Modifications of The Karma Doctrine

·期刊原文
Modifications of The Karma Doctrine

BY E.WASHBURN HOPKINS.
The Journal of The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
pp.581-593

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p.581

XXI.
MODIFICATIONS OF THE KARMA DOCTRINE
BY E. WASHBURN HOPEINS.
THE Karma doctrine in its Brahmanistic form
teaches that every individual in successive
existences reaps the fruit of ignorance and desire as
these were expressed in action performed in
antecedent existences. As a man himself sows, so he
himself reaps; no man inherits the good or evil act
of another man: na 'yam parasya sukrtam duskrtam ca
'pi sevate (Mbh. xii, 291, 22). The fruit is of the
same quality with the action, and good or bad there
is no destruction of the action: na tu naso s'ya.
vidyate. The result is exactlv as when just
retribution follows a wrong; there can be no
cessation till the account is squared: ubhayam tat
samibhutam. Whether "with eye or thought or voice or
deed, whatever kind of act one performs, one receives
that kind of act in return": Kurute (v.l. karoti)
yadrsam karma tadrsam pratipadyate (ib. 16, 22; cf.
139, 24).

We may here ignore the metaphysical subtlety of
the self as conceived by Buddhism, observing only
that despite all efforts to conceive of an
individuality which inherits Karma without being the
self of the antecedent action, the fact that the
Buddhist can remember previous existences shows that
the new ego is practically, if not essentially, one
with the previous ego, and may be regarded not only
as a collective but as a recollective entity--and how
such a self-entity differs from a soul, atman,
probably none save a meta physician could ever have
explained. Not all Buddhists, however, were
metaphysicians. Though they were not supposed to
believe in metempsychosis or even in trans-
migration, the many actually believed that the self
of to-day

p.582

atoned for the selfishness of the self of a
previous birth, that the penalty was paid by the very
individual who had done the wrong-an individual
identical with that self in memory and hence, in
mental personality, equivalent to the self or soul of
Brahmanic, as of all popular theologies.

Thus logically the doer of the deed suffers, and
not some other person. And most logically the doer
suffers at the hands of the injured. He who has
wronged another in one life is punished for it by
that other in the next life: the mamsa law, " me eat
will he whose meat I eat." Or there is a slighter
logical connection, as when the thief of grain is
reborn as a mouse, because 'mouse' means 'thief.' So
too he who starves others will himself be starved.
According as the act is mental or bodily, and
according to the mental disposition, bhava, with
which one performs an act, one reaps its fruit
hereafter in a body similarly endowed (Mbh. xv, 34,
18; Manu, xii, 62 and 81). But analogy often fails,
and a low birth of any kind, without further logical
connection, rewards a low act. Thus the fruit of
foolishness is simply rebirth "in this or a lower
world": iman lokam hinataram ca 'visanti (Mund. Up.,
i, 2, 7-10). Or hell-torture, which antedates the
systematic Karma doctrine,(1) may be adjuvant to the
mechanical fruit of evil. Hell even in the Brahmanic
system may take the place of metempsychosis
altogether, as in Manu, xii, 18 and 22, which only a
theological necessity can couple with the doctrine of
Karma as a retributive power. Here, and else- where
in many places, the only retribution is hell-torture,
after which the soul receives a new body, but not a
body conditioned by the acts already atoned for in
hell. That the same lecture of Manu's code recognizes
the full Karma doctrine does not make any difference.
The view that hell alone punishes the guilty is older
than the view that the individual is a self-adjusting
moral mechanism such as

------------------------
1 The doctrine of metempsychosis, without ethical
bearing, has no necessary connection with
ante-natal action, and this, transmigration pure
and simple, was an older belief than that in hell.
karma itself merely implies the fruit of action,
and that fruit may be in terms of metempsychosis
or in terms of hell or of both. Compare the
Anguttara Nik., iii, 99, on hell or rebirth, as
alternatives.

p.583

is usually found in the Buddhistic
interpretation. When hell and Karma both punish a
sinner, he is sent to hell first and is then handed
over to the working of Karma. A balance is struck
between evil and good. Or the individual who, it is
recognized, is never absolutely bad or absolutely
good, may take his reward of joy and punishment in
slices, first being rewarded for having been good and
then being punished for having been bad. One canny
hero, on being given this choice, said he would take
his punishment first, and his reason was the one
given by Dante-"nessun maggiore dolore che ricordarsi
nel tempo felice," etc.

