Hu Shih and Chinese Philosophy

·期刊原文

Hu Shih and Chinese Philosophy

By Wing-Tsit Chan

Philosophy East and West

V. 6 (1956) pp. 3-12

Copyright 1956 by University of Hawaii Press

Hawaii, USA

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Philosophically the first half of the twentieth century will be remembered in China as a period of three outstanding interwoven movements, namely, the introduction of Western philosophy, the downfall of Confucianism, and the reconstruction of Chinese traditional philosophy. In all cases, Hu Shih has played a leading role.

The introduction of Western philosophy into China dates back to 1896 when Yen Fu 嚴復 (1833-1921) translated Huxley's Evolution and Ethics. By 1920, the philosophies of Haeckel, Karl Marx, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Bergson, Eucken, Descartes, and James had been enthusiastically pursued. [1] All these have left irremovable imprints on Chinese thought, but the Pragmatism of James has exercised far greater influence than the rest, with the exception of Marxianism. And Pragmatism was introduced by Hu.

The reason Pragmatism was of such tremendous moment is twofold. First, it was the first concerted philosophical movement in twentieth-century China. While other philosophies were pursued as isolated though challenging academic subjects, Pragmatism was promoted as an active way of life. With Hu as the leader, a host of thinkers wrote and spoke in Pragmatic terms. Dewey, Hu's teacher, was invited to lecture in China in 1919 and 1920. His books and lectures became the vade mecum of Chinese intellectuals. The result was that the educated class in China had a clearer idea of Pragmatism than of other Western philosophies. What is more important is that the Chinese view of life at the time became predominantly Pragmatic.

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The second reason Pragmatism was most influential is because it was the guiding philosophy of the Intellectual Renaissance which Hu started in 1917. The literary revolution in which he and his fellow rebels freed Chinese thought from the bondage of the classical style and created a new literature of the spoken tongue is, as he put it, but the "practical application of evolution and Pragmatism." [2] Much of the spirit of the Intellectual Renaissance, such as the emphasis on problems instead of theories, the insistence on results, the treatment of ideas as instruments to cope with actual situations, the critical approach, the scientific method, etc., came from Pragmatism. It is well known, of course, that accomplishments of the Renaissance far exceeded a new literature. It opened up new realms of thought and introduced new methods of approach that led directly to ethical and social revolution in many respects.

Since the middle 1920s, Pragmatism as a system has been overshadowed by other Western philosophies. Pragmatists, including Hu, turned their attention to educational reform, social reconstruction, and political revolution. The philosophical arena was taken over by Neo-realism, Rationalistic and Idealistic Neo-Confucianism, and finally Marxianism. [3] But, in providing the philosophical basis and the motivating force for the Intellectual Renaissance, Pragmatism had served its purpose and had created an impact on Chinese thought that was to last for many years.

As to the downfall of Confucianism, Hu and Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀 (1872-1942) are usually regarded as the pair who dealt the fatal blow. Hu himself considers Ch'en and Wu Yu 吳虞 (1874-1949) as the most vigorous critics of Confucianism and says that they emphasized the idea that "the way of Confucianism is not suitable to modern life." [4] Certainly Wu was merciless in his attack on Confucianism. To him, the Confucian doctrine of filial piety was "a big factory for the manufacturing of obedient subjects," [5] and Confucian moral teachings were "man-eating mores." [6] But he did not have the following of Ch'en and Hu, who were dean and professor, respectively, of the intellectual nerve center of China at the time, namely, Peking University, and who were the twin leaders of the Intellectual Renaissance. Their articles in the most influential periodical of the time, La Jeunesse 新青年 were anxiously awaited by Chinese intellectuals, especially the young. Writ-

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ing in 1916, Ch'en declared that the Confucian distinction of the superior and the inferior, the noble and the lowly, etc., was "incompatible with the modern idea of equality," [7] and that "the Confucian doctrines of filial piety, obedience, and subordination of women, Confucian mores, and Confucian elaborate funerals are all unsuitable to the contemporary world." [8] Following Ch'en, Hu was no less uncompromising in his attack. His criticisms are best summed up in un essay he wrote on an anniversary of Confucius' birthday. He declared, "In the last two or three decades we have abolished three thousand years of the eunuch system, one thousand years of foot-binding, six hundred years of the eight-legged essay, four or five hundred years of male prostitution, and five thousand years of judicial torture. None of this revolution was aided by Confucianism." Likewise, none of the five great achievements in recent years, that is, the overthrow of the monarchy, the modernization of education, the transformation of the family system, the reform of social customs, and the experiment in political organization, he said, had anything to do with Confucianism. [9] Following the lead of Ch'en and Hu, Chinese professors and students alike shouted, "Destroy the old curiosity shop of Confucius." At the Sound of this call, Confucianism fell. [10]

