Buddhist Doctrines of Momentariness and Subjective Idealism

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Discussion of the Buddhist Doctrines of Momentariness and Subjective Idealism in the Nyaya-sutras

BY Jwala Prasad

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society

1930, pp.31-39

p. 31

There is a difference of opinion among scholars
as regards the exact significance of such
Nyaya-sutras as are supposed to refer to the
doctrines of the Madhyamika and the Yogacara schools
of Buddhism. It has also been suggested that probably
some of these sutras have been interpolated later on,
possibly by Vatsyayana--the author of the
Nyaya-bhasya. After making a careful study of the
sutras in question, however, I have come to the
conclusion that some of them, in any case, do not
refer to the Buddhist doctrines at all, and form a
natural and quite an integral part of the particular
sections in which they occur, and that the theory
which regards them as later interpolations is not
justifiable.

First I propose to consider one such section of
the Nyayasutras, viz. iii, 2, 10, to iii, 2, 18,
which, according to all the commentators beginning
with Vatsyayana, is supposed to contain a refutation
of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness
(ksanika-vada). According to Vidyabhusana these
sutras refer to the doctrine of momentariness, as
found in the Lankavatara-sutra, chap. vi; and he also
holds that Sutra, iii, 2, 10, which forms the main
basis for holding this view, has probably been
interpolated by Vatsyayana.(1)

Now improbable as it might appear that none of
the many distinguished commentators should have been
able to see the points which I am going to raise
against this time-honoured view, I cannot help
thinking that this particular section does not refer
to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness at all, and
that the commentators have simply been carried away
by the notions suggested by the term "ksanikatvad" in
Sutra, iii, 2, 10. Some of the modern

1. Vidyabhugana, History of Indian Logic, pp. 120, 121.
Sutra,a, iii, 2, 10,. being Sphatike 'py aparaparo-
tpatteh ksanikatvad vyaktinnam ahetuh.

p. 32

scholars have noticed the abruptness and
superfluousness of introducing such a topic in the
middle of an altogether different discussion, and
have, hence, suggested the theory of interpolation. I
shall try presently, however, to show that the
Sutras, iii, 2, 1, to iii, 2, 17, form one whole
section dealing with the transitory nature of
cognition (buddhi), and that the discussion contained
in it refers only to the Samkhya view, according to
which the buddhi is a permanent and abiding faculty.
That these sutras were once looked upon as forming
one section and as referring to the topic of the
non-permanence of buddhi will appear from the
concluding section of the Nyaya-bhasya on Sutra, iii,
2, 17-iti upapannam anitya buddhir iti "thus it is
proved that buddhi is non-eternal". Vardhamana had
noticed this point about the Bhasya, but he himself
regarded these sutras as forming an altogether
different section. He says: "Some people have held
that this is only a part, and continuation, of the
fore-going section, and should not be treated as a
separate section; specially because the Bhasya, at
the end of the present section, concludes with the
words: 'Thus it is proved that buddhi is
non-eternal,' from which it is clear that the Bhasya
takes the whole as one section dealing with the
non-eternality of buddhi. But the fact of the matter
is that the subject- matter of the present section is
totally different..."(1) The Tatparya and the
Parisuddhi simply explain away this introduction of a
discussion of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness
into this section. As has already been pointed out,
the chief ground for holding that this section refers
to the Buddhist doctrine of ksanika-vada is to be
found in the language of Sutra, iii, 2, l0--sphatike
'py aparaparotpatteh ksanikatvad vyaktinam ahetuh.
Now this sutra should normally be regarded as an
answer (uttara-paksa) to one of the preceding sutras,
which represent the opponent's view (purva-paksa)
from the point of view of the Samkhya, viz.
sphatikanyatva- bhimanavat tadanyatvabhimanah "there
is a false notion

1. Indian Thought, x, p. 313.

p. 33

of its being different, like that with regard to the
difference pertaining to a rock-crystal"; that is to
say, the Samkhya opponent says that buddhi, though
really one, appears to be diverse, just like a
rock-crystal, which also appears to be different
because of the reflections of the different colours
upon it. It will appear that the Nyaya-suci-nibandha
and the commentators regard this sutra as the end of
the section dealing with the non-eternality of buddhi
"iti navabhih sutrair buddhy-anityata-prakaranam";
and, according to them, an altogether new section
begins with the Sutra sphatike ''py, etc., which,
according to all the commentators, contains an
objection to the doctrine of permanence of things
from the point of view of the Buddhist, who holds the
doctrine of momentariness. The sutra has been
translated thus: "In the rock-crystal also, one
(rock-crystal) being produced after another, since
all the individual things are momentary, there is to
be found no reason." The following seven sutras are
then supposed to contain a discussion of the doctrine
of momentariness between the Buddhist and the Nyaya
philosopher. Now I cannot help thinking that this
view is the most absurd to hold, and it is so for the
following reasons:--