But there are various other theories which cross
the theory of Kama, and if logically set beside it
they must have annoyed not a little the religious
consciousness of the Brahmans and Buddhists.
Fortunately for man's peace of mind his theology may
be illogical without upsetting his religion, and in
India old and new beliefs seem to have met in a blend
which, however incongruous, was accepted as the faith
of the fathers, and hence was considered good enough
for the sons. Just how far these incongruities were
common to Brahmanism and Buddhism it is difficult to
say. In some cases they appear in both systems; but
on the whole Buddhism is the more decided opponent of
doctrines subversive of the Karma theory. Yet when we
say Buddhism we must make an exception in the case of
Lamaism and perhaps other exponents of the Mahayana,
where, as in Brahmanism, the Karma doctrine was
modified in many ways.

In Brahmanism itself Karma struck hard against
the old belief in sacrifice, penance, and repentance
as destroyers of sin. It is in the code of practical
life, as well as in the esoteric teaching, that
sacrifice, reading the Vedas, knowledge of God,
destroy all sin; austerity destroys all sin; penance
destroys almost every sin; penance and repentance
(i.e. public confession of sin and a promise not to
sin in the same way again) at least mitigate, if they
do not destroy, every sin; while later, as is well
known, in all the popular teaching, gifts made to the
priests remove sins, just as do visits made to holy
places (Manu, xi, 146, 228, 240-247). The older-

p.584

theologians indeed raised a question as to
penance. Unintentional sin may be destroyed by
penance; but how about intentional sin? Some said
yes, even intentional sin; but others said no, for
"The deed does not die": na hi karrma ksiyate (Manu,
xi, 46; Vas, xxii, 2-5; Gaut. xix, 5, etc.). The
incongruity was recognized; but orthodoxy prevailed
and continued to preach both Karma and its logical
antidote. Of all these factors, knowledge alone in
the primitive Buddhistic belief can destroy the
effect of Karma.

That the prayers for the dead, admitted into the
Lamaistic service, presuppose the power to change the
effect of Karma, goes without saying. The ritual
employed to " elevate the fathers" is a parallel in
Brahmanism. Whether, however, a curse, or its
practical equivalent in krtya, witchcraft, may be
construed in the same way, is doubtful. Imprecations
and magic existed before Karma was thought of. The
only question is whether, when an innocent person was
entrapped by kytya, or a slight offence was punished
out of all proportion by a curse, the resulting
unhappiness was construed as being independent of
Karma or as the real result of prenatal acts, the
curse or act of sorcery being merely the means to the
fulfilment of Karma's law. As to the effect of a
curse, it is regarded either as the punishment of an
act done in the present body or, when argued from a
present state of being, as resulting from a curse
uttered in a previous existence.(1)

Another theory of man's lot also existed before
Karma was known. In its simplest form it is the
theory that man owes what he gets, not to his
anterior self, but to the gods. What the gods arrange
is, in any case, whether good or bad, the appointed
lot; the arrangement, viddhi, is fate. If the gods
bestow a share, bhaya, of good upon a man, that is
his bhagya, luck, divinely appointed, dista. as
divine, the cause is daiva, which later becomes fate,
and is then looked upon

-------------------------
1 That is, a curse may take effect at once, an injury
be thus punished in the present existence; but
(usually) a curse changes the next state of
existence, as when Saudasa, King of Kosala, is
changed into a cannibal monster at the curse of a
great seer (Mbh. xiii, 6, 32).

