More on the Unrepeatability of Gunas

·期刊原文
More on the Unrepeatability of Gunas
By Potter, Karl H.
Philosophy East and West
V. 7 No. 1/2 (1957)
pp. 57-60
Copyright 1957 by University of Hawaii Press
Hawaii, USA

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p. 57

In an interesting article, [1] in connection with an explanation of the Vai`se.sika categories, Dr. D. M. Datta questions a conclusion put forward by me in an earlier article in Philosophy East and West. [2] My contention was that a single gu.na is conceived by the Vai`se.sika school as an unrepeatable entity, that a single blue-color (niilaruupam), for instance, resides in just one substance and no more.

Datta replies that "color, touch, etc. ... can belong to many substances." [3] He claims that an example of a single gu.na is "a particular shade of red," [4] and goes on to question my difficulties over the translation of "gu.na" as "quality." Now, of course, if, for example, a niilaruupam could be construed as a shade of blue, then "quality" would be a perfectly appropriate translation of "gu.na," for we do say, for example, "The mountains have a bluish quality about them," meaning that the mountains appear to possess some shade of blue. Therefore, the issue between Datta and me may be said to hinge on the question as to whether the Vai`se.sika's "niilaruupam" denotes a shade or (as I think) an abstract particular.

My arguments, as presented before, were of two kinds: (a) the demonstration that a contradiction arises if gu.nas are construed as repeatable, and (b) the incidental citation of at least one passage (from Vi`svanaatha's Siddhaanta-muktaavalii) evidently defending the unrepeatability of gu.nas against an objector. Datta does not attack either of these arguments. Instead, he presents several points of criticism, which may be summarized as follows. He says, if I understand him, that (1) if my interpretation were true, the notion of gu.na would overlap that of vi`se.sa; (2) my interpretation is incompatible with the fact that gu.nas possess universal characters (saamaanyas);

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1. "The Interpretation of Vai`se.sika Categories," The Philosophical Quarterly (Amalner), xxvii, No. 4 (January, l956), 217-225.
2. "Are the Vai`se.sika 'Gu.nas' Qualities?", Vol. IV, No. 3 (October, 1954), 259-264.

3. Datta, op. cit., p. 222.

4. Ibid., p. 224.

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(3) "gu.na" is not a particular but a general term, a "class term"; (4) I equate "red" to "redness" and thus "miss the important Vai`se.sika distinction"; (5) Kanaada's definition of gu.na excludes universals. [5]

(1) His first argument is that on my view gu.nas and vi`se.sas (particularities) overlap. But my view would not allow gu.nas and vi`se.sas to overlap if there is some other principle which distinguishes them. For the old school of Vai`se.sika there is such a principle, and Datta himself mentions it in a footnote -- "Unlike Vi`se.satva, gu.natva is a jaati (universal)." [6] One distinguishing principle, that is, for the old school, was that, whereas a single gu.na is characterized by a universal called gu.natva which also characterizes other gu.nas, vi`se.sas are characterized by no universal at all. Therefore, my view does not confound gu.nas and vi`se.sas for the old school.

"But," one might point out, "if gu.nas are as unique as vi`se.sas, how can one defend the above distinguishing principle?" The answer is that one cannot, and this was seen clearly by Raghunaatha `Siromani, who writes in his Padaarthatattvaniruupa.na:

Further, now gu.na-ness [is] not a single universal, established by perception (and occurring) in the twenty-four [kinds of gu.nas] beginning with color. [7]

Raghunaatha and his followers reject gu.natva as a universal. They also reject the whole category of vi`se.sa as unnecessary. [8] The general logic underlying these moves should be evident enough to those acquainted with Occam's razor. I conclude that my interpretation confounds gu.nas with vi`se.sas for neither the old school nor the new, since, for the old school a differentiating principle is present, and for the new there are no vi`se.sas at all. The historical development of the system, culminating in Raghunaatha's wholesale rejection of vi`se.sas and gu.natva, seems to lend additional weight to my view.

(2) Datta's second contention, that my view contradicts the rule that gu.nas possess universals, is false. In fact, it is just the fact that niilaruupam possesses niilatva that leads me to my interpretation, and I assert the general point quite emphatically on page 260 of my article, as rule 2 of the rules accepted by the system of which I make use there.

(3) Datta's third point, that "gu.na" is a general rather than a singular term, is perfectly true but has no relevance to the point at issue. The issue

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5. Datta, op. cit., pp. 224-225.
6. Ibid., p. 224, n. 26.

7. "Evam gu.natvam api na rupaadicaturvim`sataaveka pratyak.sasiddhaa jaati.h." Karl H. Potter, The Padaarthatattvaniruupa.nam of Raghunaatha `Siromani (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Yenching Institute, l957), p. 64.