As shown above, the promotion of Pragmatism and the destruction of Confucianism are both historically important. Of even greater importance is Hu's reconstruction of Chinese philosophy, for it inaugurated an entirely new phase in the study and understanding of Chinese philosophy. Briefly, his contributions in this respect may be stated as follows:

1. He was the first to give Chinese philosophy a clear outline. Previous histories of Chinese philosophy had been vague and confused accounts, including poetry, religious beliefs, and irrelevant legendary philosophy, forming an elaborate catalogue of names and quotations with neither coherence nor outline. Hu, for the first time, made a clear outline, eliminated non-historical and irrelevant material, and brought prominent schools, problems, and concepts into bold relief, thus giving Chinese philosophy a clear and well-defined picture. In this he set the pace and pattern that are still followed today. He achieved this in his celebrated Chung-kuo che-hsueh shih ta-kang 中國哲學史大綱 ("Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy"), [11]

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which is based on but more substantial and more important than his The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China. [12]

The Outline is limited to the ancient period. Students are disappointed that Hu has not carried his project through the entire history of Chinese philosophy. It is not true, however, that he has been unwilling to go beyond ancient Chinese thought. Although he has been making contributions to many fields of Sinology -- literature, drama, biography, the Classics, history, Buddhism -- he has continued to publish on Chinese philosophy, notably his Huai-nan Wang shu 淮南王書 ("A Book on Huai-nan Tzu" 淮南子 {d. 122 B.C.}), [13] Shen-hui ho-sheng i-chi 神會和尚遺集 ("Works by Monk Shen-hui," {d. 760}), [14] and Tai Tung-yuan ti che-hsueh 戴東原的哲學 ("Philosophy of Tai Tung-yuan" {1723-1777}), [15] and many articles on Chinese philosophy including Buddhism.

2. He started the movement of "doubting antiquities." The whole Outline is permeated with the spirit of doubt which led him to reject such legends as the origin of Chinese philosophy in the mythological emperor Fu-hsi 伏羲, to leave alone the whole period of the Western Chou (1111-770 B.C.), and to start his history of Chinese philosophy with Lao Tzu 老子 (6th or 4th century B.C.) and Confucius (551-479 B.C.). With this spirit, doubting Hu Shih looked upon Chinese history itself with skeptical eyes. In this way he started the "doubt antiquities" movement that eventually penetrated the whole new culture of modern China. His friend Ch'ien Hsuan-t'ung 錢玄同 (1887-1938) and his pupil Ku Chieh-kang 顧頡剛 turned this into a concerted movement which resulted in an almost complete rejection of traditional theories and beliefs on ancient Chinese history.

3. He established a standard and procedure for sifting sources. He was able to draw a clear outline of the history of Chinese philosophy because he applied Western critical and scientific procedures to the study of Chinese philosophical works. Having been trained both in Sinology in which textual criticism and the sifting of spurious works from the authentic have been a strong tradition since Han times (206 B.C.-200 A.D.) and in Western scientific method emphasizing evidence -- an exceedingly rare combination -- he was to cast aside unreliable works and theories and restore authentic

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systems to their rightful place. In his Outline he devoted twenty-four pages to the selection and examination of primary and secondary sources, and, as Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei 蔡元培 (1867-1940) pointed out, almost one-third of the Outline is concerned with historical and literary evidences. In these efforts, Ts'ai said, he "opened countless avenues for later scholars." [16]

4. He provided Chinese philosophy with a historical and social environment. Instead of studying Chinese philosophy in a vacuum, as had been done both in China and in the West, Hu insisted that "philosophy does not come out of a clear sky," [17] and sought the factors for its origin and development in its social and historical environment. [18] It is this historical and sociological approach that led him to characterize Lao Tzu as primarily a rebel. [19] As has been well said, "Hu Shih did not look for the origins of ancient philosophies in a Divine Spirit, but in the facts and phenomena of an objective society. This was truly a new attitude at the time." [20]

