Liang Shuming and Henri Bergson on intuition

·期刊原文

Liang Shuming and Henri Bergson on intuition: cultural context and the evolution of terms

by Yanming An

Philosophy East and West

Vol.47 No.3 Pp.337-362 1997.07

Copyright by Hawaii of University

From the end of the last century, as a sign both of the crisis of
Chinese culture and of its rescue, many Western works in philosophy
and the social sciences were translated into Chinese. As
intellectuals in China borrowed the new concepts and terminology
from these translations, they were eager to find answers to how it
was that China had become weak and how China could be helped to
regain its past glory. However, as Hans-Georg Gadamer points out, an
interpreter cannot avoid the involvement of his own tradition or
cultural prejudice when he deals with foreign ideas and concepts.(1)
As a result, there often exists an important difference between the
original European concept and its Chinese version. To identify this
kind of difference and analyze the reasons for it is a useful task
for cultural historians--useful because we can thereby find out some
of the inherited presuppositions of Chinese culture. One such
presupposition is the priority of ethics over epistemology. This
means prizing certain European epistemological concepts as sources
of ethical standards rather than as keys to reality. It means
prizing moral inclination rather than cause-effect deliberation. The
reverse is also true. Once we know these priorities, we have a
useful tool for explaining the development of a philosopher's
thought. We can look for evidence of the impact of priorities on his
attempts to assimilate new foreign doctrines.

This essay will approach this general issue through a comparison of
the concept of intuition in Henri Bergson (1859-1941) and its
Chinese counterpart, zhijue in Liang Shuming (1893-1988), a
prominent philosopher and social reformer in contemporary China. It
will answer three closely related questions. First, what does
"intuition" mean to both Bergson and Liang Shuming? Second, what
does the Chinese cultural heritage contribute to the formation of
Liang's zhijue? Third, what is the historical fate of zhijue in the
development of Liang's thought, or what is the relation between his
early term zhijue and his later term lixing (reason)? We will start
with the third problem.

The Appearance and Disappearance of Zhijue

A terminological study shows that the term zhijue exists neither in
the Confucian classics nor in the other literature of traditional
Chinese culture. As a matter of fact, it is a modern Chinese version
of the Western term "intuition." From the beginning, it has borne
the apparent imprint of Henri Bergson's Vitalism.

Bergson's concept of intuition, along with his two major books, An
Introduction to Metaphysics and Creative Evolution, were translated
into Chinese at the beginning of this century. Very soon they
received a warm response in Chinese intellectual circles. Around
1915, Liang became familiar with Bergson through the "Western
philosophy books" that he "borrowed from a friend, Zhang Shenfu."(2)
In a 1916 essay, he applied Bergson's idea to an exploration of some
Buddhist issues.(3) In 1921, Liang contributed another essay to a
magazine in which he not only employed the concept of zhijue but
also dealt with the relation between zhijue and lizhi (intellect) in
Weishi Buddhism and Bergson.(4)

Later in 1921, Liang lectured and published his major philosophical
book, Dongxi fang wenhua jiqi zhexue or Eastern and Western Cultures
and Their Philosophies.(5) Therein he systematically demonstrated
his concept of zhijue and clearly defined it as the opposite of
lizhi. He even insisted that these two concepts, respectively,
characterized Chinese and Western cultures and therefore might
account for the principal difference between them. However, at least
from the time of a lecture given by him in 1934, not only was zhijue
replaced by another concept, lixing, but the term itself virtually
disappeared.(6) This replacement seems to have been deliberate,
because zhijue hardly appears of in any of Liang's works after this
time.

Concerning this phenomenon, as well as the relation between zhijue
and its substitute lixing, there are two representative opinions
among students of Liang's thought. The first is offered by Professor
Guy S. Alitto:
Why did he [liang] abandon Vitalism and intuition (zhijue) for
lixing? His post-1949 Marxist critics have claimed that he had been forced to
because such goods had "gone out of fashion," or because such flagrantly
obscurantist thought had been decisively and permanently discredited in the 1923
Science and Philosophy of life debate. All have agreed that the actual
content of lixing was exactly the same as the intuition of his first book.(7)
A careful reading of the context of this passage may reveal that
Professor Alitto's view is fully consistent with the explanation of
Liang's "Marxist critics." However, it seems to me that the opinions
of these critics are themselves suspicious. The core of their
argument is that the fear of being viewed by his contemporaries as
"out of fashion" primarily accounts for Liang's abandoning of the
term zhijue. If this judgment is true, then Liang appears to have
been an academic opportunist, and what he hoped to gain was not the
truth but the praise of the masses. However, this does not seem to
fit Liang's personality and attitude toward life. For example, Liang
had earlier offered two ideas--on "the premature birth of Chinese
culture" and "there being no such thing as revolution in ancient
China"--that certainly were not in tune with Marxist theory in
China. After the Communist victory in 1949, these ideas not only
sounded very much "out of fashion," but also caused Liang to suffer
theoretical attacks and political persecution, including a fierce
critique from Mao Zedong himself. Nevertheless, we can still find
them in an essay by Liang in 1974.(8)

Another explanation comes from Dr. Zheng Dahua of the People's
Republic. In a 1993 book, where he compares the concepts of lizhi
and lixing, Dr. Zheng states that "As far as these features [of
lixing] are concerned, there is really some partial overlap
(xiangtong zhichu) between lixing and zhijue."(9) Now, to say that
there is a "partial overlap" is also to acknowledge that there is a
partial non-overlap. Compared to Professor Alitto's unquestioning
acceptance of the "Marxist criticism," Zheng's comment shows
important progress in understanding the relation between the two
concepts. Nevertheless, Zheng does not go far enough to identify
what this non-overlapping part is and to ask why Liang has abandoned
his concept of zhijue.

In my view, the disappearance of Liang's zhijue is not an
academically trivial problem. As we know from the history of
philosophy in both China and the West, a basic concept often
functions as an Archimedian point in a philosopher's system. The
elimination of such a concept may result from the philosopher's
profound doubt concerning either the accuracy of the concept or the
system as such. In some cases, it may signal either the onset of an
intellectual crisis or a remarkable development in the philosopher's
thought. I believe that Liang's substitution of lixing for zhijue
fits into this general rule.

The criticisms above leave me with two responsibilities. First, I
must find a reason different from Professor Alitto's to explain
Liang's abandoning of zhijue. Second, I have to go beyond Dr.
Zheng's work to explain the difference between zhijue and lixing. I
would start this two-fold task with an analysis of the foreign
origin of Liang's zhijue, namely Bergson's concept of intuition.
Bergson's Concept of Intuition
In looking closely at the various relevant passages in Bergson's
writings, we may find that there is an inconsistency in his
statements about intuition and its relation to the concepts of
"intellect" and "instinct." On the one hand, he seems to contend
that a sharp and irreconcilable antagonism obtains between intellect
and intuition. On the other, he insists that intellect and intuition
supplement each other, and that reality in its fullness is revealed
only by a combination of the two. As Gustavus W. Cunningham points
out, "the first view he [Bergson] constantly and explicitly
emphasizes; the second he seemingly unconsciously and implicitly
holds."(10) I will demonstrate these two views in what follows.
Intuition as Opposed to Intellect All science and all philosophy are
aimed at the attainment of a true understanding of reality. However,
there is first of all the question of what reality is. According to
Bergson, "This reality is mobility. Not things made, but things in
the making, not self-maintaining states, but only changing states,
exist.... All reality, therefore, is tendency, if we agree to mean
by tendency an incipient change of direction."(11) There are two
kinds of method for the investigation of this reality. The first
Bergson calls "intellect," or "intellectual method."(12) It is not
only a cultural inheritance passed down from Plato and Aristotle,
Galileo and Kepler, and Kant and the post-Kantians, but also a
method conforming to "the habit of our thought."(13) We tend to take
everything that is to be comprehended and force it into intellectual
molds, and shape every problem that presents itself to us according
to an intellectual construct. However, in Bergson's view, this
method is essentially wrong. First of all, what is identified by the
intellect as an object is not reality as such, but a substitution
that is constructed by the intellect itself.