p.585

as a blind power, necessity, chance, hatha. So
radical a blow at Karma as is given by this theory is
formally repudiated in the words bhagyam Karma, "luck
is Karma," or some equivalent denial. It is daiva,
fate, which according to Manu, xi, 47, causes a man
to sin, for he is represented as performing penance
on account either of an act committed before birth or
'by fate,' that is, as the commentators say, by
chance (carelessness) in this life. But daiva
elsewhere is a mere synonym of Karma, as in
daivamanuse (Manu, vii, 205), and is expressly
explained to be such in the later code of
Yajnavalkya, i, 348: tatrra daivam abhivyaktam
paurusam paurvadaihikam, "Fate is (the result of) a
man's acts performed in a previous body."
Nevertheless, although the Brahman here, as in the
Hitopadesa and other works, expressly declares that
what is called dista, 'decreed,' or fate, and is said
to be insuperable when writ upon the forehead,
likhitam api lalate, results really from man's own
act, whether in the present or the past, yet the
original notion of God's favour persists, until it
leads in its logical conclusion to that complete
abrogation of the Karma doctrine which is found in
the fundamental teaching of the Bhagavad Gita in its
present form. This fundamental teaching (not
historically but essentially) inculcates the view
that the favour of God, here called prasada, 'grace,'
combined with the necessarily antecedent 'loving
faith' of the worshipper, surpasses all effects of
antenatal error. Thus, though starting with Karma,
the Gita, like all later sectarian works, finally
annuls the doctrine, exactly as in Japan one sect of
Buddhists finds that an expression of faith in
Amitabha Bhutsi transcends all other acts and secures
salvation. This virtually does away altogether with
the logic of Karma. In the same way Krsna in the
Mahabharata, iv, 20, 7-29, is not led to believe that
her present misfortunes are the result of acts in a
previous existence, but that they are due to the
Creator, Dhartar; "through whose grace, prasada, I
have obtained this misfortune," she says, owing to a
"fault against the gods," devanam kilbisam, committed
not in a prenatal state, but when she was s foolish
young girl, bala, in

p.586

her present life. It is the will of the god which
is identifed with daiva: (na daivikam, she says of
her condition). Yet the formal denial of any cause
save Karma is as vigorously made in the epic as
elsewhere. "Not without seed is anything produced;
not without the act does one receive the reward. I
recognize no Fate. One's own nature predetermines
one's condition; it is Karma that decides": daivam
tata na pasyami, opposed to svabhava and Karma(xii,
291, 12-14) On the other hand, the fatalistic belief,
despite this objection, is constantly cropping up.
The length of a man's life is "determined at the
beginning" (as is that of all creatures) by fate,
under the form of Time, kala, ayur agre 'vatisthate
(Mbh. xii, 153,56); through Kala alone comes death
(ib. xiii, 1, 50). There is a long discussion in
xiii, 6, 3 ff., of the relative importance of action
in the present life and that action (or effort) in a
preceding life which is virtually fate, and the
conclusion here reached is that it is activity in
this life which determines every man's lot, for
"there is no determining power in fate": na 'sti
daive prabhutvam (ib. 47). This is the manly view.
The weaker sex adopts the opposite opinion (Sak.,
p.68). The theory of chance and accident is clearly
expressed in Buddhism. According to the Milinda, it
is an erroneous extension of the true belief when the
ignorant (Brahmans and Buddhists) declare that "every
pain is the fruit of Karma" (136and138).

The individual, besides having his Karma
abrogated by divine grace, may secure a remittance of
part of his evil Karma involuntarily. The Karma
doctrine demands that every individual shall reap
what he has sown. But when the farmer, in the mose
literal sense reaps the harvest he has sown, it is
due not to his own Karma, but to the virtue of the
king, and conversely, when, owing to the neglect or
oppression of the king, the farmer does not reap his
crop, then the blame attaches to the king. Thus, if
his wife dies of hunger, he ought logically to say
that it is due to his wife's or his own previous
Karma. Instead of this, it is the fault of the king,
and the king will reap hereafter

p.587

the fruit of the sin. The king alone determines
the character of the age, rajai 'va yagam ucyate
(Mbh. xii, 91, 6), and "drought, flood, and plague"
are solely the fault, dosa, of the king (ib. 90, 36).
The same theory holds in Buddhism (Jataka 194). The
share of religious merit accruing to or abstracted
from the king's account in accordance with this
theory is mathematically fixed.