5. He established the centers of focus in the history of Chinese philosophy. It is significant that the three works mentioned above represent three important phases of Chinese philosophy, namely, the Huai-nan Wang shu representing the Ch'in-Han (221 B.C.-A.D. 220) period, the Shen-hui ho-sheng i-chi representing Chinese Buddhism, and the Tai Tung-yuan ti che-hsueh representing modern Chinese philosophy. He is the first to discover and determine the central position of Shen-hui in Chinese Ch'an (Meditation) Buddhism and Tai Tung-yuan in modern Chinese philosophy since Wang Yang-ming 王陽明 (1472-1529). Likewise, he placed the center of gravity of the ancient logical movement in the Neo-Mohists Hui Shih 惠施 (380-305 B.C.) and Kung-sun Lung 公孫龍 (c. 380-? B.C.) and the center of focus of Legalism first in four Legalists and finally in Han Fei Tzu 韓非子 (d. 233 B.C.). [21]

6. He discovered the methodology in Chinese philosophy. Contrary to the popular belief that Chinese philosophy lacks a methodology, he found that major Chinese philosophers developed their thought-systems according to certain definite methods. For example, the fundamental method of Confucius is his doctrine of conscientiousness and altruism (chung-shu 忠恕 ), which, Hu argues, is not only an ethical doctrine but a method of inference, for, while shu in a narrow sense means loving others as oneself, in a broader

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sense it means application of one thing to others by inference. [22] This, he said, is the "central thread" running through all Confucian doctrines. [23] To previous historians of Chinese philosophy, the "three standards" or "laws of reasoning" of Mo Tzu 墨子 (fl. 479-438 B.C.) was just an ordinary phrase. To Hu, however, it is the fundamental method in the philosophy of Mo Tzu. [24] He traced the entire development of modern Chinese philosophy from the eleventh century to the eighteenth through the changes in methodology. According to him, the rationalistic and speculative philosophy of the Neo-Confucianism of Cheng I 程頤 (1033-1107) and Chu Hsi 朱熹 (1130-1200) was determined by their narrow application of the inductive method to book study, and this method was "liberalized" or "liberated" by Idealistic Neo-Confucianism, especially that of Wang Yang-ming, who centered his philosophy on the freedom of the mind. This method was in turn "liberated" by the practical and critical schools of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which emphasized induction, evidence, and practical application. [25] In short, he found that Chinese philosophers not only had a methodology but even evolved their philosophies according to it. This was an entirely novel approach to Chinese philosophy. His interpretation of chung-shu as the chief method of Confucius does not have the support of Chinese scholars who still prefer to treat it as an ethical doctrine. His study of Mo Tzu almost exclusively from the standpoint of method is certainly going too far. [26] And his assertion that the most important aspect of The Great Learning and the Chung-yung (Doctrine of the Mean) is their method, is hardly convincing. [27] But by raising the question of methodology and determining its position in Chinese philosophy, he gave it a completely new complexion.

7. He approached Chinese philosophy from the standpoint of the logical method. To him, the basic problem of The Book of Changes is logical; the most important doctrine of Confucius is that of the "rectification of names"; Confucius was China's first logician; the fundamental problem of the "Yang Chu" 揚朱 chapter of the Lieh Tzu 列子 is one of names and actuality; and the logic of Chuang Tzu 莊子 (between 399 and 295 B.C.) comes from his philosophy of life. [28] Undeniably some of these cases are overstated, but the logical approach wipes out the old concept that Chinese philosophy

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consisted chiefly of ethical aphorisms. His reconstruction of Neo-Mohism and Sophism brings a logical system out of the corrupted and obscure texts and paradoxes that few previous writers could understand. [29] And he gave special significance to the problem of names in various ancient philosophies, especially in Hsun Tzu 荀子 (fl. 298-238 B.C. ). [30]

8. He removed the mysticism from the Taoists. To him, Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu were not mystics but realists who championed the cause of complete individual freedom. If he has gone too far in minimizing the mysticism, he has brought Taoism under new light and has completely revolutionized the traditional interpretation.