From mobility itself our intellect turns aside, because it has
nothing to gain in dealing with it. If the intellect were meant for pure
theorizing, it would take its place within movement, for movement is reality
itself, and immobility is always only apparent or relative. But the intellect is
meant for something altogether different.... It always starts from
immobility, as if this were the ultimate reality: when it tries to form an idea of
movement, it does so by constructing movement out of immobilities put
together.(14)

This ultimate fallacy necessarily leads to many derivative mistakes.
Intellect has to depend on a "point of view" to approach an object,
and on "symbols" to translate mobility, so the result must vary with
the change of these points of view and symbols.(15) Intellect is a
photographic method and simply gives us snapshots, so it is unable
to provide us with "reality in all its sinuosities."(16) Intellect
can only represent an inner life "by concept, that is by abstract,
general, or simple ideas." This will definitely result in life
losing its "variety of qualities, continuity of progress, and unity
of direction."(17) In essence, what intellect aims at is not
"disinterested knowledge," but a certain "practical end."(18)
In contrast to intellect, according to Bergson, intuition or the
intuitive method comes from a "new philosophy"--namely his own,
although, historically, it "flashed" momentarily in the works of
Descartes, Leibniz, and especially Spinoza.(19) Bergson defines
intuition as "the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places
oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in
it and consequently inexpressible."(20) Due to the identity of
intuition with reality, intuition as a method is qualitatively
superior to intellect. In intuition, "what I experience will depend
neither on the point of view ..., since I am inside the object
itself, nor on the symbols . . ., since I have rejected all
translations in order to possess the original."(21) And I am
"capable of following reality in all its sinuosities and of adopting
the very movement of the inward life of things."(22) What intuition
can offer me is a "disinterested knowledge."

Based on this comparison, Bergson concludes that, in order to grasp
reality as such, "We must break with scientific habits which are
adapted to the fundamental requirements of thought, we must do
violence to the mind, go counter to the natural bent of
intellect."(23) It is obvious that, in this context, the concept of
intuition is treated by Bergson as a direct opposite of intellect.
The two are different not only in quantity but also in quality. In
other words, intuition is more valuable than intellect in both
epistemology and ontology.

Intuition that Integrates with Instinct and Intellect Bergson,
especially in his Creative Evolution, consciously or unconsciously
offers another model for the relation between intuition and
intellect. In contrast to the original one, first of all, it adds a
third major concept, "instinct."

Bergson defines instinct as "a natural ability to use an inborn
mechanism."(24) He further claims that this definition "determines
at least the ideal limit toward which the very numerous forms of
instinct are traveling."(25) Instinct is typically shown in the case
of animals. Its function can be clearly illustrated through an
example provided by Bergson himself. When a horsefly lays its eggs
on the leg or shoulders of a horse, it acts as if it knew that its
larvae have to develop in the horse's stomach and that the horse, in
licking itself, will move the larvae into its digestive tract.
Bergson believes that instinct closely associates with "life"
itself. It is an "innate knowledge of a thing,"(26) and "is molded
on the very form of life."(27) It is essentially a "vital
process."(28) And, "the instinctive knowledge . . . has its root in
the very unity of life, which is, to use the expression of an
ancient philosopher, a `whole sympathetic to itself'."(29)
Accordingly, it possesses a great advantage in dealing with "life"
in comparison with intellect or intelligence.(30) Bergson concludes:
Instinct finds the appropriate instrument at hand: this instrument,
which makes and repairs itself, which presents, like all the work of
nature, an infinite complexity of detail combined with a marvelous
simplicity of function, does at once, when required, what it is
called upon to do, without difficulty and with a perfection that is often
wonderful.(31)

However, instinct also has its remarkable disadvantage. First, it
"is necessarily specialized, being nothing but the utilization of a
specific instrument for a specific object."(32) Second, "it is
incapable of going so far in quest of its object; it does not
speculate."(33) The horsefly knows its prey, but it knows little
else instinctively. Further, it does not know that it knows; and its
unreflective knowledge is converted immediately into behavior.
Taking this disadvantage as a point of departure, Bergson, in a new
context, develops his concept of intuition: "By intuition I mean
instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of
reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely."(34) It
is obvious that intuition is something retaining the advantage of
instinct, while discarding its disadvantage. When talking about the
existence and function of intuition, Bergson often has in his mind
the image of an artist.
Our eye perceives the features of the living being, merely as
assembled, not as mutually organized. The intention of life, the simple
movement that uns through the lines, that binds them together and gives them
significance, escapes it. This intention is just what the artist tries to regain,
in placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy, in breaking
down, by an effort of intuition, the barrier, the space put between him and
his model.(35)

This illustration leads to a new model of the relation between
intuition and intellect. Now they come to be "two faculties" of
human consciousness,(36) in contrast to the animal's experience,
which is characterized by instinct. It is only the fact that
intuition and intellect serve different spheres of human knowledge
that distinguishes them.

Intelligence, by means of science, which is its work, will deliver
up to us more and more completely the secret of physical operations. . . .
But it is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us.(37)
Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the
work of consciousness: intuition goes in the direction of life, intellect
goes in the inverse direction, and thus finds itself naturally in accordance
with the movement of matter.(38)

Furthermore, according to Bergson, intuition and intellect are
complementary. On the one hand, "intuition may enable us to grasp
what it is that intelligence fails to give us, and indicate the
means of supplementing it."(39) On the other, although intuition
transcends intelligence, it gets from intelligence the push that
makes this possible. "Without intelligence, it would have remained
in the form of instinct, riveted to the special object of its
practical interest, and turned outward by it into movement or
locomotion."(40) In fact, these two faculties will help each other
to pursue their full development.

At this point, Bergson seems to be engaged in reconciling intuition
and intellect and, therefore, establishing an integral basis for the
great building of human knowledge as a whole. However, this effort
must presuppose a new theory of reality. Bergson already realizes
this important issue: "If consciousness has thus split up into
intuition and intelligence, it is because of the need it had to
apply itself to matter at the same time as it had to follow the
stream of life. The double form of consciousness is then due to the
double form of the real."(41)

This is not the place to discuss in detail whether or not Bergson's
theory is correct. As far as this essay is concerned, the most
important thing is to point out that both of Bergson's models refer
to the problem of the theory of knowledge. In other words, both,
although appearing in different forms, aim to answer the question of
why and how we could know reality. There is no room for ethical
evaluation in either model. Both models influence the formation of
Liang's opinion concerning the relation among lizhi, benneng
(instinct), fixing, and zhijue. However, as a Chinese thinker in the
traditional sense, he does not fail to open up an ethical dimension
for this concept-cluster. This fusion proves to be the main source
of his contribution as well as his confusion with regard to the
relevant issues.