1. It is very unusual and unnatural that at the end
of a discussion the author of the Nyaya-sutras
should stop with a sutra representing the
opponent's view (purva-paksa) and not finish with
an answer establishing his own view (uttara-paksa).

2. It would be curious that the author of the Nyaya-
sutras, while trying to establish the non-
eternality of buddhi as against the Samkhya
philosopher, should leave him and the subject under
discussion alone, and abruptly usher in a Buddhist,
apparently against the Samkhya first, make him say
something which is distinctly against the Nyaya
view, and then begin to measure swords with him.

3. The Sutras, iii, 2, 10 to iii, 2, 18 are evidently
a discussion of the Samkhya view of cause and
effect rather than of the

p. 34

Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. This is clear
from the example of the production of curd out of
milk, and from the fact that as the Sutra "na payasah
parinamah gunantara-pradur-bhavad" could not be
explained in terms of a discussion between a Nyaya
philosopher and the Buddhist, the Bhasya introduces
it with the observation: atra kascit pariharam aha
"here someone has offered the following refutation";
and the Vrtti actually says: saugatamate
samkhyadusanam upanyasati "the author points out a
defect in the Buddhist doctrine from the point of
view of the Samkhya". A study of the sutras in
question will easily show that the sutra is not an
answer to the Buddhist view, which is, in fact, to be
found in none of the sutras in this section, but to
the Nyaya view that the effect is different from the
cause; for it is said in this sutra that milk, while
it becomes curd, is only transformed by the
appearance of different qualities. Further, would it
not be a curious procedure again that the Nyaya
philosopher should introduce a Samkhya, with a view
different from his own, to meet his opponent, who,
this time, is the Buddhist?

The fact is that a hopeless confusion has been
created by the assumption that the Sutra sphatike py,
etc., has reference to the Buddhist doctrine of
momentariness,(l) simply because

1. For considerations of space it is impossible to
consider here every sutra in this section, but the
main arguments given above should be sufficient to
show that the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness
is not the theme of these sutras. It is evident
that it is the term ksanikatvad in the sutra which
has suggested the presence of this doctrine here;
but it is to be noted that ksanika and its
derivatives are quite normally used to denote
simply "momentary" as apart from the technical
sense of the term as found in the Buddhist
metaphysics. A very happy example of the use of
the word, and that, too, in order to express the
momentary nature of cognition (buddhi), which
forms the subject of discussion in the present
context also, is to be found in the Sabara-bhasya
under Mimamsa-sutra, i, 1, 5, where it is said:
arthavisaya hi pratyaksa-buddhih, buddhy-antara-
visaya; ksanika hi sa, na buddhy-antara-kalam-
avasthasyate. Another text of the Sloka-varttika
under Mimamsa-sutra, i, 1, 4, and the Kasika on
the same provide another example of the use of
this term in the same kind of context.
Speaking about buddhi, the Varttica says: na hi sa
ksanam-apy-aste jayate va pramatmakam(i, iv, 54);
and the Kasika explains: kintu nendriyadivaj
jata sati buddhih ksanamatram apy aste, etc.

p. 35

it happens to contain the term ksanikatvad. I shall
presently offer my own explanation of the sutra, and
show that the Sutras, iii, 2, 1, to iii, 2, 17, form
one continuous section dealing with the
non-eternality of buddhi, as against the Samkhya view
that it is eternal.