The relation of husband and wife, touched upon in
the last paragraph, also interferes with Karma. In
the unmodified theory, a wife is exalted only in this
life by her husband; her position in the next life
depends upon her own acts. If she steals grain she
becomes a female mouse, etc. (Manu, xii, 69). But
elsewhere in the code (v, 166; ix, 29) and in the
epic, a woman's future fate is that of her husband if
she is true to him. Faithfulness might logically be
reckoned as her own act; but the reward is in fact
set in opposition to the operation of Karma, as is
clearly seen in the words of Sita in Ram. ii, 27,
4-5. Here the heroine says: "Father, mother, brother,
son, and daughter-in-law reap each the fruit of
individual acts(1); but the wife alone enjoys the lot
of her husband....in this world and after death." It
is evident that the words svani punyani bhunjnah,
svam svam bhagyam upasate, which express the Karma
doctrine as operative in the case of others, are here
placed in antithesis to the wife's reward, which is
to share the fruit of her husband's acts. The
faithful wife absorbs her husband's qualities, gunas,
but if unfaithful is reborn as a jackal (Manu, ix,
22, 30; v,164).

To return to transferred Karma. A voluntary
transfer occurs only in the case of good Karma. But
transfer of evil Karma is found in still other cases
than that mentioned above ? For not only are a
subject's sins transferred to a bad king (Manu, viii,
304, 308), but the priestly guest who is not properly
honoured transfers his evil deeds to the

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1 The commentator understands karmaphalam, 'the
fruit of acts,' to be meant, and this is supported
by the varied reading: bharyai 'ka patibhagyni
bhunkta patiparayana pretya cai 've 'ha, "here and
hereafter the faithful wife enjoys her husband's
lot." J.R.A.S. 1906.

p.588

inhospitable host, and all the good Karma of the
householder is transferred to the guest (Menu, iii,
100, etc.). Further, a perjurer's good Karma goes
over to the person injured by the perjury
(Yaj..ii,75), or, according to Menu, viii, 90, ii
goes to the dogs," suno gacchet; but the latter
expression merely means "is lost" (Visnu, viii, 26).
'Brahman glory' can perhaps be interpreted as
Karma-fruit. If so, it goes to the benefit of the
gods when its possessor sins (Manu, xi, 122).

A voluntary transfer of good Karma is recognized
for example, in the epic tale of the saint who,
having merited and obtained "a good world," offers to
hand it over to a friead who has not earned if. It is
hinted in this case that though acquired merit in the
objective shape of a heavenly residence may be
bestowed upon another, the gift ought not to be
accepted (Mbh. i, 92, 11 f.). Strangely enough, the
idea that good Karma is transferable is also common
in Buddhism. Thus there is the Stupa formula, sap
uyae matu pitu puyae, (erected) "for (the builder's)
own religious merit and for the religious merit of
his mother and father," and also the formula' in the
ordination service: "Let the merit that I have gained
be shared by my lord. It is fitting to give me to
share in the merit gained by my lord. It is good, it
is good. I share in it." We may compare also the
pattidana formula: aham te ito pattim dammi, "I give
thee my merit."

Most of these modifications of Karma are to be
explainsed by the impaect of diverrgent beliefs,
which, older than Karma, survived in one form or
another, interposing themselves between the
believer's mind and his newer belief. Such also is
that which accomplishes the most important
modification in the whole series, namely, the belief
in hereditary sin. The belief that a man may inherit
sin rises naturally when disease is regarded as the
objective proof of sin. As disease is palpably
inherited, so, since disease is the reward of sin,
the inherito of disease is the inheritor of sin. At
the time

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1 Warren, " Buddhism in Translations," p. 336 f.

p.589

of the Rig Veda me find the doctrine of inherited
sin already set forth. The poet in RV. vii, 86, 5
first inquires why the god is angry, what sin, agas,
has been committed, and then continues in
supplication: "Loose from us paternal sins and loose
what we in person have committed" (ava drugdhani
pitrya srja no 'va ya vayam cakrma tanubhih). The
collocation and parallel passages show that what is
here called drugdha is identical with the preceding
agas (enas) and with anhas, found elsewhere, RV. ii,
28, 6, in the same connection; it is the oppressive
sin-disease (either inherited or peculiar to the
patient), which may be removed by the god, who has
inflicted it as a sign of anger, and whose mercy,
mrlika, is sought in visible form, abhi khyam.