The Influence of Weishi Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism
He Lin, a prominent philosopher in China today, gives a convincing
elucidation of Bergson's success among Chinese intellectuals in the
1920s: When reading Bergson's book, we can often smell some flavor of
Chinese philosophy. For example, his belittling of science and emphasizing
of philosophy, his praise of intuition, his discarding of symbols, and
his gating points of view, all remind us of the philosophy of Laozi
and Zhuangzi in the pre-Qin and Wei-Jin periods, and the philosophy of
Lu yuan and Wang Yangming in the Song-Ming period; and his entire
philosophy of change, which stresses duration and Creative Evolution, is also
likely to remind us of such sayings as "The movement of heaven is full of
power.

Thus the superior man makes himself strong and untiring"; "The
spirit is bound to no one place, nor the Book of Changes to any one form"; and
"Things cannot exhaust themselves; hence there follows, at the end,
the hexagram of Weiji [Before Completion]."(42)

According to this statement, the popularity of Bergson is mainly due
to the fact that Chinese intellectuals find in him something similar
to what their own tradition already provides. However, we should not
forget that there is another side to this same coin. The involvement
of tradition may result in an inaccurate understanding of the
subject with which the intellectuals are concerned. The existence of
both these sides is proved in the case of Liang Shuming. The
following is Liang's own description of his road to Bergson.
After a period [in which I was] engaged in the study of Buddhism, I
turned to Confucianism after 1920. At the beginning of this shift, it was
the Ming Confucian Mr. Wang Xinzhai (Wang Gen 1483-1541) who gave me the
greatest timulation and led me through the door (of the Confucian school).
What he praised most was ziran (spontaneity). This was the very point from
which 6 began my comprehension of the Confucian school. . . . Afterwards I
compared it with Western thought. I felt what most successfully developed its
own idea d particularly suited my taste was the Vitalist philosophy, mainly
represented by Bergson.(43)

This passage indicates that both Buddhism(44) and the
Neo-Confucianism of Wang Xinzhai stand as the background from which
Liang starts to approach the philosophy of Bergson. This section
will investigate the relevant ideas from the two schools.
Feiliang and Zhijue. According to Weishi, or Consciousness Only,
Buddhism, there are two faculties involved in the process of
cognition. The first is "xianliang" (sensation),(45) which enables
us, for example, to see the greenness and taste the bitterness in a
cup of green tea. What xian liang perceives is not an integrated
sense of "tea," but rather some individual sense datum like
greenness or bitterness.

The second faculty is "biliang" (intellect). Its objects are not
sense data, but synthetic and integrated senses such as the
awareness of tea with fragrance. Biliang enables us to fulfill the
task of conceptualization through both division and integration,
abstraction and generalization. Now a question arises: what is the
fragrance of tea? Where does it come from? According to Weishi
Buddhism, this could be answered by the existence of a psychological
activity named "feiliang." Liang believes that fragrance falls in
the category of significance (yiwei). According to his definition,
significance is "neither equivalent to static sense data, nor
identical to fixed concept. It is actually a lively inclination (huo
xingshi) [among a variety of sense data]."(46)
In Weishi Buddhism, significance is actually an illusive thing
shaped through the operation of feiliang. Liang says:
As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as subtlety in sound
itself.

There is no such thing as beauty in painting itself. There is no
such thing as tastiness in candy itself. All these
significances-subtlety,
beauty, and tastiness--are added to [the objects] by the zhijue of
human beings. Therefore zhijue just means feiliang.(47)
According to He Lin's interpretation, "In general, feiliang simply
means a capability that is unable to grasp reality."(48) For this
reason, Weishi Buddhism is always doubtful of the function of
feiliang. In the Weishi lexicon, feiliang is a "passive term, a
negative term."(49)

Liang revises the doctrine above in two points. First, in Weishi
Buddhism, the term feiliang does not designate "a particular
psychological faculty" as both xianliang and biliang do, but rather
a kind of psychological activity that vacillates between xianliang
and biliang. In contrast, Liang insists on treating feiliang as an
independent faculty, or independent "stage" in human cognition, and
decides to replace the term feiliang with zhijue in order to
highlight this important change.(50) Second, in Weishi Buddhism,
"significance" results from feiliang, and will primarily account for
the existence of fallacy and absurdity, which necessarily accompany
human knowledge. In contrast, Liang consciously or unconsciously
tends to regard significance as an objective thing. He even claims
that it is the unique object that feiliang/zhijue should seek.(51)
He writes, "Zhijue means a knowing toward significance. . . . What
zhijue comprehends is simply a significance, spirit, inclination, or
tendency."(52) Afterwards, these two points play a remarkable role
in Liang's understanding of Bergson. And they even become the
components of his own concept of zhijue.

The Antagonism of Intuition and Deliberation in the Chinese
Tradition. There is a long tradition in the Confucian school of
treating liangzhi (intuitive knowledge) and silu (deliberation) as
two alternative sources of social behavior. Using the terms of the
philosophers since the Song period, the former belongs to the
category of tianli (heavenly principle), whereas the latter belongs
to that of renyu (human desire). I will undertake a brief survey in
order to reveal the traditional Chinese background of Liang's
zhijue.

The term liangzhi first appears in the Mencius, who also hints at
the existence of its opposite, deliberation. Mencius writes:
What makes a man able to act without having to learn is his
liangneng (intuitive ability); what makes a man know without having to
deliberate (luj is his liangzhi. There are no young children who don't know to
love their parents, and none of them when they grow up will not know
to respect their elder brothers. Loving their parents is
benevolence; respecting one's elders is righteousness. What is left to be done is
simply the extension of these to the whole world.(53)
This statement has two key points. First, both liangzhi and
liangneng are not treated by Mencius as epistemological concepts,
but rather moral value ones. In other words, he does not employ them
to answer such questions as "How could a man know the external,
objective world? Why is it possible that man's knowledge corresponds
to the essence of the world?" but rather "What makes a human being a
human being? Why does there exist such a thing as human society?"
Second, Mencius' statement clearly differentiates two kinds of
attitudes toward other people and life as such. One directly comes
from the absolutely good mind, which is forged, first of all, in a
person's family life, while another comes through a deliberation
that always involves some particular practical interest. In the
Mencius, the former is definitely superior to the latter.
This distinction is developed into an antagonism by Cheng Hao
(1032-1085) of the Song period, who says, "Generally speaking, the
trouble with man is that he is selfish (zisi) and mentally
calculating (yongzhi). Being selfish, he cannot take action as a
spontaneous response, and being mentally calculating, he cannot take
intuition (mingjue) as his natural guide."(54) Here the selfishness
and calculation belong to the category of deliberation, while
spontaneous response and intuition are different names for liangzhi.
In Cheng Hao's view, the former is not only the opposite of the
latter, but also the source of trouble from which humanity suffers.
An example to illustrate this antagonism can be acquired through a
revision of Mencius' well-known parable of the child about to fall
into the well.(55) When seeing this event, a bystander may be moved
to save the child either by liangzhi or by a deliberation of the
consequence of his behavior: the response from the child's parents,
his own fellow villagers or friends, and so on. The former is
associated with the heavenly nature of a human being, and
necessarily leads to a good action, whereas the latter is associated
with one's reflection on one's practical interests and probably
leads either to the same action or to the opposite one. Herein lie
the seeds of social trouble.