After the Samkhya explanation of the
non-simultaneity of cognitions and the
non-recognition of an object, as given in the Sutras,
iii, 2, 6, and 7, has been refuted by the Nyaya
philosopher by means of the assertion contained in
the Sutra, iii, 2, 8, na gatyabhavat, that the
explanation given by the Samkhya cannot be true
because, according to them, there is no motion in
buddhi, the follower of the Samkhya says in Sutra,
iii, 2, 9 that there is only a semblance of
difference (and therefore of diversity) in cognitions
like that to be found in the case of a rock-crystal
(which, although one, appears to be different
according to the reflections on it). After this, I
hold that the assertion hetv-abhavad, which has been
regarded as a Nyaya-sutra by some, and as only a part
of the Bhasya by others, is really a Nyaya-sutra
forming the uttara-paksa along with the next three
sutras, viz. sphatike ''py, etc. In the Sutra, na
hetv- abhavad, it is said that there is no proof that
buddhi is like a rock-crystal (it is simply an
illustration which you give), and in the next sutra
then, sphatike 'py aparaparotpatteh ksanikatvad
uyaktinam ahetuh, it is further maintained that even
the case of a crystal is not in point, since, in it
also, because the reflections are produced one after
another, the individual reflections are momentary,
the main object being to emphasize the fact that the
diversity of reflections in a crystal is not a case
of semblance, but of real production by the objects
reflected into it. The term "api" in sphatike 'py is
very significant, and is indicative of the fact that
this sutra is a development of an argument begun in a
previous sutra, and this we actually find in the
Sutra, na hetv-abhavad. The next two sutras also
represent the uttara-paksa: In the Sutra,
niyamahetv-abhavad yatha-darsanam abhyanujna it is

p. 36

said that as there is no reason to support a
universal rule (with regard to the permanence or
transitoriness of objects), we can admit (the truth
or falsity of this character about things) only in
accordance with our experience; since, according to
the Nyaya-sutras, neither are all the objects
necessarily permanent, nor are they necessarily
transitory.(1) But, it is pointed out in the next
Sutta, notypatti-vinasa- karaopalabdheh, that in this
particular case, it is not right to say that buddhi
is permanent, because the causes of the production
and destruction of cognitions can be perceived.(2)
This leads to a discussion of the nature of
production by means of the example of curd and milk,
which discussion also is evidently one between a
follower of the Samkhya and a Nyaya philosopher.

It is rather strange that Vidyabhusana should see
in the Sutra sphatike 'py, etc., an echo of the
doctrine of momentariness as found in the
Lankavatara-sutra, chap. vi,(3) when, evidently, the
doctrine as defined in this work shows a distinct
divergence from the view about the production of
individuals contained in the Nyaya-sutra in question.
According to Vidyabhusana's own quotation and its
translation,(4) the author of the Lankavatara-sutra
says, "A momentary thing is that which is inactive,
distinct in itself, and not liable to cessation. By
calling things momentary I mean that they are not
produced; I do not, O fools! say that they are
destroyed after being produced."(5) This statement
clearly shows that the doctrine of momentariness, as
explained here, simply means change, and not
production and destruction of things every moment;
while in the

1. Cf. Nyaya-sutra, iv, 1, 28.
2. Cf. Ns., iii, 2, 24: "Inasmuch as cognition is
recognized as non-as eternal, its destruction
proceeds from another cognition, just like sound."
3. History of Indian Logic, p.121.p. 121.
4. History of Indian Logic, p. 246.
Nirvyaparam ksanikam viviktam ksayavarjitam,
Anutpattim ca dharmanam ksanikartham vadamy-aham,
Utpattyanantaram bhangam na vai desemi balisah.

p. 37

Nyaya-sutra under consideration there is a distinct
mention of the production of individuals one after
another--apara- parotpatteh. It will appear that the
doctrine that all things are non-eternal, since they
have the character of being produced and destroyed,
is considered by the author of the Nyaya-sutras in
another section beginning with the Sutra, iv, 1, 25,
sarvam anityam utpatti-vinasa-dharmakatvat, and that
various doctrines relating to eternality,
non-eternality and change are dealt with in the
Fourth Book of the Nyaya- sutras. Hence the doctrine
of momentariness, instead of being introduced in Book
III, 2, in the middle of a discussion irrelevant to
the subject from the Nyaya point of view, could have
been easily introduced in the Fourth Book; and, in
fact, the doctrine of non-eternality as found in that
Book is not very different from the doctrine of
momentariness. Further, it must be remembered that it
is the complete destruction and the fresh production
of all individual things which the author of the
Nyaya-sutras objects to. He does admit non-eternality
in the case of some kinds of existence, for example,
in the case of cognitions themselves.

