dealt with the mind and liang-chih. As far as the volition and the thing are concerned, the case is quite different. Because the volition and the thing at the outset have good and evil, then through the development of liang-chih, the volition is transformed to follow the mind; owing to the function of liang-chih, what pertains to the empirical level is exalted to the transcendental plane. Thus, the volition also becomes "the volition without form," namely, the purely and supremely good volition, which must be formless. Not only is the volition with differentiated good and evil transformed to purely good, but this purely good volition becomes, also, formless like the formless mind. Since the volition is like this, then the thing where the volition intends is also like this. The formless thing is "the thing without the form of the

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thing," which, being purely good, is solely "the manifestation of liang-chih-in-itself." How can there be diverse forms of right and wrong? There are neither forms nor the form of the "thing." On the one hand, the formless thing is "the manifestation of liang-chih-in-itself"; on the other hand, it is the absolute "thusness." Of course, to serve parents and to obey elder brothers are still to serve parents and to obey elder brothers; even grass, wood, tile, and stone are still grass, wood, tile, and stone. There are still differences, but not those between good and evil, The different things are all things as such; they are different without the forms of their differences. Things as such are purely the manifestation of liang-chih-in-itself. They are purely what the heavenly principles of liang-chih pervade and what the enlightenment of liang-chih transcendentally affects; so the thing becomes no obstacle, and the functioning of the volition becomes unfathomably mysterious. At this time the function of volition is tantamount to the function or transcendental affection of enlightenment of liang-chih.

Hence Lung-hsi says that "the mind without the form of the mind is concealed in profundity, the volition without the form of volition is perfect (round) in its transcendental affection, the knowing without the form of knowing is tranquil in itself, the thing without the form of the thing is unfathomable in function." The meaning of these sentences while seemingly paradoxical is indeed clear, definite, and intelligible. This is what Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism share in common, but not what comes from and blends with Ch'an Buddhism. The distinctions between Confucianism and Buddhism do not lie in this respect.

IV. Sudden Teaching and Gradual Teaching
If we talk about the thing from the point of view of where the volition intends, then the thing and the volition must be cured, step by step, through moral cultivation; and the mind, the volition, liang-chih, and the thing have to be separately revealed, that is, each of them needs to be reflected and contemplated -- the volition and the thing are to be reflected, and the mind and liang-chih are to be contemplated. Thus, our spiritual state is in the state of being and is unable to become a unity. This is the reason the doctrine in four statements is in the state of being. If we talk about the thing from the standpoint of the transcendental affection of enlightenment of liang-chih, then the enlightenment of liang-chih is the mind-in-itself, the transcendental affection of enlightenment cannot but be smooth; the volition arising from liang-chih is free from the diversion of good and evil, while the thing presents itself in accordance with the heavenly principles of liang-chih and is naturally free from the impurities of right and wrong. Thus, the enlightenment of liang-chih does not deal with different levels, and the volition, liang-chih, and the thing are fully united, all

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of them manifesting themselves as thusness. The enlightenment of liang-chih knows nothing, and yet knows everything (nothing is not known). Besides, it has no form to be adhered to. This is the meaning of the saying that the four items are in the state of nothing. Actually the four items as a whole are one as nothingness. Of these two approaches just elucidated, the former is an empirical approach, whereas the latter is transcendental. Speaking from the standpoint of moral cultivation, the former is a posteriori, even though a priori standards are admitted; this is the so-called gradual teaching. The latter is a priori, with nothing to be coped with; so "sudden" enlightenment becomes necessary because there is no place for gradual teaching.

If we perform moral cultivation in accordance with the former approach, then once we become pure without selfish desires, we can also attain the realm where the four items are in the state of nothing. This is the meaning of the saying "where moral cultivation is, is the mind-in-itself." (This "is," in the process of moral treatment, is forever partially "is" as well as the "is" with form. It is not until there is nothing to be coped with that the "is" becomes wholly "is" as well as formlessly "is," then the moral cultivation also becomes formless.) If we follow the latter approach, then we realize our mind-in-itself straightforwardly; once this is realized, everything becomes realized. Liang-chih or the mind-in-itself immediately becomes manifest, and the event and the thing that it transcendentally affects also present themselves immediately. This is the meaning of the "round, sudden" teaching ("sudden" implies "round" and vice versa), or the saying "where the mind-in-itself is, is moral cultivation." Moreover, the mind-in-itself is also formless, and so is the moral cultivation.