Obviously such a view as this is inconsistent
with the doctrine of Karma. If a man's sin is
inherited it cannot be the fruit of his own actions.
Individual responsibility ceases, or at least is
divided, and we approach the modern view that a man's
ancestors are as guilty as himself when he has
yielded to temptation. Not the self, in the orthodox
view or the confection that replaces soul (self) in
the heterodox (Buddhistic) view, but some other self
or confection reaps the fruit. This view has indeed
been imputed to Buddhismh, but it was in an endeavour
to make it appear that Buddhism anticipates the
general modern view of heredity and is therefore a
'scientific' religion. No examples, however, were
proffered in support of this contention, and there
was apparently a confusion in the mind of the writer
between self-heredity (Karma) and heredity from one's
parents. The fact that in Buddhism one inherits one's
own sin in the form of fruit does not make it
scientific in the modern sense of heredity. To find
an analogue to the thought of to-day we must turn to
Brahmanism.

For although it mould seem that after the pure
Karma doctrine was once fully accepted such a view as
that of inherited sin could find no place in either
Buddhism or Brahmanism, yet as little as the Hindu
was troubled with the intrusion upon that doctrine of
the counter-doctrine of God's sufficient grace, was
he troubled with the logical

p.590

muddle into which he fell by admitting this
modification and restriction of the working of Karma.
He admits it, not as an opposed theory, but as a
modification. Thus in the Great Epic, i, 80, 2 f.:
"When wrong is done, it does not bear fruit at once,
but gradually destroys....If the fruit (of Karma)
does not, appear in one's self, it is sure to come
out in one's sons or descendants":

na 'dharmas carito, rajan, sadyah, phalati, gaur
iva, sanair dvartyamano hi kartur mulani krntati,
putresu va naptrsu va, na ced atmani pasyati, phalaty
eva dhruvam papam, gurubhuktam ivo 'dare.

Almost the same words are used in xii, 139, 22:
"When, O King, any evil is done, if it does not
appear in (the person of) this man (who commits the
deed, it appears) in (the person of) his sons, his
grandsons, or his other descendants ":

papam karma krtam kimcid, yadi tasmin na drsyate,
nrapate, tasya pvtresu pautresv api ca naptrsu.

Strange as this doctrine appears in contrast with
the Karma theory ("no one reaps the fruit of
another's good or evil deeds," cited above), it can,
perhaps, be explained as an unconscious adaptation
from the visible consequences of evil. Thus, when the
god Justice, otherwise personified Punishment, judges
a king, he decrees that if a king is unjust that
"king together with his kin" is destroyed (Menu, vii,
28). But this is a natural, obvious result, as it is
said further "if the king through folly rashly
harasses his kingdom, he, with his kin, soon loses
his kingdom and life" (ib. 111, sabandhavah). It is
such wrong that is particularly alluded to in one of
the texts above,' but here the further step has been
taken of incorporating the notion of divided
punishment into the Karma system with its special
terminology, so that it now appears as a modification

--------------------------
1 Compare, in the continuation of the first
selection, the seer's words, which express the
punishment to be meted out to the king in this
particular instance: tyaksyami tvam sabandhavam
(i, 80, 5).

p.591

of that system, whereby (divided punishment
implying inherited sin) the sons and grandsons reap
the Karma of another. It is improbable that the
author of Manu, iv, 172- 174, had any such notion. He
simply states the observed fact that when a king is
destroyed his relatives (i.e. his whole family)
suffer also. But the later writer begins a fatal
process of logical analysis. If the king's sons or
grandsons suffer for ancestral sins, then clearly
Karma works from father to son. In the second
example(1) the generalization is complete; if the
fruits of sin do not appear in the person of any
sinner, such fruits may be looked for in the person
of his descendants, even to the third generation.
This forms a sharp contrast to the teaching of xii,
153, 38: na karmana pituh putrah pita va
putrakarmana, margena 'nyena gacchanti, baddhah
sukrtaduskrtaih "neither the son by the Karma of his
father nor the father by the Karma of his son go,
bound by good and evil deeds, upon another course,"
for "what one does, that the doer alone enjoys": yat
karoti....tat kartai 'ua samasnati (Mbh. xii, 153,
41).It agrees logically with that later explanation
of the fate of Yayati which sees in this seer's
rehabilitation in heaven, not a purchase, or a gift
accepted, but a "reward for the virtue of his
grandchildren," for in one case a man's sins are paid
for by his descendants and in the other the
descendants' virtue affects the fate of the (still
living) grandsire.(2)