Wang Yangming (1472-1529), the great leader of the Idealistic School
in Ming times, further stresses the antagonism between liangzhi and
deliberation. In regard to deliberation, he writes:
The five powerful despots drove out the barbarians and honored the
house of Zhou all because of their selfishness (sixin), and therefore they
didn't follow with principle (li). Some people say that they acted in
accordance with principle. This is because these people's mind (xin) is not
completely therefore they always admire the deeds of the powerful
despots. They ust pay attention to what looks good on the outside and completely
ignore its relation to the mind.(56)

According to this statement, the value of an activity is not decided
by an external achievement, but by the internal mind that causes
this achievement. The five powerful despots deserve no high praise,
because what propels their deeds is not principle/liangzhi, but
rather selfishness/ deliberation.

Wang Yangming defines liangzhi as follows:: gzhi is a nature conferred on us by Heaven, a spontaneous, ntelligent, d intuitive (mingjue) element in the substance of our mind. Any
ideas that arise are, without fail, automatically comprehended by this liangzhi
of our nd. If they be good, liangzhi in our mind automatically
comprehends this.

But if they be evil, this, too, liangzhi automatically
comprehends.(57)

Here liangzhi is not a faculty to "find the appropriate instrument
at hand"(58) and to satisfy the direct needs of life. It is a
"spontaneous, intelligent, and intuitive" criticism of the ideas
raised in mind, an intellectual agent to urge people to live a
virtuous life.

Next is Wang Yangming's student, Wang Gen (Wang Xinzhai), who leads
Liang Shuming into the Confucian school. Because of him, an element
of benneng is inserted into the original concept of liangzhi. He
writes, "The substance of heavenly nature itself is lively and
active. It is just (what makes) birds fly and fish jump."(59) The
same idea is more clearly expressed by Wang Bi (Wang Dongya), Wang
Gen's son and doctrinal transmitter. "In my opinion, both Shun's
dealing with his parents and Confucius' acting in accordance with
change (qudang)(60) originate from the subtle use (miaoyong) of
mind. This subtle use is the same one that propels people to eat as
they feel hungry, and to sleep as they feel sleepy."(61)
Both citations contain a serious conceptual confusion. The "heavenly
nature" and "subtle use of mind" are simply other names for liangzhi
in the sense of Wang Yangming, whereas what results in the flying of
a bird and the jumping of a fish and what makes people go to sleep
and eat need obviously to fit into the category of benneng In
comparing the former to the latter, Wang Gen and his son enlarge the
connotation of the concept liangzhi. It actually includes both
benneng and liangzhi in the original sense. In order to
differentiate one from the other, we had better follow Liang and
call Wang Gen's liangzhi "spontaneity."
Two points should be stressed again. First, in the Chinese tradition
from Mencius to Wang Gen, both liangzhi and its opposite,
deliberation, are always treated as ethical concepts. They refer to
human practical behavior, attitude toward life, or value choice.
Second, Wang Gen and his Taizhou school tend to put both benneng and
liangzhi into a single bag, "spontaneity." This distorts the
doctrine of Mencius and Wang Yangming. The following section will
prove that the first point leads to Liang's idea of zhijue as an
equivalent of liangzhi, while the second point partially accounts
for his introducing benneng into his concept of zhijue.
Liang's Concept of Zhijue In Eastern and Western Cultures, the concept of zhijue is employed
by Liang to feature Chinese culture as a whole. However, a scrutiny
of all the relevant passages there reveals the fact that he actually
uses it in three senses without always realizing or identifying the
change in meaning. They are zhijue as a method of knowledge, zhijue
as an equivalent of benneng, and zhijue as an equivalent of
liangzhi.

Zhijue as a Method of Knowledge. In Liang's view, Chinese
metaphysics is fundamentally different from either Western or Indian
metaphysics both in the problem on which it focuses and in the
method it applies to resolve this problem. With regard to the
problem itself, the ancient Chinese philosophers never bother
themselves to discuss such a "stagnant and static problem"(62) as
monism versus dualism or materialism versus idealism. In contrast,
according to Liang:

In the Chinese metaphysics transmitted from very ancient times,
there is a principal issue permeating all learning, no matter how great or
trivial, profound or shallow. This is a set of ideas referring to
that which changes, not the static. What they [Chinese philosophers] talk
about is simply abstract rules of change, not problems concerning
concrete things.(63)

In fact, concepts like yin and yang and qian (the creative) and kun
(the receptive) in Chinese philosophy, and the "metal," "wood,"
"water," "fire," and "soil" of Chinese medicine, do not refer to any
visible, physical things in either the human body or the universe.
Instead, simply, they symbolize certain kinds of "significance." For
instance, Liang warns that we should not equate the Chinese concept
of the five elements with the Indian concept of the four Greats:
earth, water, fire, and wind. "The former refers to abstract
significance, the latter to concrete substance."(64)

The particularity of this problem calls for a corresponding method
to deal with it. In contrast to their Western and Indian
counterparts, Chinese philosophers developed a method that Liang
calls zhijue. He asks:
What do we use to recognize that kind of significance or tendency?
It is zhijue. In order to know the significance or tendency, we have to
use zhijue to experience (tihui) and ruminate (wanwei). What are
called yin and yang and qian and kun cannot be grasped through sensation
(ganjue); also, they are not abstract concepts formed through the
operation of intellect (lizhi). Those are dynamic and harmonious
concepts, whereas the concepts that are formed through lizhi are
ones that are all definitive and fixed.(65)
Here zhijue is described by Liang as a method of knowledge distinct
from lizhi. The "significance" or "tendency" is its object, and the
dynamic or harmonious concept is its tool to accomplish the knowing.
Both Weishi Buddhism and Bergson's Vitalism help to form Liang's
zhijue as a method. From the former, he gets not only the idea of
"significance," but also feiliang/zhijue as a mode of cognition to
deal with it. From the latter. that is, from Bergson's first model,
he acquires the idea of the antagonism between intuition and
intellect-or, in Chinese, between zhijue and lizhi.

However, in contrast with Bergson, Liang does not claim superiority
for zhijue as a method over lizhi. In theory, there are two reasons
for this. First, Liang hesitates to treat "significance" or
"tendency" as equivalent to "reality" in Bergson's terminology, and
hesitates to equate a knowing about it to a comprehension of reality
as such. Second, Liang even doubts if Bergson's intuition could
truly attain the truth of reality. He emphasizes that "It is really
hard for us to accept what he [Bergson] says, because his method is
doubtful. Since zhijue is not something unselfish and de-subjective,
but something subjective and emotional, how could it get the
real?"(66)

In practice, Liang is worried about the consequences that have
already been seen in China of using zhijue as a method. In Eastern
and Western Cultures, Liang is wrestling painfully with the
questions of why it is that China, once a strong and wealthy
country, has became so backward in recent decades, and what it is in
Chinese culture that is primarily responsible for this depressing
situation. In concrete, and sometimes loquacious, language, he
compares the very different consequences of the Chinese zhijue and
the Western lizhi in the fields of machine technology, medicine,
astronomy, and public administration. In all these cases, zhijue is
inevitably painted as something stupid and laughable, and it is seen
as directly responsible for the disastrous turn of events in
China.(67) From these passages we make no mistake in concluding
that, according to Liang, the Chinese people must introduce lizhi
into their stream of knowledge if they still have any desire to save
their country.