9. He gave ancient philosophical schools equality. As Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei said, for a thousand years Chinese historians subordinated other schools to the Confucian. In recent times, scholars have tended to overemphasize the non-Confucian schools. Hu, however, treated them on the basis of equality. [31]

10. He gave Chinese philosophy many new interpretations. We have already mentioned his new theories of Lao Tzu as a rebel. The Book of Changes as a logical treatise, Confucius as a logician, Neo-Mohism and Sophism as truly logical movements, the methodology of modern Chinese philosophy, and the central position of Shen-hui in Meditation Buddhism. We may add that he brought the religion of Mo Tzu to the foreground to the extent of considering him a founder of a religion, [32] proposed the theory of evolution in Chuang Tzu, [33] pointed out the fact that both Mencius and the Chung-yung stress the importance of the individual, [34] and called attention to Hsun Tzu's belief in progress. [35] With reference to Chinese Buddhism, as will be noted later, he looks upon the Chinese Meditation school as a revolt. To him, the Critical school of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was no ordinary school of textual criticism but a renaissance. [36] All these are epoch-making theories, and many could be added.

In connection with his new interpretations of specific concepts and systems, two should be briefly summarized here, chiefly because they have aroused considerable discussion. These are his theory of ju and his theory of the development of Ch'an 禪 (Zen, Buddhist Meditation) in China.

His well-known essay, "Shuo-ju" 說儒 ("On the Ju," 1934) has been

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translated into German; it should be rendered into English. [37] In this outstanding contribution to Chinese scholarship, Hu, on the basis of the classical definition that the word "ju" meant weakness, assembled much evidence to show that the Ju as a group were descendants of the Yin-Shang Dynasty (c. 1751-1112 B.C.), which was overthrown by the Chou in the twelfth century B.C. As members of a conquered race, they were suppressed, despised, and made slaves, and gradually acquired the characteristics of tenderness and meekness. However, they were rich in the knowledge of ancient culture and expert in the traditional ceremonial arts. They made their living by practicing these arts among the Chou people, wearing ancient garments and a mild facial expression. Because of their manners and low status, they were called Ju, "weaklings."

Confucius was originally one of these "weak" people, because he was a native of Lu, which was originally a part of Yin. But he transformed himself from a weak Ju to a strong Ju. For one thing, at his time there was a prophecy that a True King would arise every five hundred years, and, according to Mencius (371-289 B.C.?), Confucius was regarded as such a True King. This gave Confucius a strong sense of social responsibility and active leadership. Also, Confucius was a foresighted person who realized that the ancient Yin heritage had to be adapted to the new culture of the Chou. The result was that he became a Ju not of the weak but of the strong, and his school, which later came to be known as the Ju school, represented a new type of Ju, firm, active, and progressive. In this way Hu upset the traditional theory that Confucius was the founder of the Ju school. Instead, he conceived Confucius to be a reformer who revived an old tradition but injected new blood into it and changed the nature of the school entirely. [38]

This is not the place, nor is the writer competent, to discuss the strength or weakness of the theory. This problem involves historical and linguistic questions of great subtlety and tremendous magnitude. What is important to note is that the theory has started a long debate which still goes on today. Kuo Mo-jo 郭沫若 agrees that the Ju were descendants of a conquered people but argues that their weakness is not due to their degraded status as slaves but to the fact that as aristocrats they were not accustomed to productive work. Deposed, they were employed by the new rich to teach their children and in this way built their own occupation. As time went on, a leader emerged. He was Confucius. [39] Fung Yu-lan 馮友蘭 thinks that the Ju were

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not descendants of Yin-Shang but originally aristocrats in the Chou whose occupation was teaching ceremonies and musical rites. As the feudal structure declined, these aristocrats lost their positions and drifted among the common people. In order to make a living, they took up teaching and performed rites among the masses. With Confucius, the Ju entered upon a new stage. The arts were employed not merely for earning a living but also to bring about good government and world peace. [40] Like Chang T'ai-yen 章太炎 (1868-1936) before him, [41] Ch'ien Mu 錢穆 , perhaps the most outstanding Chinese Sinologist today, insists that the Ju were experts on the Six Arts of ceremonies, music, archery, charioteering, writing (or history), and mathematics. He went on to say, however, that they were at first employed by aristocrats but gradually became independent practitioners. Eventually, the knowledge that was for the benefit of aristocrats was spread by Confucius for the benefit of all. [42] Jao Tsung-i 饒宗頤 prefers to understand ju not in the sense of weakness but of tenderness. In other words, the occupation of the Ju was to protect the people and to bring them peace. Hence, they were teachers and experts on ceremony and music. [43]

None of these theories is really conclusive. What is of great interest to us is that Hu started this long debate. It can be taken for granted that the final word has not been said. Two thousand five hundred years after the birth of the Sage, the question of his real status and that of his followers is still with us.