It is due to the doctrine of inheritance that we
find another suggestion made in Manu and the Great
Epic. The child's disposition, one would think, must
be his own, but when the subject of impure (mixed)
birth is discussed we get a very clear intimation
that the child inherits (from father or

-------------------------
1 This case is as follows: a bird revenges itself on
a prince who has killed its young by picking out
the prince's eyes, remarking that an instantaneous
punishment comes to evil-doers in the shape of
revenge, but that this revenge squares the
account. If unarengred at once, the evil fruit
will appear in a subsequent generation.
2 In the first passage cited above the sage receives
a good world as a gift,oift, or if ashamed to do
this may "buy it for a straw," but in xiii, 6, 30,
it is said, "Of old, Yayati, fallen to earth,
ascended to heaven again by virtue of his
descendants' good works" (punar aropitah svargaim
dauhitrtaih punyakarmabhih),

p.592

mother, or from both) his mental disposition,
bhava, just as, to use the epic's own simile, a tiger
shows in his (outer form the ancestral stripes.
Interchanging with bhava in the epic discussion is
sila, character, which is inherited. So Manu, x,
59-60, says that the parents' character, sila, is
inherited by the son. The epic has (Mbh. xiii, 48,
42):

pitryam va bhajate silam matrjam va, tatho
'bhayam, na katham cana samkirnah prakrtim svam
niyacchati,

(43) yathai 'va sadrso rupt matapitror hi jayate
vyaghras citrais, tatha yonim purusah svam niyacchati
: "A man shares his father's or his mother's
character, or that of both. One of impure birth can
never conceal his nature. As a tiger with his stripes
is born like in form to its mother, and father, so
(little) can a man conceal his orgin." It is clear
from the nanabhava, 'varied disposition,' which opens
the discussion, and from sila, 'character,' as used
in the cases here cited, that character as well as
outer appearance is here regarded as inherited. Not
only, then, may a man's sinful act be operative in
his bodily descendant without that descendant being
an earner of his own Karma, but the descendant's evil
disposition (the seed of the active Karma) may be the
result, not of his own prenatal disposition, but of
his bodily ancestors and their disposition. With this
admission there is nothing left for the Karma
doctrine to stand upon.

In conclusion, a refinement of the Karma theory
leads to the view that the fruit of an act will
appear at the corresponding period of life hereafter:
" What good or evil one does as a child, a youth, or
an old man, in that same stage (of life hereafter)
one receives the fruit thereof":

balo yuva ca vrddhas ca(1) yat karoti subhasubham
tasyam tasyam avasthayam tatpalam pratipadyate,

as given in Mbh, xii, 181, 15, which is repeated
in xii, 323,

p.593

14, with a change at the end, bhunkte janmani
janmani, " birth by birth one reaps the fruit." A
third version (xiii, 7, 4) combines these: " In
whatsoever stage of life one does good or evil, in
just that stage, birth by birth, one reaps the
fruit":

yasyam yasyam auasthayam yat karoti subhasubham
tasyam tasyam avasthayam bhunkte janmani.

That this is an after-thought is pretty certain.'
The earlier expositions know nothing of such a
restriction. accounts for a man's misfortunes as
being the fruit of acts committed at the same age in
a precedent existence. But it is difficult to
understand how it would cover the case of a child
born blind, which the Karma doctrine, untouched by
this refinement, easily explains as the penalty of
committd at any stage of a former life. Perhaps such
infant mlsfortunes led in part to the conservation of
the older theory of parental guilt, inherited and
reaped in misfortune by the offspring. The same query
arose else where--" Was it this man's sin or his
parents' that he was born blind? " (2)

----------------------
1 There are other forms of this stanza with slight
variations. It occurs several times in the
pseudo-epic besides the places here cited.
2 As a kind of modification may also be regarded the
quasi personification of Karma, as if it were a
shadowy person pursuing a man. In Brahmanism this
conception is common. In Buddhism an illustration
will be found in the introduction to the
Sarabhanga Jataka, No. 522, where the lurking Deed
waits long to catch a man, and finally, in his
last birth, "seizes its opportunity," okasam labhi
(or labhati), and deprives him of magical power.
On the barter of Karma as a price, in poetical
metaphor, see Professor Rhys Davids on the
Questions of Milinda, v, 6. Poetic fancy also
suggests that even a manufactured article may
suffer because of its demerit (Sak.,p.84).