Based on the analysis presented above, I believe, at this point,
that it can be said that Liang is unquestionably a severe critic of
zhijue, or more precisely, of zhijue as a method of acquiring
knowledge.(68)

Zhijue as an Equivalent of Benneng. There is no denying that Liang
in his many writings, including Eastern and Western Cultures,
praises zhijue as a virtue higher than lizhi. In fact, he seems to
be turning into an advocate of what he has previously attacked. This
contradiction comes mainly from a confusion over his use of the
term; that is, he applies the same term, zhijue, without further
explanation, to denote different objects.

In many instances, Liang tends to use zhijue as the equivalent of
benneng. This can be proved by the following observations. First,
zhijue and benneng often appear in his works as interchangeable:
A benneng, zhijue in pursuit of correctness and good can be found in
every person,(69)

Humaneness is simply benneng, qinggan (feeling), and zhijue.(70)
Second, he often uses zhijue to denote something that should have
been expressed by the term benneng: Things like the "universal love"
of Mohism and the mercy of Buddhism can be called "following the guidance of feeling" (renqing
suozhi)....

Even, as an unworthy person is bound to do, indulging in sensual
pleasure and refusing to turn back may also be viewed as "following
the guidance of zhijue."(71)
For the majority of philosophers in both China and the Western
world, what causes "indulging in sensual pleasure" should be called
benneng. In putting zhijue in place of benneng, Liang is actually
telling his readers that there is no substantial difference between
benneng and zhijue.

The conclusion that zhijue/benneng is still among the highest of
virtues, no matter what the consequences may be, must sound quite
absurd to mainstream Confucian philosophers. In my view, this
absurdity springs from two sources. The first is Liang's belief in
Wang Gen's concept of spontaneity. The second is Liang's
misunderstanding of Bergson's idea of the relation between intuition
and instinct. It is true that, in order to highlight the weakness of
intellect, Bergson emphasizes the similarity between instinct and
intuition, but he never in fact equates them.

Zhijue as an Equivalent of Liangzhi. Liang's zhijue has a third
meaning. He states that "today we should refer to Mencius' liangzhi
and liangneng as zhijue."(72) For the sake of clarity, I am going to
call zhijue "an equivalent of liangzhi." This definition implies
that Liang accepts the conception held by mainstream Confucianism,
even though he still keeps the Chinese version of Bergson's term,
intuition.

In contrast to benneng, liangzhi is not a biological concept, but a
social-moral-ethical one. It does not aim to satisfy the physical
needs of the individual person, but to maintain a harmonious social
network, or social organization. It is not a direct response to an
event in the external world, but an intuitive evaluation in the mind
of an individual who confronts an external event. In Liang's view, a
zhijue in the sense of liangzhi will bring about in people "a good
attitude toward life,"(73) namely an attitude to live in accord with
the principle of the universe.

As we have already demonstrated, Bergson's concept of intuition is
embodied in the artist, who is naturally and automatically able to
comprehend the substance of reality. In contrast, Liang's zhijue as
an equivalent of liangzhi is embodied in the Chinese sages,
primarily Confucius himself. According to Liang, Confucius takes it
as the most desirable kind of life to be in harmony with the rhythm
of the universe. The universe is a great flow, a constant process of
production and reproduction. Parallel to this universe, society is
also constantly undergoing change. It is simply an exercise in
dreaming to seek out some fixed rules that will ensure our correct
response to all challenges. In fact, the only valid course of action
is to follow the guidance of zhijue. Liang argues that "[The way
chosen through] zhijue is always right. We do not need to seek
correctness in the external world. The life of a human being is a
flowing and changeable integrity. One will naturally take for
oneself the most right, secure, and proper path."(74)
Liang believes that a dialogue from the Analects exemplifies
Confucius' opinion on zhijue. In the time of Confucius, the practice
of "being in mourning three years over the death of one's parents"
was respected by most people as an unchanging rule. But when one of
his disciples inquires about the necessity of following this rule,
instead of giving a definite answer, Confucius raises another
question. For the sake of the huge love one has received from one's
parents, doesn't one feel a natural impulse to mourn their death for
three years? If so, one should act immediately to satisfy this
feeling. If not, one might continue one's life as though nothing had
happened, no matter how intense may be the pressure from society,
relatives, and friends.

Here "natural impulse" is simply another term for zhijue. Confucius
certainly approves of the practice of "being in mourning three
years." However, this approval is not based on any fixed rules or
social customs, but rather on a people's "natural impulse"/zhijue.
Zhijue is constant and universal, because its existence and movement
always comply with the rhythm of the universe. Rules, on the other
hand, are partial and temporary, because they come into existence in
specific historical situations--and all rules will sooner or later
be out of date. In fact, we should read in this light the famous
saying in the Analects: "There are four things from which the Master
was entirely free. He had no forgone conclusions, no arbitrary
predeterminations, no obstinacy, and no egoism."(75) Liang insists
that this is a fundamental doctrine that Confucius left to his
disciples and to the Chinese nation as a whole. In opposition to
this attitude is lizhi. It painstakingly seeks out fixed rules in
order to resolve all the problems of everyday life. The
"deliberation" or "calculation" that prevails in Western culture is
lizhi in its extreme form.

Superficially, Liang not only accepts the Chinese version of
Bergson's intuition and intellect, but also continues Bergson's
claim that the two are mutually antagonistic. However, this is not
an antagonism in the sense in which Bergson would see it; rather, it
is the antagonism that has been rooted for generations in the works
of the Confucian philosophers. Liang's view is actually
representative of a continuity in the idea of antagonism between
liangzhi and deliberation in Chinese history. He compares these two
attitudes as follows: Lizhi can provide human beings with a tool for calculation, and
calculation categorically originates from selfish purpose. Therefore
lizhi often comes with an impulse to possess, although by itself it
is something unselfish, static, and [morally! neutral.... In contrast,
Confucius always follows the guidance of zhijue. Most important is
the sharpness and clarity of zhijue. The evils of humankind result from
a paralysis of zhijue, while all the virtues of humankind originate
simply from zhijue.(76)

Accordingly, Liang concludes that since the dominant principle in
Chinese culture is not lizhi but zhijue, Chinese culture is actually
not lower, but rather is higher than its Western counterpart. I
think that what Liang really wants to praise is simply zhijue in
this sense.