The other section of the Nyaya-sutras which I
propose to consider here is that which consists of
Sutra, iv, 2, 26, and the following sutras. According
to some, it refers to the Buddhist doctrine of
subjective idealism (vijnana-vada), while according
to others, it contains a discussion of the philosophy
of the Madhyamika School (Sunya-vada). Vidyabhusana
holds that Sutra, iv, 2, 26, and the next are later
interpolations, and refer to the doctrine of
vijnana-vada as found in the Lankavatara-sutra,
chaps. ii and xi.(l) The view that these sutras refer
to the vijnana-vada has been questioned and refuted
by Jacobi as against Stcherbatsky, who held this view
on the authority of Vacaspati Misra.(2) Sutra, iv, 2,
26, which is the most important in this section, is:
buddhya vivecanat tu bhavanam yathatmyanupalabdhis
tantvapakarsane

1. History of Indian Logic, p. 120.
2. Journal of the American Oriental Society, xxxi (1911).

p. 38

patasadbhavanupalabdhivat tadanupalabdhih, and an
examination of the language of the sutra will show
that it certainly does not refer to the doctrine that
things cannot be conceived to exist apart from the
ideas of them. I shall also presently show that the
sutra does not refer to the doctrine of Sunya-vada
either, as Jacobi holds. A faithful translation of
the sutra will indicate what it actually means. It
may be rendered thus: "And by means of an analysis by
intellect (buddhya vivecanat tu), the true nature of
existent things is not cognized (bhavanam
yathatmyanupalabdhih); they cannot be cognized, just
as the existence of cloth is not cognized after the
threads have been separated from one another." It
will appear that Vidyabhusana's translation of the
sutra, viz. "Things, some say, do not possess a
reality if they are separated from our thoughts, just
as there is no reality in a web separated from its
threads, "(1) is evidently not correct. "buddhya
vivecanat'' certainly does not mean here "separated
from our thoughts",and "bhavanam yathatmyanupalabdhih"
only means "the non-cognition of the true nature of
things". The example of threads and cloth clearly
shows that what is meant to be asserted in the sutra
is that the true nature of the whole cannot be known
by analyzing it into parts, which is a distinctly
Nyaya view about the nature of the whole. Further,
the particle tu in "buddhya vivecanat tu" indicates
that the assertion in the sutra is a development of
some argument that has gone before; and this is to be
found in the preceding sutra, anavasthakaritvad, etc.
Thus it will appear that the Sutra, iv, 2, 26, along
with iv, 2, 25, instead. of representing the Buddhist
view, forms the Nyaya answer (uttara-paksa) to the
opponent's view (purva-paksa) contained in
Nyaya-sutras, iv, 2, 23 and 24, in which it is said
that an atom is not an indivisible whole but an
aggregate of infinite parts. In defence of the
doctrine of indivisibility of atoms it is said
firstly, in iv, 2, 25, that a denial of the doctrine
will lead to a regress ad infinitum, and secondly, in
case it be said that

1. Nyaya-sutras (Sacred Books of the Hindus), p. 133.

p. 39

an atom can be understood only as something made of
parts, it is asserted in iv, 2, 26, that the nature
of the whole cannot be known by analyzing it into its
parts.(l) Then the following two sutras, iv, 2, 27,
and iv, 2, 28, again form the purva-paksa. In the
first of these vyahatatvad ahetuh, it is said that
what has been asserted about the nature of the whole
is no ground, because it is vitiated by
contradiction; the meaning being that it is
contradictory to say that the whole cannot be known
by the cognition of its parts; and in the second of
these tadasrayatvad aprthag-grahanam, it is further
said that the whole is not known apart from its
parts, for its existence depends upon them. Then the
next sutra, pramanatas carthapratipatteh, represents
the uttara-paksa, and asserts that an object is
proved to exist, or is known by means of a pramana,
that is to say, an object as a whole is known by
means of the various pramanas; and this leads to a
discussion in the following sutras on the validity
and limitations of the pramanas.. It will appear thus
that the whole section contains a discussion on the
nature of the whole in its relation to the parts, and
that Sutra, iv, 2, 26 simply emphasizes the Nyaya
view that the true nature of the whole is known
independently of its parts, and not by an analysis of
its parts, or rather by analyzing it away into its
parts.

The explanation of such forced interpretations of
the Nyaya-sutras as have been discussed above is to
be found in the fact that the commentators were too
anxious to make use of anything that they could get
hold of in the language of the sutras in order to
refute the Buddhist doctrines, which were ever
pressing upon them, to pause and consider how far
they were justified in doing so.

1. Compare the arguments contained in Sutras, iv, 2,7,
to iv, 2, 15, especially the opponent's view in iv,
2, 14, where it is said that the perception of
things would be possible, just like the perception
of a mass of heir by a person of dim vision.