These two cannot be but ceaselessly profound and pure. Those who perform moral cultivation in accordance with the first approach are men of middle (average) or low inherence. Generally speaking, most people are like this. Those who perform moral practice in accordance with the latter approach are, of course, men of superb inherence, who are extremely rare. Whether the inherence is high or low is not a problem of intelligence but of selfish desires and dispositions. Those of superb inherence seem to have few selfish desires and are unlikely to be influenced by sensibilities. Hence the saying that "Yao and Shun followed their nature." They follow their enlightenment spontaneously with ease. Men of middle or low inherence have many selfish desires and involvements or entanglements. Since their liang-chih cannot easily prevail, they must practice the moral cultivation of reflection and contemplation.

Now Lung-hsi's record of Yang-ming's combination of the four items in the state of being and those in the state of nothing becomes apparent. He wrote

Originally my teaching consists of two approaches. The saying that the four items are in the state of nothing is the teaching for the people of superb inherence, while the saying that the four items are in the state of being is for those of inherence on or below the average. Men of superb inherence, having

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realized the mind-in-itself without good and evil, set up their foundation from the state of nothing, and let the volition, liang-chih, and the thing spring from the state of nothing. Thus, all the difficulties are solved at the same time, and where the mind-in-itself is, is moral cultivation. This is plain and straightforward with nothing unaccomplished. This is the learning of sudden enlightenment. Men of middle or low inherence, who have not yet realized the mind-in-itself, cannot but set up their foundation on what is having good or evil, and let the mind, liang-chih, and the thing emerge from the state of being. Such men need the moral cultivation to perform good and to get rid of evil. By means of moral treatment wherever necessary, their minds gradually achieve realization and from the state of being return to the state of nothing, or to the mind-in-itself. Their final success is not different from that of the people with superb inherence. (Recorded Conversations of Wang Lung-hsi, chüan 1, "Witness of Tao at the T'ien Ch'üan Bridge.")

In chüan 3 of the Instructions for Practical Living, the statement about the high and low inherences are the same as Lung-hsi's above, but Yang-ming's statement does not include the following passages to be found in Lung-hsi's version: "set up their foundation from the state of nothing, and let the volition, liang-chih, and the thing spring from the state of nothing" and "establish their foundation on what is having good and evil, and let the mind, liang-chih, and the thing emerge from the state of being." Of course these words are Lung-hsi's interpolation; however, they cannot be said to be wrong, insofar as they are understood according to my exposition above.

The phrase "set up their foundation from the state of nothing" means "get a foothold from the state of nothing." This "foothold" leads to the ultimate unity without the need of moral treatment. Both the mind-in-itself and the moral cultivation are formless and "ceaselessly pure." For if there is no moral treatment, then there is no moral cultivation of development as that in "developing liang-chih in order to render the volition sincere." This is, of course, the learning of sudden enlightenment, which solves all problems at one stroke.

But the phrase "having not yet realized the mind-in-itself," which is about the people of middle or low inherence, does not mean that they have absolutely no realization (insight) or affirmation of the mind-in-itself without good and evil, or liang-chih-in-itself. For the saying that the four items are in the state of being explicitly contains the following two sentences: "That which has no good and evil is the mind-in-itself" and "That which knows good and evil is liang-chih." Furthermore, Yang-ming said that "as to the development of liang-chih, it depends on the realization of liang-chih." How can liang-chih be developed when it has not been realized? Therefore, the phrase "have not yet realized" must mean having not suddenly realized or attained the loftiest realm, where there is no good and evil but only unity. This realm has not been attained, therefore, moral treatment becomes indispensable. Thus the "form" of each item is revealed in the state of being, hence the saying that "the mind, liang-chih and the thing emerge from the state of being."

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The phrase "cannot but set up their foundation on what is having good and evil" is not quite appropriate and becomes misleading. Here, "set up foundation" must also mean "get a foothold," which actually means to start cultivation from doing something about the volition with good and evil. That the volition has good or evil expresses that the volition is being in this manner. Here this "yu" (being) is different from the "yu" (having) in the phrase "has good or evil." The volition is the "being" in this manner and so is the being of the thing. However, the mind and the knowing of liang-chih are still the supremely good being, namely, the purely intelligible being which transcends sensibility. Although these four kinds of "being" are different, they are all in the state of being. Just because the volition with good and evil has once been revealed as being in this manner and has not sprung solely from liang-chih nor has been transformed to formless volition, then the mind, liang-chih, and the thing are each revealed as "being" in their respective manners. Hence, the saying that all "emerge from the state of being," which is what Lung-hsi meant by "a posteriori learning." The phrase "set up their foundation on having good and evil" actually contains two phrases: (1) commence cultivation with the volition, (2) set up their foundation or get a foothold on the state of "being." Thus, the phrase "set up their foundation from the state of nothing" in the learning of sudden enlightenment (or a priori learning) should also contain two phrases: (1) commence cultivation with the a priori mind-in-itself, (2) set up their foundation or get a foothold from the state of nothing. Thus, doctrines of "being" and "nothing" are symmetrical.