As to Zen Buddhism in China, the controversy has been between Hu and the world-renowned Zen authority, D. T. Suzuki, in a recent issue of this journal. In his essay "Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism in China: Its History and Method," Hu presented a new history of the Ch'an movement in China which, he says, "I have reconstructed on the basis of authentic records hitherto neglected or distorted." [44] Supported by newly discovered documents and historical records, he concluded that Shen-hui, in 734, "swept aside all forms of sitting in meditation" and replaced it by "having no thought" and "seeing one's original nature." In this way Shen-hui pronounced a new Ch'an movement which renounces Ch'an itself and is therefore no Ch'an at all. [45]

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According to Hu, most of the so-called Ch'an schools in the eighth century emphasized knowledge instead of quiet-sitting, and the Ch'an masters from 700 to 1100 "taught and spoke in plain and unmistakable language and did not resort to enigmatic words, gestures, or acts." [46] The apparently absurd question-and-answer method and other techniques that were developed were not as illogical or irrational as they seem. They were only methods of "education by the hard way," by letting the individual find out things through his own effort. [47]

Suzuki agrees with Hu that Chinese Zen (Ch'an) had almost nothing to do with the Indian practice of dhyaana (quietude, meditation). But he insists that, instead of Shen-hui, it was Hui-neng 慧能 (638-713 A.D.) who brought on the revolution and that the revolution aimed at the identification of praj~naa and dhyaana. The Zen masters understood praj~naa not as rational knowledge but as intuition. In fact it was Shen-hui's overrational interpretation of praj~naa that led to the decline of his influence on the historical development of Chinese Zen. Later developments such as the question-and-answer method were not rational exercises of the mind but methods of praj~naa intuition. In short, according to Suzuki, Zen is not explainable by mere intellectual analysis. [48] Historical handling of Zen cannot go further than the objective relationship with other so-called historical factors. Zen is to be grasped within and "Hu Shih seems to neglect this." [49]

The difference between Hu and Suzuki is that between a historian and a religionist. So far as philosophy is concerned, Hu insists that he is not a philosopher but a historian. Not only in relation to his work on Zen but in all his work on Chinese philosophy it is as a historian that he has made the greatest contribution.

Notes

*. While Chinese and Western Scholars are honoring Dr. Hu's 65th birthday by publishing a presentation volume, it is deemed fitting that his contributions to Chinese philosophy be outlined and offered to the Western reader for the first time.

1. For an outline and bibliography of twentieth-century philosophy in China, see my An Outline and a Bibliography of Chinese Philosophy, rev. ed., (Hanover, N. H., 1955), pp. 42-44; for a graphic outline, see my Historical Charts of Chinese Philosophy, "Far Eastern, Publications," (New Haven: Yale University, 1955), chart 7; and for a brief account of Pragmatism, Materialism, Neo-realism, Vitalism, and New Idealism, see my essay, "Trends in Contemporary Philosophy," in Harley F. McNair, ed., China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946), pp. 314-320; O. Briere, Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy, 1898-1950, Laurence G. Thompson, trans. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956), pp. 19-26, 66-85.

2. See Hu Shih's chapter in Albert Einstein, et al, Living Philosophies (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1931), especially pp. 255, 259, 261-262.

3. For a summary and discussion of Rationalistic and Idealistic Neo-Confucianism, see my Religious Trends in Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), pp. 30-53.

4. Wu Yu, Wu Yu wen-lu 吳虞文錄 ("Essays by Wu Yu") (Shanghai: Ya-tung Bookstore, 1921), p. 3.

5. Ibid., p. 15.

6. Ibid., p, 71.

7. La Jeunesse, II, No. 3 (November, 1916), 5.

8. Ibid., II, No. 4 (December, 1916), 4-5.

9. Hu Shih, Hu Shih lun-hsueh chin-chu 胡適論學近著 ("Recent Sinological Treatises by Hu Shih"), 1st series (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935), pp. 508-510, 519-523.

10. For a story of the attempt to establish Confucianism as a state cult, then the downfall, and finally the revival of Confucian philosophy in the twentieth century, see my Religious Trends in Modern China, Chap. I.

11. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1919, Vol. I. Pp. 398 + 10. Only Volume I has been published. Hereafter referred to as Outline.