It is interesting to know Liang's own opinion on his three usages of
zhijue. On zhijue as a method of knowledge, as we have already
demonstrated, Liang held a negative view even in the first edition
of Eastern and Western Cultures (1921). With regard to zhijue as an
equivalent of benneng, Liang realized his confusion of zhijue with
benneng shortly after the publication of the book. In the Preface to
the third edition (November 1922), following the statement of his
old views concerning Mohism, Buddhism, and the unworthy person that
had appeared in the first edition, he announces, "Today I know that
all these sayings are wrong. The 'universal rove' of Mohism and the
indulging in sensual de sire of the unworthy person do not mean
'following the guidance of zhijue' at all."(77) Again, in Human Mind
and Human Life (1984), Liang admits that his Eastern and Western
Cultures conflated three kinds of benneng/zhijue, namely the "animal
benneng," the "social benneng," and the "human benneng," which is
equal to Mencius' liangzhi and liangneng. According to Liang, the
first benneng should not have been treated as something superior to
lizhi.(78)

In contrast to the fate of the first two usages, "human benneng," or
zhijue as an equivalent of liangzhi, remains in Liang's later works.
This thesis will be proved by a textual examination in what follows.

Liang claims that "liangzhi is simply identical to zijue
(self-consciousness)."(79) Then, elsewhere, he asks: "What are
self-consciousness and self-discipline? Loving good and hating evil,
while being aware [of this love and hatred] is called
self-consciousness, and taking self consciousness as the ground to
act only in accordance with what we really wish is called
self-discipline. What the term fixing emphasizes is only the
naturalness of the principle of self-consciousness and self
discipline."(80) From these two passages we have good reason to
conclude that fixing is his later substitution for zhijue as an
equivalent of liangzhi. This statement already suggests the answer
to why zhijue disappears from Liang's writing after Eastern and
Western Cultures. First of all, the term ap pears to be a
theoretical hodgepodge referring simultaneously to the three
qualitatively different objects. This confusion has eliminated the
validity of zhijue as a major philosophical concept. I believe that
this is the first reason for his discarding the concept of zhijue in
his later works.

More profoundly, this conflation suggests that Liang vacillated in
choosing his position in dealing with the relation between Chinese
and Western cultures. A half century later, he admitted that when
writing Eastern and Western Cultures, he was still in the midst of a
theoretical transition from Buddhism to Confucianism. He was not yet
an authentic Confucian.(81) This fluctuation between theories is
partly responsible for the different ways in which zhijue is used.
When he eventually converted to Confucianism, it became necessary to
find a new concept to express the unique meaning of zhijue as an
equivalent of liangzhi. That is the second reason why he substitutes
lixing for zhijue.

Liang's Concept of Lixing

The change from zhijue to lixing leads to a series of theoretical
consequences. This section will concentrate on two of them, namely a
t new social perspective and the relation between lixing and lizhi.
Lixing and Its Social Function. For Liang, the introduction of
fixing as a philosophical topic and his growing interest in the
social aspects of Confucianism meant following the same road.
Originally, Liang says, he was quite disgusted with the Confucian
doctrines both of "name and position" and of "rectification of
names." "I didn't recognize their real significance, although I knew
definitely that they had little to do with logic." Afterwards, he
realized that "social organization was the backbone of a culture,
and Chinese society is an ethics-based (lunli benwei) society. We
should approach its particularity from this perspective." Ultimately
he found that Confucius had already thoroughly explored the problem
of social organization. The emphasis on "name and position" and
"rectification of names" reflects Liang's great insight into both
the prominent position of fixing and the fundamental importance of
ethics in society.(82) Liang believes this is a significant point of
which the Chinese--and, in fact, all humanity--should take note:
I often say that if the Chinese have not lived in vain for several
thousand years, if the Chinese have made any contribution at all,
then it is because they first understood why a human is human. That is to
say, very early the Chinese ancients understood humanity.... And the
sum total of the spirit of the Chinese people is the bringing into
play of this lixing.(83)
Liang defines fixing as a "clear, bright, peaceful, and harmonious
mind" (qingming anhe zhixing).(84) According to Liang, lixing will
manifest itself in two ways. The first is "a mind that goes forward
or upward"(85)--a mind that refuses to surrender to mistakes, that
differentiates right from wrong, that appeals to fairness, and that
advocates justice. In brief, it is a mind that dislikes the "checks
and balances" of practical life, a mind that is devoted simply to
perfecting the person.

The second manifestation is "honesty in interpersonal
relations."(86) It starts with love among family members. People who
have this emotional attachment may expand their love of family to
include other people, birds and animals, and even grass and stones.
Through this all-encompassing love, human beings will realize the
enjoyment of life in a harmonious community, and even in a
harmonious universe.

Lixing becomes the cornerstone of Chinese ethical society for two
reasons. In the first place, fixing bestows a precious inner
discipline and ethical consciousness, and therefore is able
partially to fulfill the task of religion to unite the entire
nation. This is primarily due to the efforts of Confucius himself,
who always encourages people to examine themselves, to ponder
everything, dependent on their own minds, and to cultivate their own
capabilities of ifferentiation.... Confucius offers people no doctrine except the
idea of self-reflection. He teaches people to believe in nothing but their
own fixing. Since the establishment of the Confucian school, the Chinese
nation has been imbued with this teaching, and has willingly chosen a way
to bstitute religion with morality.(87)
Second, fixing is a moral imperative, "a force to motivate moral
action." It points out a definite direction for people's lives, and
demands of all the members of an ethical group that "you should do
so and so" unless you do not wish to see your group, including
yourself, continue to survive.(88)

One may ask, how can fixing constantly sustain the vitality it needs
to maintain social order? Or, to put it differently, how is it that
the Chinese people have tended to follow the guidance of fixing for
several thousand years? Liang's answer:
It is because there exists in Chinese society a (physical)
representative of fixing, namely the scholar/gentleman (shiren).
Traditional Chinese society was composed of four levels: scholars,
peasants, artisans, and merchants. I he scholars led all four
levels.

They made extremely important contributions to society, although
they did not undertake any physical work. They represented fixing in
their sustaining of education and [personal] cultivation and the
maintenance of social order and stability.(89)

Here, the triumph of fixing ultimately means universal control over
society by "scholars." Due to their efforts, fixing prevails
throughout the Chinese homeland, and the other social levels are
assigned their proper positions in the social organization.
The Relation between Lixing and Lizhi. Along with the introduction
of the concept of fixing, Liang develops a new model for the
relation between benneng, lizhi, and lixing. This model not only
dissolves the antagonism between lizhi and zhijue, but also allows a
reconsideration of the relation between Chinese and Western
cultures.

Now, in Liang's view, benneng is a kind of innate ability (or
tendency) that is passed to an individual through biological
inheritance. It can be neither eliminated from an individual's
experience nor acquired by the individual during his or her
lifetime. "Because the life of animals in particular depends on
benneng, so an animal's benneng should be taken as the typical form
of benneng."(90)

In contrast to benneng, both lizhi and fixing characterize human
life. They are the "two aspects" of the operation of thinking (xinsi
zuoyong) in human beings. Liang says, "The aspect of knowing is
called lizhi, while the aspect of feeling is called fixing. In
actuality, they are intimately and inseparably connected. For
example, in mathematics, the mind that does the calculating is
lizhi, while the mind that seeks accuracy is lixing."(91) It is
obvious that this relationship is strongly shadowed by Bergson's
second model of intuition and intellect. First, both Bergson and
Liang start their analysis from a statement of benneng and its
difference from intellect and intuition, or lizhi and fixing Second,
both invent a new term--"consciousness" in Bergson and the
"operation of thinking" in Liang--to designate the essential unity
of the respective original two concepts. Third, for both, intellect
and intuition, or lizhi and zhijue (as the equivalent of liangzhi)
are no longer antagonistic, but rather supplement each other in
building an ideal unity of human wisdom.