V. A Priori Learning and A Posteriori Learning
There is another passage in which Lung-hsi talked about these two kinds of learning from the point of view of a priori and a posteriori:

Master (Lung-hsi) said to Tsun-yen Tzu (Wang Tsun-yen). "The rectification of the mind is a priori learning, whereas the sincerity of the volition is a posteriori learning." Tsun-yen Tzu said, "Why is it necessary to discern between the mind and the volition by judging their being a priori or a posteriori?" Master said, "All our worldly (temporal) passions and desires arise from the volition. The mind originally is supremely good, and when moved by the volition, it has evil. If we can establish our foundation on a priori mind-in-itself, then what the volition moves cannot but be good, all worldly passions and desires cannot remain, and the moral cultivation of developing liang-chih naturally becomes simple and easy. This is similar to the saying "as he (the great man) is posterior to Heaven, he observes the Heavenly seasons." But, if we set: up our foundation on the a posteriori activity of the volition, we cannot avoid the impurities of worldly passions and desires. Once fallen into involvements, we are bound to exert ourselves in chopping off the entanglements then the moral cultivation of developing liang-chih becomes complicated and difficult, and much endeavour is needed to recover our a priori mind-in-itself." (Recorded Conversations of Wang Lung-hsi, chüan 1, "Records of Three Mountains and Twin Swamps.")

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Here "the rectification of the mind" is regarded as the a priori learning. The word "rectification" has actually no meaning. The phrase "rectification of the mind" is employed merely to express sudden enlightenment. No longer has it the meaning of the same phrase in the context of the Great Learning or in Yang-ming's commentaries on the Great Learning. According to Yang-ming the moral cultivation of rectifying the mind consists in the sincerity of the volition. Hence he says: "It is not until attaining the sincerity of the volition that one's moral cultivation gains reality." "Rectification of the mind" is nothing but a moral state devoid of practical content. The real moral cultivation lies in the sincerity of the volition, which is a focus based on developing liang-chih. The rectification of the mind mentioned by Lung-hsi as the a priori learning is obviously not that rectification in Yang-ming's context of explanation, which is the four-sentence doctrine that the four items are in the state of being. Lung-hsi's a priori learning aims at explaining that the four items are in the state of nothing and that "the rectification of the mind" actually means the straightforward sudden realization of the mind-in-itself. If we "have realized the mind-in-itself, then we set up our foundation from nothing, and the volition, liang-chih, and the thing all spring from nothing." These three items come spontaneously after the mind, therefore, the moral cultivation is "plain and straightforward with nothing unaccomplished."

In the passage quoted above, there is a similar explanation: "If we can establish our foundation on the a priori mind-in-itself, then what the volition moves cannot but be good, all worldly passions and desires cannot remain, and the moral cultivation of developing liang-chih naturally becomes simple and easy." By saying "establish our foundation on the a priori mind-in-itself," Lung-hsi rendered the word "rectification" meaningless. If we ask how we "can establish our ground on the transcendental mind-in-itself," then the answer is nothing but sudden enlightenment, which transforms the mind, the volition, liang-chih, and the thing into a unity; then not only is "the moral cultivation of developing liang-chih naturally simple and easy," but there also is actually no cultivation of "developing," because on this level, moral treatment has been transcended. Therefore, it is superfluous and misleading to repeat that "the moral cultivation of developing liang-chih is simple and easy," as this repetition may make people misunderstand that there are two kinds of moral cultivation for developing liang-chih -- one being easy while the other is complicated and difficult. In fact, under the circumstance that we have suddenly realized that the four items are in the state of nothing, there is no "developing liang-chih." If it is necessary to say "developing liang-chih," then there is only one system of moral cultivation, namely, the teaching that the four items are in the state of being.