12. Shanghai: The Oriental Book Co., 1928. Pp. 87. Originally written in 1917, this English work formed the basis of the Chinese Outline. However, in the Outline many chapter have been revised and expanded and new ones added. Its chapter headings are: Historical Background, Lao Tzu, Confucius, Confucius' Pupils, Mo Tzu, Yang Chu, Mohists, Chuang Tzu, Confucianists before Hsun Tzu (The Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, and Mencius), Hsun Tzu, The Termination of Ancient Philosophy (including the Legalists). Much more research material and many new ideas are found in the Outline but not in Logical Method.

13. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1931. Pp. 136.

14. Shanghai: Ya-tung Bookstore, 1930. Pp. 220.

15. Shanghai; Commercial Press, 1932. Pp. 197 + 157.

16. Outline, p. ii.

17. Ibid., pp. 35, 53.

18. See especially Outline, pp. 35-46, 67-68, 71-77; Logical Method, pp. 1-13.

19. Outline, pp. 50-68; Logical Method, pp. 13-16.

20. Wang, Sen-jan 王森然, Chin-tai erh-shih chia p'ing-ch'uan 近代二十家評傳 ("Critical Biographies of Twenty Scholars of the Recent Period") (Peking: Tung-hua Bookstore, 1934), p. 358.

21. Outline, pp. 184-253, 364-379; Logical Method, pp. 83-130. Dates of many philosophers used in this essay differ from those proposed by Hu.

22. Outline, pp. 107-109.

23. Ibid., p. 107.

24. Outline, p. 162; Logical Method, p. 72.

25. Hu Shih wen-ts'un 胡適文存 ("Hu Shih's Works") (Shanghai: Ya-tung Bookstore, 1921), 1st series. Vol. II, pp. 54l-556.

26. Outline, pp. 152-165; Logical Method, pp. 63-82.

27. Outline, p. 281.

28. Outline, pp. 78, 104, 177, 266-274; Logical Method, pp. 28-52, 140-148.

29. Outline, pp. 184-253; Logical Method, pp. 83-130.

30. Outline, pp. 59-61, 92-105, 177-178, 266-272, 328-339, 351-353, 373-375; Logical Method, pp. 46-52,141-144, 159-169.

31. Outline, pp. ii-iii.

32. Outline, pp. 150, 166-175; Logical Method, p. 57.

33. Outline, pp. 255-265; Logical Method, 134-139.

34. Outline, pp. 283, 296.

35. Logical Method, 150-158.

36. Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 45.

37. The essay is found in Hu Shih lun-hsueh chin-chu (op. cit.), pp. 3-81. German translation by von Wolfgang Franke, "Der Ursprung der Ju und ihre Beziehung zu Konfuzius and Laudsi," Sinica Sonderausgabe, 1935, 141-171; 1936, 1-42.

38. Hu Shih lun-hsueh chin-chu, pp. 9-10, 16-17, 19-22, 26-27, 33, 37, 42, 52, 66, 76, 80.

39. Kuo Mo-jo, Ch'ing-t'ung shih-tai 青銅時代 ("The Bronze Age") (Shanghai: Hsin-wen-i Publishing Co., 1951), pp. 158-162.

40. Fung Yu-lan, Chung-kuo che-hseuh shih pu 中國哲學史補 ("Supplement to A History of Chinese Philosophy") (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), pp. 28, 30, 59.

41. Chang T'ai-yen, "Yuan Ju" 原儒 ("An Inquiry on the Ju"), in his Kuo-ku lun-heng 國故論衡 ("Balanced Inquiries on Sinology"), Pt. 3.

42. Ch'en Mu, Hsien-Ch'en chu-tzu hsi-nien 先秦諸子繫年 ("Interlinking Chronology of Ancient Chinese Philosophers") (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935), pp. 85-86; 92; Kuo-shih ta-kang 國史大綱 ("Outline of Chinese History"), Vol. I (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1940), pp. 65-68; "Po Hu Shih chih Shuo Ju" 駁胡適之說儒 ("Refutation of Hu Shih's On the Ju"), Journal of Oriental Studies, I (Hong Kong, 1954), 124, 127.

43. Jao Tsung-i, "Shih Ju" 釋儒 ("Ju Explained"), ibid., p. 120.

44. Philosophy East and West, III, No. 1 (April, 1953), 4.

45. Ibid., pp. 7, 17.

46. Ibid., p. 20.

47. Ibid., p. 21.

48. "Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih," ibid., p. 31.

49. Ibid.