Moreover, since Liang often treats fixing and lizhi as respective
representatives of the two cultures, his new model is evidence of an
effort to combine the features of both cultures:
Should there appear in China a [new mode of] social
organization/group (tuanti), it must be something fused out of concrete facts from both
China and the west.... I his is an organization based on fixing. It not
only sufficiently ensures the development of the human spirit [fixing],
but also contains the advantages of Western culture [lizhi].(92)
At the same time, there are two fundamental differences between the
respective models of Bergson and Liang. In the first place,
Bergson's intuition is still an epistemological concept that
represents a method of knowing more advanced than intellect, whereas
Liang's fixing is an ethical-moral-social concept that highlights
features of human experience more profoundly than lizhi. Thus, the
goal of Bergson's unity is a perfect knowledge of reality, whereas
that of Liang's unity is the comprehensive development of human
experience as a whole.

In the second place, for Bergson, intellect refers to matter, while
intuition refers to life experience. The superiority of the latter
is explained by the difference between them. In contrast, Liang
compares the relation between fixing and lizhi to that of substance
(ti) and function (yong). By means of the well-known relation
between these two concepts in traditional Chinese philosophy, Liang
shows that the superiority of fixing to lizhi lies in another place:
What we call lizhi is a wonderful function of the human mind; what
we call fixing is a good virtue of the human mind. The latter is
substance, while the former is function. In order to know the human mind as
such, we have to differentiate one from the other, although they are
inseparable in essence.(93)

Here "substance" and "function" are understood as an agent and its
tools. Lizhi is free from connotations of good or bad, because it
can be applied by any people for any purpose. On the contrary,
lixing is categorically good, because it brings about only good
consequences. For example, weapons were effective tools in the
Sino-Japanese war. The Chinese army, with lixing, could apply them
in the cause of justice, whereas the Japanese army, without lixing,
could apply them in the cause of injustice. In the hands of the
Japanese army, the more advanced a weapon was, the more severe the
evil it could cause. As far as the prospects for a good future for
humankind are concerned, fixing is more important than lizhi.
Moreover, fixing will naturally and automatically lead to success in
any issue related to lizhi, or to finding the correct way to resolve
the problem of knowledge. On this, Liang states:
The ancient Eastern philosophers simply focus their doctrine on the
cultivation of personality and human life [lixing].... By refusing
to ncern themselves only with theoretical knowledge [lizhi], they lay
a strong foundation for that very theoretical knowledge. In contrast,
should you ignore the [moral] practice and practical problems, and be
engaged ust in the theoretical knowledge as such, you would fail in [the
effort to establish a correct! theoretical knowledge.(94)
In reality, this understanding is close to Zhang Zhidong's motto:
"Chinese learning for substance, and Western learning for function."
It is clear that, after a long and difficult journey, Liang
eventually arrives at a Confucian standpoint. He believes that he
has already found a way that is both idealistic and realistic for
dealing with the relation between the two cultures and that will
lead China out of its backward circumstances.

Conclusion

1. At least three philosophical schools are involved in the
formation of Liang's zhijue and its relation to lizhi, benneng, and
so forth. Bergson is mainly concerned with the theory of knowledge.
He contributes two models pertinent to the relation between
intuition and intellect. The first insists on the antagonism between
intuition and intellect, while the second seeks a complete
scientific system based on the unity of the two. They respectively
stimulate Liang to construct his own two models. Weishi Buddhism
studies the function of feiliang in the process of cognition and
points out the importance of "significance," although treating both
of them as something negative. Both feiliang and significance
permeate Liang's early concept of zhijue. Finally, mainstream
Confucians have established a tradition of the ethical antagonism
between liangzhi and deliberation. No less important, Wang Gen and
his Taizhou school replace liangzhi with spontaneity, a composit of
liangzhi and benneng. The tradition provides Liang with a core
element for zhijue as an equivalent of liangzhi and helps him to
remodel Bergson's epistemological antagonism as an ethical one. At
the same time, the revision of Wang Gen is partially responsible for
Liang's opinion of zhijue as an equivalent of benneng.
2. In Liang's early works, especially Eastern and Western Cultures,
the concept of zhijue has three meanings: it is a method of
knowledge, an equivalent of benneng, and an equivalent of liangzhi.
Liang criticizes the first of these from the beginning and later
discards the second, but never negates the content of the third. Due
to this alternation of meanings, zhijue hardly functions as a strict
philosophical concept. This may explain why it disappears from
Liang's later works. Along with the completion of his transition to
Confucianism, Liang retains only the content of zhijue as an
equivalent of liangzhi, and gives it a new name, fixing.
3. In his later period, Liang replaces the antagonism of zhijue and
lizhi with the unity of fixing and lizhi. In this new model, on the
one hand, fixing and lizhi are understood as two aspects of the
human "operation of thinking"; on the other hand, they are
respectively defined as substance and function. Liang does not fail
to stress the dominant position of fixing in the new relationship.
This proves once again that Confucianism is still a fundamental
element in Liang's later thought.