Lung-hsi stressed the duality between the transcendental and the empirical and explained the sentences that the four items are in the state of being to mean

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"establish the ground on the empirical activity of the volition," which is the same as his words in the "Witness of Tao at the T'ien Ch'üan Bridge." This phrase has to assert two things: (1) to commence with the activity of the volition, (2) to establish the root, or set up the foothold, "on the state of being." Here the cultivation of developing liang-chih is naturally "more complicated and difficult" than the four items in the state of nothing, which are suddenly realized. In principle there are two levels. But affirming difficulty and easiness in relation to these two levels is liable to arouse the idea of avoiding difficulty and choosing easiness. For, now that there is the path simple and easy, why do we not take it? This is the defect -- wandering in the realm of void. We must know that sudden enlightenment is far from being easy and is not the way that everybody can follow; even men with superb inherence are not completely free from the impurities of worldly passions and desires, but for such men these impurities are comparatively slight and easily transformed. (Man is, after all, a finite being, a being with sensibility.) Thus, it is inappropriate to evaluate difficulty and easiness with respect to the duality between the transcendental and the empirical. Strictly speaking, the developing of liang-chih can be set up only on the basis of the saying that the four items are in the state of being; there is no such development on the basis of the saying that the four items are in nothingness. Thus, the duality between the transcendental and the empirical, or between the sudden and the gradual, proves to be crude and ambiguous. How gradual is the cultivation in accordance with the sentence that the four items are in the state of being? Is it thoroughly gradual? Is the learning thoroughly empirical? Answers to these questions require careful examination.

VI. Is The Four-Sentence Teaching A Thoroughly Gradual Teaching?
In the saying that the four items are in the state of being, the moral cultivation of rendering the volition sincere is not a piecemeal cure in an empirical fashion, although developing liang-chih to render the volition sincere is viewed from the standpoint of the activity of the volition and based "on the state of being." The statement that the sincerity of the volition is where the moral cultivation lies merely means that the activity of the volition is where the problem is. The ground for solving this problem, that is, the transcendental ground of sincerity of the volition, is liang-chih. The activity of the volition is empirical, whereas liang-chih is transcendental. Thus, the ground of the moral treatment is transcendental or a priori. To be grounded on the activity of the volition is to be viewed from the standpoint of the activity of the volition, and based on "being"; if we stress the cultivation of moral treatment, then this cultivation is grounded on liang-chih. Therefore, the phrase "grounded on the empirical activity of the volition" does not imply that the cultivation of rendering the volition sincere is an empirical treatment: For, according to the teaching of developing liang-

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chih, the essential cultivation of moral practice is developing liang-chih, but not turning outward to rely on empirical learning (which is a secondary condition, like paccaga which is inferior to hetu); the ground that renders the development of liang-chih possible is liang-chih itself. It is absurd to leave liang-chih there and turn outward to secure a kind of external cultivation to develop that liang-chih.

This liang-chih is definitely not the nature or reason understood by Chu Hsi, who presupposed a duality between mind and nature, or mind and reason. Liang-chih itself is reason and also mind, that is, the unity of mind and reason. It possesses an irrepressible power which compels its own emergence. It is only the mind itself that has such a power. If it is merely reason, then it cannot possess this power, for the mind is capable of activity (which is not the movement of ch'i, the material force). This is similar to the pure mind-in-itself of tathaagata-garbha in Buddhism: mind being True Thusness (tathataa or tathaagatha), True Thusness being mind, and the mind and True Thusness being a unity, we can speak of the "fumigation of True Thusness," that is, the True-Thusness-Mind has the power to cope with or weaken avidyaa or maayaa. But, for those who affirm aalaya as the origin of occasions but not the True-Thusness-Mind, True Thusness in their system is "mere reason" or "inactive True Thusness." Then, True Thusness is not tainted by avidyaa, nor does it fumigate avidyaa; it is only an object enlightened by praj~naa. So those who belong to the School of Mere Ideation (Vij~naptimaatra, Vij~naanavaada or Yogaacaara) handed down by Hsüan-tsang have to deny the fumigation of True Thusness in the Mahaayaana`sraddhotpaada `saastra, or Treatise on the Wakening of Faith in the Mahaayaana. (On this point, Chu Hsi and the Mere Ideation school share the same type of thought, therefore, both are thoroughly gradual teaching, which is also thoroughly empirical learning because it depends solely on empirical treatment.)