8. See ibid., p. 43.

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is over what kind of thing the general term "gu.na" denotes -- i.e., what sorts of entities are members of the class marked out by the term.

(4) The charge that I equate "red" to "redness" is the result of a misunderstanding or misreading. The English word "red" has a close relation to the English word "redness," in that we say that a thing which is red has redness. But in the Vai`se.sika system "rakta" (red) does not bear the same relation to "raktatva" (redness) as "red" does to "redness" in English. For the Vai`se.sika, a pot which is red does not have redness. Instead, the red color (raktaruupam) of the pot has redness. I made a special attempt to point out, in part two of the earlier article, that it is precisely the discrepancy between our language habits at this point that produces the prevalent misinterpretation of the category.

(5) The definition which Datta attributes to Kanaada is not sufficiently unambiguous to settle the issue. Datta translates Kanaada's definition of "gu.na" thus: "a simple, non-dynamic, general quality inhering in a substance only." [9] He adds that this excludes universals. However, it does not. Take the universal ghatatva (potness). Potness is a simple, non-dynamic, general quality inhering in a substance only, since it inheres only in pots.

This is the real point -- what Datta calls my fear that gu.nas will be confused with universals -- and that fear is not allayed by the considerations Datta brings forth. Furthermore, it is not only my fear. The Navya-naiyaayikas recognized exactly this difficulty and took steps to meet it. Let me conclude by citing and explaining a careful answer, couched in the technical terminology of the new school, to someone who shares my fear. [10]

In the Siddhaanta-muktaavalii (SM) on Bhaa.saapariccheda (BhP) 8, Vi`svanaatha is concerned with the definition of "saamaanya" or "universal."

He [Vi`svanaatha, the author of BhP as well as SM] is explaining [the category of] universals [in the words] 'saamaanyam...' and so forth [in BhP 8]. Now, the definition of that [namely, a universal,] is that, being eternal, it inheres in many [entities]. [11]

Dinakara, in his commentary on this, glosses "anekatvam" as "ekabhinnatvam" and Raamarudra, in turn, explains "ekabhinnatvam," which means literally "other-than-one-ness," as follows:

And one should not object, "the definition of universal over-extends so as to include color and the rest [of the gu.nas], since colors, etc, inhere in that which possesses a

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9. Presumably this is a translation of Vai`se.sika Suutra I.i.16. Datta, op. cit., p. 264.
10. I am indebted to Professor Daniel H. H. Ingalls of Harvard University for his help in translating this passage.

11. "Saamaanyam niruupaayati -- saamaanyam iti. Tallak.sa.na.m tu nityatve saty anekasamavetatvam." Kaarikaavalii-Muktaavalii-Dinakarii-Raamaruudri, Kashi Sanskrit Series, No. 6 (Banaras: Vidya Vilas Press, 195l), p. 56.

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mutual absence limited by some unity or other." For what is meant by saying that something is "other-than-one" is simply that it possesses a mutual absence the counterpositiveness of which is limited by unity. [12]

The objector quoted is making the following point: "You, Raamarudra, define a universal as an entity which inheres in that which is other than a single thing. But look here -- a blue-color inheres in something (the blue pot, say) which is other than some single thing or other (some other pot or cloth, say). Therefore, your definition has not succeeded in distinguishing universals from gu.nas."

Raamarudra's reply, couched in Navya-nyaaya terminology, comes to this: "The difficulty is with your interpretation of 'other-than-one-ness.' What we mean to say is that a universal inheres in something which is different not simply from some particular thing or other but from any single thing. That is, universals inhere in pluralities, and colors, etc., do not."

Raamarudra's explanation thus clearly implies the truth of my interpretation of the category of gu.na, for shades of color inhere in pluralities, and thus fall under the definition of universal, not of gu.na. No gu.na is characteristic of several things at once; it inheres in one thing only.

The difficult fashion in which Raamarudra phrases his remarks quoted above is the result of the lack in Sanskrit of articles and quantifiers. Where in English we make the necessary point by saying "each gu.na resides in a single substance," the Naiyaayika, lacking words for "each" and "a," is forced to say this with the help of the theory of absences and the notion of limitation. [13]

In conclusion, let me sum up the situation by saying that, as far as I can tell, Datta gives no tenable reasons for his view that niilaruupam denotes a shade of blue, whereas the later Vai`se.sika literature, as suggested above, clearly indicates the truth of my view that niilaruupam denotes abstract particulars.

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12. "Na ca yatki.mcid ekatvaavachinnabhedavati samavete ruupaadau jaatilak.sa.naativyaaptir iti vaacyam. Ekabhinnatvapade.na ekatvaavachinnapratiyogitaakabhedasyaivoktatvaat." Ibid.
13. This matter is explained in detail by Ingalls in his Materials for the Study of Navya-nyaaya Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), especially pp. 44-59.