NOTES

I wish to express my profound gratitude to my teacher, Professor
Donald J. Munro, who helped me to revise this essay not once, not
twice, but five times. Without his generosity and encouragement, it
would not have been possible to present this essay at this time. My
thanks are also extended to the two anonymous readers whose
constructive criticisms and suggestions greatly improved the quality
of this essay.
(1) Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer
and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 357-361.
(2) Liang Shuming, Shuming sanshi qian wenlu (The writings of Liang
Shuming before the age of thirty) (Shanghai: Dongfang Wenku, 1924),
p. 18.
(3) Liang Shuming, "Juyuan juyi fun" (On tracing the origin and
solving the doubt), in Liang Shuming, Shuming sanshi qian wenlu, pp.
1-20.
(4) Liang Shuming, "Weishi jia yu Bogesen" (The Consciousness Only
School and Bergson), in Liang Shuming, Shuming sanshi qian wenlu,
pp. 97-102.
(5) Liang Shuming, Dongxi fang wenhua jiqi zhexue (Eastern and
Western Cultures and their Philosophies) (Shanghai: Shangwu
Yinshuguan, 1921); hereafter Eastern and Western Cultures.
(6) Liang Shuming, "Jingshen taolian yaozhi" (Essence of spiritual
cultivation), in Liang Shuming Xiansheng jiaoyu wenlu (Mr. Liang
Shuming's writings on education), ed. Tang Xianzhi (Zouping:
Xiangcun Shudian, 1935), pp. 67-95.
(7) Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confucian (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1986), p. 191.
(8) Liang Shuming, "Jintian women yinggai ruhe pingjia kongzi" (How
should we evaluate Confucius today), in Dongfang xueshu gaiguan (A
general survey on Oriental academic thought) (Chengdu: Bashu Shushe,
1986), pp. 72, 60.
(9) Zheng Dahua, Liang Shuming yu xiandai xinru jia (Liang Shuming
and contemporary Neo-Confucianism) (Taibei: Wenjin Chubanshe, 1993),
p. 77.
(10) Gustavus W. Cunningham, A Study in the Phi/osophy of Bergson
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1916), p. 41.
(11) Henri Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme
(New York and London: Knickerbocker Press, 1912), p. 65.
(12) Ibid., p. 66.
(13) Ibid., p. 73.
(14) Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (Lanham:
University Press of America, Inc., 1983), p. 155.
(15) Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 2-3.
(16) Ibid., p. 69.
(17) Ibid., p. 15.
(18) Ibid., p. 67.
(19) See Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 346.
(20) Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 7.
(21) Ibid., pp. 2-3.
(22) Ibid., p. 69.
(23) Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 30.
(24) Ibid., p. 139.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Ibid., p. 150.
(27) Ibid., p. 165.
(28) Ibid., p. 166.
(29) Ibid., p. 167.
(30) Especially in Creative Evolution, the concepts of intellect and
intelligence are actually interchangeable. See A. D. Lindsay, The
Philosophy of Bergson (Edinburgh: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1911), p.
216. Also see Arthur Mitchell's Introduction to the UPA Edition of
Creative Evolution, p. xxvi.
(31) Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 140.
(32) Ibid.
(33) Ibid., p. 151.
(34) Ibid., p. 176.
(35) Ibid., p. 177. See also Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics,
pp. 3-4.
(36) Ibid., p. 178.
(37) Ibid., p. 176.
(38) Ibid., p. 267.
(39) Ibid., p. 177.
(40) Ibid., p. 178.
(41) Ibid.
(42) He Lin, "Hengli Bogesen" (Henri Bergson), in Xiandai xifang
zhexue jiangyan ji (Collected lectures on contemporary Western
philosophy) (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1985), p. 21. The
wording of the three internal quotes is taken from The I Ching or
Book of Changes, trans. Richard Wilhem, rendered into English by
Cary F. Baynes, 3d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990), pp. 373, 296, 714.
(43) Liang Shuming, "Zhongxi xueshu zhi butong" (The difference
between Chinese and Western learning), in Zhaohua (Discussions in
the morning) (Changsha, 1941).
(44) As far as the influence upon Liang's understanding of Bergson
is concerned, the Buddhism here specifically means Weishi Buddhism.
(45) With regard to the subjective side of knowing, mainstream
Western philosophy and psychology believe that cognition is based on
a "sensual organ." It possesses a capacity of "sensation." The
function of this capacity is to perceive "sense data." These three
terms, respectively, refer to the different aspects of cognition and
therefore, in most cases, should not be confused. However, as with
many Chinese scholars of his time, Liang rarely takes pains to
distinguish them. In his work, "xianliang" sometimes has all three
meanings, sometime simply one or two of them.
(46) Liang Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures, p. 73.
(47) Ibid., p. 72.
(48) He Lin, "Songru de sixiang fangfa" (The method of thinking of
Song Confucians), in Zhexue yu zhexue shi lunwen ji (Collected
essays on philosophy and the history of philosophy) (Beijing:
Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1990), p. 177.
(49) Liang Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures, p. 73.
(50) See ibid., p. 72.
(51) He Lin indicates that, for Liang, "zhijue simply means a
capability to know significance" (Zhexue yu zhexue shi lunwen ji, p.
177).
(52) Ibid., p. 72.
(53) Mencius 7A.15. D. C. Lau's translation: "What a man is able to
do without having to learn it is what he can truly do; what he knows
without having to reflect on it is what he truly knows" (Mencius,
trans. with an introd. by D. C. Lau [London: Penguin Books, 1970],
p. 184). This version fails to identify both "liangneng" and
"liangzhi" as technical terms or philosophical concepts.
(54) Cheng Hao, "Da Hengqu Zhang Zihou Xiansheng shu" (A letter to
Mr. Zhang Zihou), in Ercheng ji (Collected works of the two Chengs)
(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981), p. 460. For an English translation,
see Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 2:524.
(55) Mencius 2A.7.
(56) Wang Yangming, Chuanxi lu (Taibei: Liming Wenhua Shiye Gongsi,
1986), p. 165. English translation modified from Wing-tsit Chan,
trans., Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian
Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 251-252.
(57) Wang Yangming: Daxue wen (Questions on the Great Learning)
(Taibei: Liming Wenhua Shiye Gongsi, 1986), p. 191. English
translation slightly modified from Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese
Philosophy, 2:603.
(58) Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 140. This citation refers to
Bergson's concept of instinct.
(59) Ibid., p. 714.
(60) I haven't got a clear knowledge of the textual allusion of the
expression "qudang" This translation is based on my understanding of
the content in the Analects 11.21.
(61) Huang Zongxi, Mingru xuean (The writing of Ming Confucians)
(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1985), p. 722.
(62) Liang Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures, p. 115.
(63) Ibid.
(64) Ibid., p. 116.
(65) Ibid.
(66) Ibid., p. 79.
(67) See ibid., pp. 25-32.
(68) He Lin writes, "On the one hand, he [Liang] tends to regard
zhijue as a method; on the other hand, he denounces it as a
suspicious and unreliable method for seeking truth" (He Lin, Zhexue
yu zhexue shi lunwen ji, p. 178). This statement strongly supports
my basic opinion on Liang's zhijue as a method.
(69) Liang Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures, p. 125.
(70) Ibid., p. 128.
(71) Ibid., p. 144.
(72) Ibid., p. 125.
(73) Ibid., p. 121.
(74) Ibid., p. 125.
(75) The Analects, trans. James Legge, bk. 9, chap. 5.
(76) Liang Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures, p. 127-128.
(77) Ibid., p. 3.
(78) Liang Shuming, Renxin yu rensheng (Human mind and human life)
(Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian Xianggang Fendian, 1985), p. 82.
(79) Ibid., p. 70 n. 15.
(80) Liang Shuming, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi (The essence of Chinese
culture), 1st ed. (1949). The quotation is from Liang Shuming
Xiansheng nianpu (A chronicle of Mr. Liang's life), comp. Li
Yuanting et al. (Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 1991), p.
188.
(81) See Liang Shuming, Renxin yu rensheng, pp. 78-79.
(82) Liang Shuming, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi (Hong Kong: Xianggang
Jicheng Tushu Gongsi 1963), p. 115.
(83) Liang Shuming, "Essence of Spiritual Cultivation." For an
English translation, see Professor Alitto in The Last Confucian, p.
186.
(84) Liang Shuming, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi, p. 134.
(85) Ibid., p. 135.
(86) Ibid.
(87) Ibid., p. 107.
(88) Liang Shuming, Xiangcun jianshe lilun (The theory of rural
reconstruction) (Chongqing: Xiangcun Shudian, 1939), p. 132.
(89) Ibid., p. 43.
(90) Liang Shuming, Renxin yu rensheng, p. 43.
(91) Liang Shuming, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi, p. 128.
(92) Liang Shuming, Xiangcun jianshe lilun, p. 175.
(93) Liang Shuming, Renxin yu rensheng, p. 108.
(94) Liang Shuming, Jinian Xiong Shili Xiansheng (In memory of Mr.
Xiong Shili) (Taibei: Mingwen Chubanshe, 1988), p. 61.
Yanming An Doctoral candidate in the Department of
Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Michigan