Liang-chih, the unity of mind and reason, however, naturally possesses the power to emerge. In coordination with the phrase "to make the volition sincere," we say "to develop liang-chih"; as far as the "development" of liang-chih is concerned, liang-chih actually develops itself by itself instead of by external cultivation. Hence there is the necessity to affirm that liang-chih can unconsciously present itself anywhere and at any time. Reflective realization and verification mean verifying liang-chih immediately during its presentation. Moreover, this realization is not irrelevant to liang-chih but is the awakening of us through the shocking power of liang-chih itself, which urges us to reflect or contemplate it before affirming it. In short, reflective realization is contemplating liang-chih itself, by its own power of shock. Then the development of liang-chih is developing itself by itself rather than by external cultivation. Therefore, speaking about developing liang-chih to render the volition sincere, we must first admit that, in a sense, we have already verified and realized liang-

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chih, or else it is impossible to explain the development of liang-chih. Hence Yang-ming says that "as to developing liang-chih, it depends on the realization of liang-chih itself: once liang-chih is fully developed, all problems are solved immediately." ("Preface to the Ancient Scripture of the Great Learning," chüan (7), Complete Works of Wang Yang-ming.) Thus, even the development of liang-chih in the saying that the four items are in the state of being necessitates our "realization of liang-chih itself." It is in the process of moral treatment that the mind, liang-chih, and the thing are simultaneously in the state of being. It is owing to moral treatment that the word "being" is in the saying that the four items are in the state of being. Without moral treatment, we must say that the four items are in the state of nothing.

Therefore, what the "Witness of Tao at T'ien Ch'üan Bridge" recorded about Yang-ming's statement resolving the differences of view between Wang Lung-shi and Ch'ien Hsü-shan is inappropriate since it incorrectly stresses the duality between "having realized" and "not having realized." If the saying that the four items are in the state of being applies to the men of middle or low inherence, then, how can they develop liang-chih, provided that they "have not realized the mind-in-itself"? Moreover, this would contradict the saying that "the development of liang-chih consists in the realization of liang-chih itself." In sum, the realization of the mind-in-itself is essential to the sayings that the four items are in the state of being and that they are in the state of nothing (having realized liang-chih is tantamount to having realized the mind-in-itself). The distinction between superb and low inherence does not lie in whether or not the mind-in-itself is realized, but in whether or not there is moral treatment. Therefore, the previously mentioned statement of resolution by Yang-ming should be amended as follows: Men of superb inherence, having suddenly realized the mind-in-itself without good and evil, set up their foundation on the state of nothing, and let the four items attain ultimate unity without undergoing gradual moral treatment, while the volition, liang-chih, and the thing spring from the state of nothing; men of middle or low inherence, despite their final realization of the mind-in-itself, need moral treatment and so cannot but commence moral cultivation with what is having good or evil, that is, establish their foundation on the state of being, and let their mind, liang-chih, and the thing emerge from the state of being. Thus, Yang-ming's ideas become crystal clear and definite. From this we see that the saying that the four items are in the state of being is neither thoroughly gradual teaching nor thoroughly empirical learning.

Tackling the activity of the volition belongs to the empirical level, but the ground of moral treatment is liang-chih, which is transcendental. It is solely owing to the necessity of moral treatment that the teaching is gradual. On account of having this transcendental ground, the gradual teaching also possesses the ground for the possibility of sudden enlightenment. (It is owing to

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the affirmation of the mind-in-itself that the sudden teaching becomes possible. Without the transcendental mind-in-itself, the teaching cannot but be thoroughly gradual teaching and empirical learning, like those of Chu Hsi and the Mere Ideation school.) This kind of gradual teaching resembles that of the Treatise on the Wakening of Faith in the Mahaayaana. Its implication of sudden teaching is similar to the situation of the Hua-yen school grounding its philosophy on the Treatise on the Wakening of Faith in the Mahaayaana but advancing its sudden teaching according to Avata^msaka suutra, or Hua-yen ching [Flowery Splendor Scripture]. Thus, the four-sentence teaching also contains the possibility of sudden enlightenment, and leads to the sudden teaching despite its being gradual teaching. Hence, Lung-hsi's saying that the four items are in the state of nothing is not without its ground in Yang-ming's teaching. Further, the four-sentence teaching may be regarded as a universally applicable constant principle of moral practice, because even men of superb inherence cannot totally dispense with the moral treatment necessitated by the impurities of worldly passions and desires, though comparatively slight and easily transformable.

For this reason, the saying that the four items are in the state of nothing expresses only the loftiest realm attained, after practicing or exercising moral treatment, instead of an objectively practical teaching. Since the gradual teaching presupposes the ground of sudden enlightenment, suddenness means only the loftiest realm, whereas the lack of suddenness means the gradual realm. (Thoroughly gradual teaching and empirical learning can never involve suddenness.) Men of superb inherence are capable of instantaneous suddenness, while people of average or low inherence also possess the ground enabling suddenness. For high inherence and low inherence, there seem to be two kinds of teaching methods; however, there is only one, that of the four-sentence teaching. The phrase that the four items are in the state of nothing cannot independently become a teaching method; it has been considered as a teaching method insofar as it is applied to men of superb inherence who "follow their nature" and become the so-called heaven-gifted sages. If they "follow their nature" that is heaven-gifted, how can the saying be a teaching method? (The T'ien-t'ai school said that suddenness is a manner of teaching instead of a principle of teaching. Here we say that suddenness is confined to men of superb inherence, or the suddenness is expressed by the sudden time in the four-sentence teaching. However, Lung-hsi emphasized only the duality between the transcendental and the empirical. He seemed to instruct people to abandon the a posteriori and take on the a priori; his teaching was inappropriate in making the a priori learning appear easy, taking the four-sentence teaching to be a posteriori, and neglecting the a priori nature of liang-chih in this teaching. In short, Lung-hsi was negligent and imprudent. Nevertheless, apart from the doctrine that the four items are in the state of nothing, he stressed

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only liang-chih. He always said that one can succeed if one trusts liang-chih. Thus, the fact that the four items are in the state of being in developing liang- chih can lead to the state of nothing. Interpreted in such a way, Lung-hsi's teaching may be regarded as faultless. Those ambiguous words of Lung-hsi were because of his imprudence in thinking and inaccuracy in expressing his ideas. No wonder his inappropriate words aroused others' sarcastic remarks. Even Yang-ming was stimulated by Lung-hsi's intelligence and advocated the doctrine of high and low inherence to suit Lung-hsi instead of making a detailed exposition of his own philosophy for Lung-hsi. In addition to this, according to the Instructions for Practical Living, Yang-ming said that the four-sentence teaching "originally is a universally applicable principle of moral practice." (Lung-hsi's records did not mention this because he regarded it as an expediency.) Therefore, this teaching is not confined to men of middle or low inherence. It is a pity that Yang-ming did not explain it to enlighten Lung-hsi.

VII. Conclusion
My critical exposition above has clarified and rectified Lung-hsi's equivocal sayings. The terms such as ssu-yu or ssu-wu have their precise meanings, whose differences and ramifications should be made clear. Thus, we can now state that the four items are in the state of being or nothing, that men can attain sudden or gradual enlightenment, and that the four-sentence teaching is a universally applicable principle of moral practice.

Lung-hsi's insight into the theory of ssu-wu is not without ground. On the whole, he stayed with Yang-ming's prescriptions, promulgating and developing them; he may be called the fittest successor of Yang-ming's philosophy. Should his imprudent words be expunged, his sayings would be mostly what Yang-ming had already pronounced; among all Yang-ming's disciples at that time, Wang Lung-hsi was the most proficient in and familiar with Yang-ming's thoughts. He inherited all of Yang-ming's doctrines without establishing new ones, concentrating exclusively on Yang-ming instead of absorbing other Sung Neo-Confucianists' ideas thereby making his doctrine impure. In sum, Lung-hsi has been characterized by his saying that the four items are in the state of nothing, whence he displayed both his ingenuity and his negligence. However, if all inexact and imprudent words were disregarded, then his theory would also be the natural consequence of Yang-ming's teaching of liang-chih and would not be fallacious.

In chüan 12 of the Anthology and Critical Accounts of the Neo-Confucianists of the Ming Dynasty, Huang Tsung-hsi commented on Lung-hsi, "Master (Lung-hsi) succeeded Yang-ming's final instructions after a long intimate relationship, so most of Yang-ming's subtle words survive through him";

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Huang also said, "Master (Lung-hsi) channelled and disentangled many lines of thought, contributing much in expounding Wen Ch'eng Kung's (Yang-ming's) learning." These remarks do not diverge from the facts. But it is erroneous for Tsung-hsi to say that Lung-hsi's doctrine that the four items are in the state of nothing "cannot but resemble Ch'an Buddhism and have diverged from Confucian prescriptions," since Huang Li-chou (Tsung-hsi) was never himself clear about the key to making distinctions between Ch'an Buddhism and Confucianism.